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Abstract 
The concept “love” can refer to different types of relationships. We use it 
when talking about our family, friends, romantic partners, pets, god(s), pieces of 
art, ideas, etc. and refer to love as if it happens to us, like a feeling, or as an action 
or behavior that we conduct, like an emotion or special deed, or even as a type of 
relationship that is had between two things. No matter what manifestation that love 
takes on or how it is described, the phenomenon that occurs is always the same. 
Of course we express love in different ways with different objects, like romantically 
with romantic partners and familially with family members, but the process for 
giving our husbands and wives, mothers and fathers, pets and everything else a 
special importance is the phenomenon of love 
My aim in this thesis is to explain the phenomenon of love. I will argue that 
love is a way of responding to an object through a process of appraising it for its 
subjective, intrinsic value and then bestowing the experience of that appraisal 
back onto the object as an extrinsic quality whereby the object becomes valuable 
and irreplaceably important. This way of looking at the phenomenon of love, 
through a value theory, is taken up as a compromise of the two popular value 
theories, The Appraisal View and The Bestowal View. Irving Singer makes 
arguments for uniting these actions of appraising and bestowing value into a 
theory of love however leaves much unexplained and thus comes under fire from 
his critics. My take on love will aim at explaining how a value theory that is a 
compromise between Appraisal and Bestowal can avoid the problems that are 
suggested by Singer’s critics and describe how love occurs. 
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Introduction 
The word “love” refers to a phenomenon that is very difficult to explain. Its 
difficulty lies in that love is manifested in different ways. Everyone experiences 
love differently and even the way we think of love differs among individuals. We 
believe it to be a way of thinking, a feeling, an emotion, a behavior, or a type of 
relationship. We experience it for different things in varying ways such as 
romantically for our partners, familially for our parents and children, neighborly for 
our fellow humans, etc. We even experience love for things like god(s), ideas, 
works of art, and other inanimate objects. As a word, we use “love” as a verb and 
a noun as well as an adjective, and experience the phenomenon in a multitude of 
degrees, loving some things more or less than others. Despite the versatility that is 
experienced with regard to love, there are common features that we will see link all 
of these differences together into a single phenomenon, love. My aim here will be 
to characterize the nature of love while also providing a conceptual, hence 
explanatory analysis of it. If we come to find that love truly is experienced in 
multiple ways as I have expressed above, then a theory of love must account for 
those differences as well as whether or not other popular beliefs about love 
accurately represent some aspect of the phenomenon. 
I shall argue that the question: “What is love?” has a definitive answer that 
can explain all of these different experiences associated with it. In order to do this, 
I will be drawing on different philosophical methods such as traditional analytic 
analysis as well as a type of phenomenological reduction in order to uncover 
features of love that are necessary for building a theory around. The reason for 
basing my argument partly on the phenomenological reduction of love is because 
the subjective nature of the phenomenon lends itself to a wide variety of 
experiences and interpretations. As previously mentioned, some take love to be a 
type of emotion, for others it is a feeling, some people experience love more 
strongly for things like animals or god(s), while others experience it for people. 
Some people experience stronger correspondence than others to bodily changes 
such as sweaty palms when confronted by an object of romantic affection, or a 
guttural feeling of losing a loved one. Since love is experienced in different ways, 
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there is no standard behavior for a person in love or a verifiable way to know 
whether someone is in love or not. In order to therefore understand love, we will 
need to break love down into fundamental features that are necessary for all 
phenomenal experiences of love. By understanding fundamental features of love, I 
will have criteria on which to judge other theories of love, as well as, be able to put 
forth my own argument for the nature of love, concluding that love is the 
experience of creating a relationship in which the object is given a special 
significance. 
To make this claim about love, I will be adopting a value theory of love, 
whereby the object of love (the beloved) becomes valuable in a special way to the 
subject of love (the lover), thus constituting love. Every instance of love involves 
this phenomenon of giving a special significance to the object. Love requires a 
value based theory to explain it, which I intend to defend and will promote in the 
third chapter as a combination of the two popular existing value theories, the 
appraisal theory of love and the bestowal theory of love, which will be explained in 
the second chapter. I intend to also examine other theories of love to show where 
they go wrong in explaining love, and also, how they all require the same process 
of giving an object a special significance. These theories will give us insights into 
potential problems a theory of love must overcome and show that even historic 
perspectives of love follow the same systematic process that I will describe is 
necessary for love to occur.  
Moreover, love is a process in which the lover relates in a special way to 
the object of his/her love. At this point I do not want to make any claims about the 
workings of how the lover relates in this special way, only that love involves this 
general process of responding. It will not be until the third chapter that I begin to 
forge the inner workings and details associated with how love occurs, and is 
sustained. Because however love requires a response by the subject, we can say 
that love is a type of relationship, in that love can be manifested as a specific 
thing, just as we can have happy relationships or aggressive relationships, so can 
we have a loving relationship; and as a relationship, love depends on the response 
of the subject towards a given stimulus, the orientation between a subject and its 
object. To be in a love relationship, just like with any type of relationship, we must 
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respond in certain ways, towards our object of love for it to be classified as that 
specific type of relationship. 
The way we act (our behavior, how we think, what we feel, the things we 
do) determine what type of relationship exists if any at all. These actions are 
conditioned by the world around us and our thoughts we have of our surroundings, 
which include other people, animals, things, and even ideas. These factors go into 
creating relationships and we will look at those factors as they appear in love-
relationships (another point that will be discussed later). When I do mention it later 
though, we will see that relationships demand interaction with more than just the 
object of love but with our past as well. 
Love is largely a product of our past. Our behavior is conditioned by our 
experiences in the world, our beliefs, emotions, feelings, and evaluations. What I 
learn about the world allows me to make decisions based on that information and 
disposes me to be a person that exhibits a certain behavior (as well as a person 
with a specific genetic makeup). The information I process therefore aids in the 
creation of my personality and behavioral tendencies. For example, from a young 
age, I have come to believe that seeing something die is sad and when I see that, 
my stomach feels empty, all because death, to me, is a troubling phenomenon. I 
am not sure even to this day how to reconcile death as a natural part of life. Given 
an instance of death, I behave in a certain way because it coincides with my 
thoughts and feelings about what happens when something dies. Loving 
something is no different. Love occurs in a similar way, just like almost every other 
type of behavior, in that our past influences our future. The kind of person I am 
affects the choices that I make. My beliefs and experiences from when I was 
young provide me with dispositions for behaving a certain way in the future. My 
behavior is causally determined by my past even though I continually make 
choices about my future, much like a compatibilist conception of how free will 
relates to causal determinations. 
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A compatibilist may suggest that our will is free, making us responsible for 
our actions, however, we are determined in regards to the choices that we make.1 
So while a woman may be disposed to find a certain type of man attractive (based 
on her beliefs and past experiences of what it means to be attractive), her 
behavior of acting on that attraction is an act she can freely make. The same 
applies to love. A complete passivity in the matter of love might suggest that we 
have no choice as to who or what we love, as if we are shot by Cupid’s arrow and 
therefore must fall in romantic love with a random partner/object (the idea that love 
is determined). The idea of Cupid however, seems to better represent how falling 
in love feels. We may often feel as though we are completely passive when 
dealing in love, but we actually can take some control and freedom over the 
matter. We are not completely passive in our responses and behaviors therefore 
we are not passive in love. 
When we reflect on our loving relationships we may think that the 
phenomenon of love has occurred suddenly and we are not in control, and even 
the notion of falling in love, gives the impression of being out of control and 
suggests our passivity in the matter; however I argue this is not the case. Our 
reluctance to thinking we play an active role in love is due to the fact that many of 
the motives of love happens unconsciously. Our subconscious builds up to love 
rather than love happening all at once in a surprising manner. The idea of 
unconscious behavior plays a role in love and when I refer to the subconscious or 
unconscious, I mean it to be taken as the phenomenon in which a part of 
consciousness is not present in our current awareness – meaning we are unaware 
of a set of thoughts, beliefs, behaviors, desires, etc.2 Our capacity to love begins 
when we are young and learning how to relate to the world. Our beliefs about the 
world, which we will later see play a major part in love and the active role we can 
take, are altered constantly, refined, lost, gained, changed and experienced, and 
those beliefs partly determine our way of relating, just as with all other types of 
                                                          
1. Michael McKenna, "Compatibilism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), accessed May 1, 2014, 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/compatibilism/>. 
2. Henri F. Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and 
Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry (Basic Books, 2008).  
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relationships. We learn to act in different ways due to different objects from the 
time we are born. We begin to learn and desire things and form beliefs that direct 
the ways in which we relate and behave towards objects. Our beliefs are molded 
from birth by our experiences which lead us to behave in certain ways. We are 
creatures that assess the world based on reasoning, feeling, believing, etc., and 
our nature is one in which we react to objects in the world, such as people, 
animals, music, food and so on. 
With love being a certain way in which we respond to an object, we are 
simply responding in a special way, just like I respond to the idea of death or how 
one might respond to being confronted by a polar bear, with fear. The response for 
love has its own features that make it different from other types of responses. 
While love in each of its forms expresses general features such that it is a positive 
response, and is an evocation of feelings, emotions, and beliefs, what separates 
love from other similar phenomena is the fact that love requires a specific process 
in order to give an importance and irreplaceability to the object of love; thereby 
making the object valuable extrinsically (valuable because the lover gives it the 
quality of being important and irreplaceable rather than it being important because 
of its intrinsic qualities). So whether we speak of familial love, erotic love, 
neighborly love…, we use the same word, “love,” not metaphorically, but because 
it is applicable for describing the essential process we go through when presented 
with a stimulus – the object of love. 
The reason I say a stimulus and not a particular kind of stimulus is because 
along with my argument about the nature of love, I will show that anything can be 
the object of love. My claim about the possible objects of love is this: there are no 
restrictions on what kind of thing can be loved. As long as a subject can give an 
object this special value theory importance, that I will present, then that object can 
be the object of love. Similarly, the subject or person that loves can be anyone or 
anything that can function in a way that creates an importance and irreplaceability 
based on an object’s given, extrinsic value. 
If my theory is correct, then an effect will be that we have the ability to alter 
our relationships – were we to become more aware of how love and relationships 
work and what we can do to effect change. Despite love often occurring on an 
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unconscious level, in that we find ourselves in a loving relationship, we are 
capable of exercising an ability to indirectly alter our unconscious beliefs, 
emotions, and feelings. We will therefore be able to create love and withdraw it 
and even control our likelihood of loving within a certain group of objects. For 
example, if a woman is prone to fall in love with men who possess a “bad-boy” 
persona, and her relationships always fall apart because of the men’s lack of 
caring, understanding, and desire to settle-down and get married (which is 
something she wants), she would be able to play an active role in making sure that 
her future romantic relationships exclude people who have that certain persona by 
not falling in love with them. Not that playing an active role in falling/not falling in 
love is easily altered, but since the process of loving is often done on an 
unconscious level, we can come to learn how to exercise choice in the matter 
(which will be the focus of chapter 4). 
There are plenty of instances in which we play this type of active role when 
loving someone or something. We see examples of this all the time like when we 
force ourselves to enjoy something, such as the tastes of foods and drinks like 
beer or coffee, which can be considered “acquired tastes.” Acquiring a taste for 
something is an example of our ability to actively take part in altering our 
relationships with objects; in that, our continual choice to experience something 
such as beer or coffee provides us with the opportunity for our beliefs to change, 
our emotions to develop, and for us to feel a desire or liking for an object that 
began as something perhaps seemingly unpleasant. While of course this example 
just refers to a process of disliking and liking, love is very similar, only certain 
added conditions must be met beyond its mere enjoyment or the desire of it for 
love to occur. My explanation of the active role the subject can play when it comes 
to love will take place in the fourth chapter. Given the process that generates love, 
none of the necessary factors such as beliefs, emotions, feelings and values are 
unchangeable variables, at least not completely. 
Each of these factors is capable of being altered and is unconsciously 
changed over time anyway, without our even realizing it. Some people are able to 
openly reflect on their beliefs, emotions, and feelings and can change them while 
others may need to practice or refine their ability to become explicitly aware of 
11 
 
them. This process of changing these factors is a common occurrence in 
psychological counseling. It seems to be the case that some people are better at 
accessing and altering their feelings, expressing emotion, and are able, and are 
not afraid, to reflect on their beliefs better and more than others. In the fourth 
chapter I will explain how psychological conditions of people affect their ability to 
love and relate to objects. 
There is already a big push in the psychological therapy field to help alter 
certain subjective phenomena (beliefs, emotions, and feelings) in individuals. 
Moreover, with the capability of altering these experiences, we may have the 
potential to control the phenomenon of love (as well as all other ways of relating to 
objects). So if I fall in love with someone I ought not be in love with, because my 
love for that person is detrimental to my health, then I can choose to withdraw or 
fall out of love, or if I am put into an arranged marriage with someone I do not love, 
I can grow to love her based on beliefs about her that I come to have.  
By more accurately understanding the phenomenon of love and accepting 
the fact that we actually have the power to develop and attach love to different 
objects, we can hopefully live more fruitful lives, be happier, more peaceful and 
understanding. We will be more equipped to dealing with heartbreak, withdrawing 
our love from harmful partners, creating love in healthy relationships, and 
developing our ability to make it through the world easier and more pleasantly, 
however we determine that is. 
My method for examining love in this work will consist of four chapters (ch. 
1 the features of love, ch. 2 the history of love, ch. 3 a unified value theory of love, 
and ch. 4 Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and love as valuing). Through these four 
chapters I will be able to look at love phenomenologically so that I can create 
premises on which my argument will be based, assess other theories for strengths 
and weaknesses that might help by understanding love from different 
perspectives, construct a theory of love, and finally to link that theory with love 
from a psychological perspective. 
The first chapter will aim at identifying the features that must be true of the 
phenomenon of love in order to accommodate different theories of love that I will 
introduce in the second chapter – as if each theory of love that will be presented is 
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a genuine experience of the phenomenon of love and therefore expresses an 
experience of the phenomenon. There are four features in particular that I will 
highlight in order to account for the historical theories that we will look at and they 
will help me to both critique the theories as well as provide as the foundation to 
which I will construct my theory around. They are: 1) Love is manifested in a 
variety of ways, such that we experience love as being something like an action 
that we perform (we love something), a description or phenomenon that happens 
to us (we feel loved) or as a thing like a type of relationship (we are in love), 2) 
Love is relationship based and therefore intentionality between the two things exist 
(a subject and an object) as either love or the conditions of love (which will be 
developed in the first chapter), 3) Love consists of the object(s) in a relationship 
becoming irreplaceably significant to the subject, and lastly, 4) love takes on 
different forms for different objects. The phenomenon exists between romantic 
partners, family members, friends, pets and owners, etc. and each of these 
relationships is different however we often experience love in each of these 
different relationships. 
These four features will be the starting point for my theory of love. They will 
enable me to draw a distinction between love and what falsely appears to be love. 
I will use them as a means of critiquing the previous theories that I will go over in 
the second chapter while also salvaging parts of their mistaken accounts of the 
nature of love. Once I am able to extract ideas from the previous theories of love, I 
will be armed to develop a theory of love that not only incorporates the features 
that we experience but can also account for why the previous theories aimed at 
explaining love in the way that they did. 
The Second chapter will introduce the current and historic theories of love 
that I will be critiquing using the features from the first chapter. Each theory will be 
a brief outline of the historical viewpoint in order to express a differing perspective 
on love than what I will be taking, and will eventually aid me in showing how 
despite being conceptually different than my proposed theory of love, each 
historical account is directed at explaining the same range of phenomena. By 
looking at other theories, we will begin to understand many of the ideas and beliefs 
that have been associated with love. Even though the belief of what love is has 
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changed throughout history, this does not mean that people were wrong about all 
of the features people believed it to have. By accepting many ideas of love from 
the different theories rather than just relying on my own experiences, I can develop 
a theory that does not disregard experiences of love that are had by others (a 
common problem with many historical theories of love – not everyone experiences 
love in the same way and many theories only account for a specific experience). 
Since all average biologically developed humans can experience love, the different 
perceptions people have should be accounted for in a theory that explains love’s 
nature; therefore, examining other philosophies of love will be at the forefront of 
this work in order to show us what the phenomenon of love must include. 
Every theory that we will look at has something to offer to my philosophic 
endeavor to create a new theory of love. Since each theory accounts for certain 
ideas about love, any theory of love must explain why the experience of love was 
perceived in a way that led to those ideas. For instance one of the theories that we 
will be looking at is love as a quest for Truth (as put forth by Plato in the 
Symposium).3 Therefore any theory of love has to accommodate the perception 
that led to that idea as it was experienced, otherwise the theory would overlook an 
experience of love; which, experiences of love are necessary for uncovering the 
nature of love. 
In addition, most of the theories of love (which I will be looking at in the 
second chapter) are focused primarily on romantic love or other specific types of 
love (such as the love of God). Theories that only describe a particular aspect of 
love, such as the nature of a specific form, like romantic love, exclude the notion 
that love can be experienced in different ways toward different objects, such as the 
love between two brothers, or the love between mother and child. Because we 
love different people in different ways as well as animals and other things, 
focusing on a specific form of love will not allow me to produce a theory for the 
nature of love but the nature of the relationship instead. For instance if I were to 
only focus on poems written in iambic pentameter, I would not be able to fully 
explain the nature of poetry. I would see lines of a poem written in ten syllables 
                                                          
3. Plato, Symposium, in Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 
translated by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1997). 
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and would have no reason to suggest that poetry can be written in any other way.   
As for love, In order for it to exist among different types of relationships it must be 
understood as happening generally between subject and object instead of within a 
specific relationship. Some of the theories that we will look at later explain love in 
the general sense of responding to an object, which is also the position that I will 
take, however, the theories either fail by eventually excluding specific types of 
relationships or explain some features of love rather than its essential properties – 
the whole phenomenon in its entirety.  
The different theories of love that we will look at, do however tell us 
something informative about love. They tell us that the experience of love happens 
in different ways. These experiences show us that the process for creating love is 
the same regardless of the object or the type of relationship to an object. Love 
may be expressed and felt in different ways, occur for different reasons, yet the 
process that occurs in us when we love is identical no matter what manifestation 
our love takes. Whether it takes the form of romantic love, familial love, or the love 
of a pet, these different forms which are all expressed and felt differently, follow 
the same process of responding to an object. Again, there are different objects to 
be loved and different forms of loving them; however, each theory relies on the 
same value theory process, regardless of what is loved - which will be described in 
the third chapter. The general concept “love” is a word that can relate each form of 
love no matter what the object is or how it is experienced. 
After examining the different perspectives on love I will be able construct 
my theory on the nature of love, what makes us experience the phenomenon the 
way that we do and what conditions enable such a phenomenon. In the third 
chapter I will thus put forth my own theory of the nature of love. By looking at the 
process of what creates the phenomenon of love we will be able to understand 
why there are different theories about what love is. In addition I will take a look 
back at the previous theories of love and explain why the experiences of love may 
have led to those theories. By developing a theory that incorporates the 
experiences they sought to explain, I will hopefully strengthen my case for the 
nature of love that intertwines multiple experiences and perceptions of love. 
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In addition to putting forth my own theory in chapter three, I will need to 
defend it against not only the problems that plague the other theories, but 
problems with explaing some of our current perceptions and ideas of love, like love 
at first sight, loving things over time, the difference between loving and liking 
something very much, etc. There are a number of perceptions and experiences we 
have in regards to love that must be acknowledged and once my theory is 
explained, I can work to do just that. 
Once a clear picture of the phenomenon of love has been painted, I can 
help to illustrate and corroborate my theory by incorporating ideas and concepts 
from the field of psychology – which will occur in chapter four. I will add support by 
explaining how current uses of empirically tested psychotherapies utilize the same 
process I associate with creating love to affecting relationships (which includes 
loving relationships) pragmatically. These different types of therapies help my 
theory in two ways. First, they show how the process of love can work by 
explaining the process in which we respond to objects; and second, they illustrate 
that people have the potential to play an active role in love. A theory that is able to 
identify conditions of love may be weakened by not coinciding with the practices of 
psychotherapies that focus on how people relate, so it will be helpful for the 
philosophical theory to be supported by psychological practices. Similarly, we can 
compare the theory of love that will be presented in the third chapter with the 
current manner in which we conduct our relationships. 
Again, the concept of “love” refers to a lot of things, such as feelings, 
emotions, relationships, etc. Its object is sometimes mothers, brothers, romantic 
partners, pets, and yet, the framework is similar across the board. The process of 
loving is always the same because the ways in which we relate have the same 
steps/process; so “Love,” when used properly, always refers to the same thing, 
and describes the same fundamental response of a subject to its object of love. 
Whether we love our mothers, wives, husbands, daughters, etc., our bodies 
function according to the same process. Despite the fact that some instances of 
love incorporate sexual attraction or a desire to nurture the love object, the lover 
nevertheless always has the same process of responding, and that method, that 
process, is what creates love. The only differences are the reasons and behaviors 
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that lead to love – the way we conduct ourselves given the form that love takes on. 
Such is the fact that I do not act romantically with my family. I act romantically with 
my romantic partner and familially with my family, etc. and do so for different 
reasons.4 It is not directed at one object specifically or used to represent only one 
type of relationship, such as a familial relationship or romantic relationships. 
Anything can be an object of love because love is a process of responding to an 
object in a special way; and any object can be the object that is responded to 
according to that process – every form of which has requirements that make it a 
specific form of love. 
“Love,” in a general sense however, explains the process that eventually 
creates an importance in the object of love, and other requirements determine only 
then what type of love is present. As an experience, love occurs as a form directed 
at a specific object. These forms include romantic love, familial love, erotic love, 
and brotherly love. While these are not the only types of love, they are perhaps the 
most common. Since I will argue that “love” refers to a process of relating to an 
object, aspects like reciprocity, sexual intimacy, a blood-line, etc. are merely the 
reasons or factors that determine which form love takes. These factors are rather 
the criteria for the value theory that I will promote in the third chapter which will 
account for love’s features. With love being a general process of relating to an 
object, any object can be loved. Some often controversial things that can be 
objects of love are things like inanimate objects, ideas, animals, and gods, 
because they can be responded to in the same way that a person can be. This, 
although just a short list, shows the various arrays of objects that can be loved. 
The relationship of love does not dictate a necessary type of object because the 
process is based on responding in a specific way. Love, thus, can be experienced 
towards anything as long as the lover relates to the object in the right way – the 
way in which the subject engages the object in the specific reactive process of 
love. 
                                                          
4. This is not to say that some people do not have a parent or child that is 
an object of romantic love. Multiple types of love can occur for the same object; 
however this is generally not the case. For the majority of people, parents are not 
the object of romantic love for their child, and children are not romantic partners of 
their parents.  
17 
 
While love can occur for any object, the process of love is a phenomenon in 
which specific conditions must be met for it to occur. Once the conditions of love 
are met, and a loving relationship occurs, further conditions allow for the type of 
love to be identified, such that make love romantic or sexual or familial, etc. While 
this process is not exactly a step by step procedure for loving, it does give an idea 
of the conditions that are required to form a type of loving relationship. This 
includes emotions, feelings, beliefs and values. When put together in a specific 
process such as the appraisal and then bestowal of value as briefly stated before 
and will be examined in length later, they give rise to the loving behavior, which 
will also be expanded on in detail later. As well as giving conditions for the process 
of love, my explanation will include other behaviors such as hating, liking and 
disliking, admiring, and others. These, as well as most other behaviors or ways of 
responding to an object, occur in a similar fashion to love – as a way of relating to 
an object. While explaining the details of love specifically, I will also address these 
similar behaviors and relationships in order to establish how love differs from 
similar phenomenon, such as liking, admiring, etc. It is necessary that love should 
be distinguished from these phenomena because as well as providing a theory of 
what love is, we should also require that a theory of love can distinguish the 
phenomenon from other phenomena that have similar overlapping features. This 
way we can identify what makes love distinct and to help guard against criticisms 
that have challenged other theories of love that may render love as being 
indistinguishable from phenomena such as respect and admiration. 
Furthermore, the distinction between liking and loving an object does not 
depend on there being a greater significance for the object that is loved than for an 
object that is not. Even though the love object is often more significant than an 
object that is liked, the reason the love object is loved is because it is responded to 
in a different way. Love objects are therefore not necessarily more significant than 
other objects; they are just significant in a different way – because they are 
responded to in the special, loving way. So just because I love my parents, does 
not mean that I cannot love a friend as well, since I may prefer one over the other. 
It may be the case that I love my friend more or less than my parents or I love my 
wife more than my parents, or my brother more than my friend, etc. My love for 
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one object does not affect my ability to love other objects. Loving something does 
not mean that I like that object the most and therefore love it and all other objects I 
like to a lesser degree. I can love many things at the same time; I can love certain 
things more than others or certain people more than others. So if a little girl goes 
into a pound to look for a dog and likes ten of the dogs, the dog that she likes most 
does not necessarily become the object of love to her. In addition, she can love 
five of the dogs but prefer one over the others. Love is not synonymous with 
“prefers most” or “likes the best.” She may not love the dog at the top of her list of 
dogs she likes, because for love to occur, the relationship between the girl and the 
dog must consist of the specific process of love. Love is not the significance over 
the rest, even though the love object has a special significance; it is the process by 
which the subject attributes an extrinsic quality of being irreplaceably valuable to 
an object. Furthermore I can love as many things as I can create this special type 
of relationship with. This notion again will be explained in much more detail in 
chapter three, as it is the main claim about love that I will try to prove. 
To recap, the method for this work is four fold: 1) explore features of love 
that are necessary to construct a theory of love, 2) examine multiple theories of 
love in order to identify love’s features so as to devise a theory for the conditions 
that lead to love, 3) form a theory of love and defend it against any prominent 
objections, and 4) compare the philosophical theory of love with the social science 
of psychology in order to corroborate the theory while explaining the validity of the 
theory with examples in which we put the theory of love to practice. 
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Chapter 1 
Features of Love 
Introduction 
To understand the nature of love we must look at it phenomenologically. 
Love is not something that can be sensed directly like a physical object in the 
world. To understand love we must understand relationships and behavior 
because this is the realm (social behavior) in which love begins to exist. Love is 
not an inanimate object that can be studied through a microscope, but a 
phenomenon that occurs when people relate to one another in a certain way. 
Through relationships, people behave in a certain way which gives rise to 
conditions for love to exist. In order to understand love and its conditions we must 
start by establishing a set of features that are phenomenologically relevant to 
every experience of love. Since our love for objects can be phenomenologically 
experienced so differently among people, we cannot settle with a theory of love 
that explains the nature of it as something uncommon to token subjects that 
nevertheless do experience love. Given that there is no objective external 
standpoint from which to judge if someone experiences love, then there is no 
alternative to taking someone’s sincere avowal of having the experience  
This chapter will focus on four phenomenological features of love that must 
be recognized by any theory of love. It will be the foundation for my argument in 
later chapters and will serve to provide me with premises that I can use to evaluate 
prior theories of love. By phenomenologically reducing love to these four essential 
features that are unique to the experience of love, I will be able to create a theory 
of my own that accounts for the variety of ways that love is experienced, and 
thereby producing an accurate account of the phenomenon of love. Reducing a 
phenomenon to its essential features is a useful way of recognizing what a 
phenomenon consists of and what must be acknowledged of a phenomenon for it 
to be understood.5  
The features that I will be focusing on to aid in my examination into the 
nature of love are constant and unchanging, unlike many other features of love 
                                                          
5. Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations: Volume 1, trans. J.N. Findlay 
(New York: Routledge, 2001).   
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that only help to confuse us by being present in our experiences of the 
phenomenon. For instance, specific emotions and feelings we have for objects. 
When we experience love, we are undoubtedly struck my many emotions and 
feelings. Everyone’s experience of love is different however. Emotions vary from 
person to person, as well as feelings, bodily changes, and desires that we have for 
our love-object. Some people get very excited when they see their love-object, and 
other do not. To therefore suggest that love can be explained in terms of certain 
emotions, feelings, desires, etc. is problematic. We must begin to understand love 
through what does not change, what is constant, and experienced objectively. 
There are four main features of love that require investigation that will help 
me to construct a theory that explains the phenomenon of love. The first feature 
that we will look at is that our experience of love is manifested in different ways. A 
theory of love should therefore be consistent with the different ways we can 
experience love, while still referring to the same phenomenon. The next feature is 
that love is intentional. Love is relationship based and therefore requires a subject 
and an object. The third feature of love that we will look at is the significance of the 
beloved for the lover. We often recognize love when we reflect on the specialness 
and importance of the object of our love. Lastly is the feature that love is a first-
person perspective phenomenon, in that a person who experiences love is the 
only one that can know for sure whether what he/she is experiencing is really love 
and not some other type of response. Love is not something that can be tested for 
or witnessed by an outside party because as a response to an object, love is 
based on the subject’s perception of that object, and to know whether a person 
loves an object is to know what a person perceives. We may be able to suggest 
that someone is in love but it is only a guess based on the person’s perceived 
behavior (which we will see later in this work is not a factor in determining whether 
love exists, only what manifestation love takes). 
These four features of love will allow us to consider what love is, and what it 
is not. I will use them to critique past theories of love and then to develop a 
stronger more comprehensive theory that captures the ideas of previous theories, 
but that better explains the phenomenon of love. Some of the features are 
explained in much lengthier sections than others because of related elements that 
21 
 
need addressing; however, each feature is just as important to our understanding 
of love and all are intertwined with one another.  
 
1.1 Love is Manifested in Different Ways 
The first feature of love that we experience that is important to consider, is 
that love is manifested in different ways. To explain this we must focus on the 
language that we use when we speak of love. When confronted with the 
phenomenon of love we tend to speak of it as if it is a relationship, “That couple 
looks like they are in love,” as if it is an action, “My darling, I love you so much,” 
and even refer to it as a description, “I feel so loved when he buys me flowers.” 
Each of these phrases considers love to be manifested in a certain way. In the first 
phrase, love is a thing, a relationship in particular. The second phrase treats love 
not as a thing, but as an action performed by a subject towards an object. The 
third phrase considers love as a description, like a feeling such as happiness, fear, 
anger, etc. – something that describes our attitudinal state in the world. In the 
scenarios where each of these phrases are uttered (or thought), love is taken to be 
something different from the other two scenarios. So which scenario accurately 
depicts what love is? 
The answer is: all of them. A theory of love should to be able to account for 
each manifestation since we have different experiences of love. If however it were 
one scenario and not the others, we would have to explain what makes that 
specific manifestation of love the correct one, and there is not enough evidence for 
there being only one because our phenomenological account of love extends to 
each manifestation. For example, we might believe that love is a thing, like a 
relationship. The evidence to support the idea that love is a type of relationship 
occurs when two people interact in a specific way, therefore creating a loving 
relationship (a thing). While this may sound right to some, and experiences of ours 
can be supported by this claim, there is also evidence (which is produced by our 
experiences of love) that suggests that love is an action, like an emotion. For 
instance when we utter the phrase, “I love her or him or it” we are suggesting that 
love is a kind of thing that we do – an action – and is therefore not a type of 
relationship. Both arguments, as well as arguments that treat love as a description, 
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such as a feeling,6 revolves around how we experience love; and, since we 
experience love differently and can even experience love in all three of these ways 
simultaneously, love must be thought of and explained in each way.  
  Phenomenologically it makes sense to express our thoughts of love in 
phrases that were expressed earlier as being different manifestations of love, 
because these are the experiences we have when confronted with love – we feel 
it, we express it, we recognize it. We therefore must accept that love has different 
manifestations in the way we think and experience it. Love, while having a certain 
nature, creates different situations that get us to experience it in different ways. 
Many of the experiences we have of love is the base of historical theories of love, 
like the theory that states that love is having a robust concern for another, or love 
is the union of two creatures (we will look at a these and other theories in the next 
chapter of this thesis). What I can say at this moment about love however, is that 
our use of the concept “love” suggests that love can be thought of in different 
capacities and a theory of love ought to be able to account for each (a relationship, 
an emotion, a feeling, a type of behavior, etc.). 
 
1.2 Love is Intentional 
The second feature of love that will help us to understand its nature 
phenomenologically is that a subject must relate to an object for love to occur. 
Despite the different manifestation of love, there must always be a subject and 
object of some kind. It would seem odd to hear someone state “I love” and not say 
what or whom he/she loves. Franz Brentano, in his book, Psychology From an 
                                                          
6. Here I begin to refer to emotions and feelings as being distinct from one 
another. For the purpose of this thesis it will be unnecessary to delve too much 
into the nature of both however I will constantly be referring to both and will make 
brief explanations about the two along the way when it is necessary. While the role 
of emotions and feelings are an important aspect of this work, their importance lies 
in the fact that our feelings and emotions play a major role in our experience, not 
how emotions and feelings are related to one another. That being said, the 
position that I will take towards emotions and feelings is that of emotions as 
cognitive expressions and feelings as internal sensations. Again these Ideas will 
be explained later however will not sway my argument in any one direction.  
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Empirical Standpoint,7 introduces the concept of intentionality whereby mental 
phenomena has a reference to a content. So when we say “I love,” (using the 
manifestation of love as a verb) I (the subject) must be referring to some content 
(such as the object of my love); therefore the phrase “I love” must include an 
object to make the phrase complete.  
My purpose for this discussion is not to debate the nature of intentionality 
but to draw on a principle regarding intentionality that I argue is a necessary 
feature of love, which is that love requires a subject/object relation; and, explaing 
how the subject relates to an object will help me uncover the nature of what love 
essentially is. The way we experience the phenomenon of love depends on love 
being about something – a subject, relating to an object. So if I love, then I must 
love something. If I feel loved, I feel loved because of something. If love is a 
relationship, love is a relationship because a subject has related to an object in a 
specific way.  
John Searle however has stated that some mental states are not 
intentional,8 and if love is one of those non-intentional mental states, then it does 
not require a subject/object relation. For instance, if we take love as a description 
of the state we are in for example, “I am loved,” what I am saying is that I feel a 
certain way and that feeling has no object. It is merely a description of the state I 
am in. The love is not about anything. For John Searle, intentional states have to 
be about something and any undirected mental states such as anxiety, 
depression, and possibly even love could be classified as, “not being about 
something.” Searle states, “only some, not all, mental states and events have 
intentionality. Beliefs, fears, hopes, and desires are intentional; but there are forms 
of nervousness, elation, and undirected anxiety that are not intentional…my beliefs 
and desires must always be about something. But my nervousness and undirected 
anxiety need not in that way be about anything.”9 To then think of love as being a 
                                                          
7. Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, paperback 
ed., ed. Oskar Kraus, International Library of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 
1995). 
8. John R. Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1. 
9. Ibid.   
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mental state such as a feeling or mood, we could suggest that love may not be 
intentional and therefore the feature of love being intentional would be inaccurate. 
William C. Fish on the other hand rebuts this claim of Searle’s by 
suggesting that mental states that Searle says are non-intentional, such as moods, 
do have intentionality. For Fish, moods may not seem to have a specific 
subject/object relationship like that of desires (such as the thought “I want to sleep” 
– I being the subject and sleep being the object of what the thought is directed 
towards; however, moods have a subject that is the broader world in general. He 
suggests, “If I am anxious, then the world appears disturbing or threatening; if I am 
irritated then the world is given to me as annoying and provocative; if I am elated 
then the world just appears to me to be a wonderful place to be.”10 By Fish’s 
account, even mental states that do not seem to have an object associated with it 
are in fact about something. To say then that “I feel loved,” is to mean that my 
feeling of being loved is due to some object, be it a person, a pet, God, etc. loving 
me. 
Despite Fish’s and Searle’s conclusions about what is intentional and what 
is not, Peter Goldie, in his explanation of intentional and non-intentional states, 
clearly explains what I take to be the decisive point about intentionality for the 
purpose of explaining love, and that is that a mental state or event can have a 
“borrowed intentionality.”11 Borrowed intentionality is the intentionality of the mental 
state that is coupled with its cause. So as Fish states, “If I am elated, then the 
world just appears to me to be a wonderful place to be.”12 I therefore feel, or am 
described as being, elated, which seems not to be directed at an object, as Searle 
suggests, however what causes me to be elated is a belief about something that is 
directed at an object, which is Fish’s point. 
Moreover, if we take for instance the manifestations we discussed earlier, 
that love is a thing, such as a relationship, or is a description of a mental state, 
such as a feeling, or is an action, such as an emotion or type of behavior, there is 
                                                          
10. William Fish, “Emotions, Moods, and Intentionality,” in Intentionality: Past 
and Future, Value Inquiry Book Series Vol. 173, ed. Gabor Forrai and George 
Kampis (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005). 
11. Peter Goldie, The Emotions: a Philosophical Exploration (publication 
place: Oxford University Press, USA, 2002), 54. 
12. William Fish, “Emotions, Moods, and Intentionality,” 26. 
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at least an element of intentionality. As a relationship, the phenomenon of love 
requires a subject to relate to an object for there to be a relationship and if love 
describes a mental state, then the cause of that mental state is indirectly about an 
object, creating a borrowed intentionality. Love as an action describes how we 
relate to an object, be it a family member or the world in general and therefore has 
intentionality. Each manifestation of love requires some level of intentionality in 
that there is always a subject/object element. 
 
1.3 Love Objects are Irreplaceably Significant 
In order to address the question: “what is it about relating to something that 
gets us to experience love?” we must continue to phenomenologically uncover 
features of love that will help us identify the conditions of love. The next feature to 
therefore introduce is one in which an object, in a relationship where love is 
present, is something that has a significance to the subject that separates it from 
all other objects. We tend to think of our parents, wives, husbands, children, 
friends, etc. as being more important to us than others in the world. More than just 
being important though, the significance of the love object is special in another 
way. Water and food is important. Sex, shelter and other necessities are 
important, but the object of a loving relationship is important in a different way. The 
object of love becomes important to the subject in an irreplaceable way because of 
the way the subject responds to it, not because of its necessity to the subject. 
I may need water to survive and therefore it is essential and important to 
me, however a glass of water is not significant to me. That glass of water can be 
replaced by other glasses of water or fruit or melon that contains water. Unlike a 
glass of water, my loved ones cannot be replaced. I cannot just trade in a loved 
one for someone else and expect life to continue on as if nothing changed. The 
feelings, emotions, and beliefs about the newcomers in my life would be different 
than the feelings, emotions, and beliefs I have for my original loved ones. This of 
course does not mean that the role a loved one plays cannot be filled by another 
person, such as the case when we remarry, get another pet, make new friends, 
etc. The irreplaceability of a loved one is due to the intricacies of the relationship 
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which provide the subject with reasons for loving (which will be explained in detail 
in the second and third chapters).   
So in the case of a loved one dying (in this case a wife or husband) and the 
widow(er) remarries or falls in love with someone else, the deceased partner 
cannot be replaced by the new partner as if he/she could have been exchanged 
for the deceased partner when the deceased partner was alive. The new partner 
may replace the role of being a husband or wife, however the new partner’s 
qualities are different from the old partner and the relationship that he/she has with 
the widow(er) is different too. Even though a study conducted by The University of 
California, San Diego suggests that people have an ability to be resilient in the 
face of bereavement, avoiding a state of depression or even subsyndromal 
depression, thus having a keen ability to “move-on,”13 does not suggest that a 
deceases loved one can be replaced by a new partner in the sense that the 
deceased partner is interchangeable with another person who can fulfil the same 
role. In his paper, Love and Death,14 Dan Moller explores people’s ability to heal 
from a loved one’s passing and the likelihood of remarrying or finding a new 
partner. While this may seem as if the first spouse/partner is replaceable, he/she is 
not. Moller explains that despite falling in love with someone else after a loved 
one’s (partner) death, the only thing to be replaced is the functional role of the 
beloved. Moller states: 
Both people and the specific contours of their relationships are unique and 
will never be wholly mimicked by successor-relationships. But the same is 
true of baseball players and Congressmen: a team will function somewhat 
differently once it loses a wily southpaw, and Congress will never be quite 
the same without Preston Brooks and his cane. The reason the operations 
of these organizations are not substantially impeded by such losses is that 
the differences that matter to organizations are determined by their overall 
goals and functioning (winning ball games and legislating effectively), and 
these are not much affected by mere idiosyncrasies.15   
So while a functioning role may be replaceable, the person and relationship with 
that person cannot be. A mother therefore cannot be replaced by someone who 
performs the job better or a child or husband replaced by someone who is 
                                                          
13. The study is S. Zisook et al., “The Many Faces of Depression Following 
Spousal Bereavement,” Journal of Affective Disorders, xlv (1997).  
14. Dan Moller, “Love and Death,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 104 (2007).  
15. Ibid., 310.  
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different. For instance, suppose I have a younger sister that dies at a young age 
and my parents go on to have another child who happens to be a girl as well. She 
would not be a replacement for my deceased sister. She would have different 
qualities, I would be different, and our relationship would not be the same. She 
would still be my sister and I would still love her and relate to her; however, she 
would not be someone that could be placed in the position of being my deceased 
sister. Her idiosyncrasies would be different. The same goes for husbands, wives, 
parents, children, etc. The people whom we love are irreplaceable. 
Importance and value are not the same as irreplaceably significant. Not 
all things that are important and valuable to us are things that are loved, for 
instance a great political or cultural hero. Because these peoples’ value lies in 
their functional role, they are replaceable and are not people who I would 
consider to love.16 My respect and admiration for people like Martin Luther King 
Jr. or The Dali Lama is not special to those people. If anyone would have stood 
up for equal rights and made such an impact on race relations as did Martin 
Luther King Jr. then I might also value him/her and believe him/her to be an 
important person in world history. Similarly, people who preach happiness and 
have overcome the difficulties faced with having to flee from a country and still 
impact the world with a message of life and happiness, like the Dali Lama has, 
then they would be important and valuable to me too. Just like a stranger who 
looks at my parents and believes that they could have been replaced by two 
equally kind-hearted people who would have raised me the same as I was. The 
stranger does not love my parents, because the qualities of my parents that are 
respected by others are purely intrinsic character traits – they raised happy, 
healthy boys. Many people raise happy and healthy children and so the people 
like my parents who could be seen as being important and valuable for raising 
two healthy, happy boys that add to the goodness of this world (hopefully that 
is how people see me and my brother) are replaceable. However, to me and 
my brother, our parents are not replaceable.   
                                                          
16. Of course these people are loved by their family and friends and many 
others however I refer here to an average person who knows of the political or 
cultural hero through his/her impact on politics or culture.   
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We experience our love objects as not being replaceable for the reasons 
why we find them important and valuable. My parents are loved by me and my 
brother because they are important and valuable to us in a different way than they 
are to strangers. This suggests that love is a way in which we respond to objects 
and therefore given our understanding of how we respond, there are no limits on 
what we can and cannot love. If a schizophrenic woman believes a stuffed animal 
is her best friend and she loves it, by responding in the same way that a person 
who is not schizophrenic responds to her friends  (in a friendship loving way), then 
surely she will love the stuffed animal because she will have responded applicably. 
People experience love differently but assuming they experience specific features, 
such as viewing their object of love as irreplaceably important and valuable, then it 
would be very difficult to deny that person is in fact in love. It seems to follow then, 
that by discovering what these different reasons for loving are, I may explain not 
only what love is, but why we often consider things that are not people or animals 
as being objects of love (which is incorporated in the fourth feature).  
 Co-workers and acquaintances do not have this irreplaceable quality, and 
neither do many other people in the world. If my relationship with someone is 
purely functional, then they can be replaced. What this tells us about the nature of 
love is that the irreplaceable nature of being a love object is bound in the 
relationship. Something about the way we relate to someone’s idiosyncrasies or 
qualities is what makes the person significantly irreplaceable. Functional roles do 
not provide this. In order to therefore find out what conditions need to be met for 
love to exist, I have to focus on what makes the object in a relationship, 
irreplaceably significant. 
 
1.4 Love has Different Forms 
Up until now, I have written about the significance of a relationship in 
regards to love; however, the experience of an object having an irreplaceable 
significance to us does not only happen in one type of relationship, but many 
types. We romantically love our husbands and wives, or we love our mothers and 
fathers and children in a type of familial love. We have loving relationships with 
friends, pets, God, etc. We relate to all of these objects differently, but are 
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nonetheless objects of love. Of course my relationship with my parents is not the 
same as my relationship with my dog or girlfriend; however, in each case where 
love is present, there is a common, unifying feature in that the object is 
irreplaceably significant because of something having to do with the way the lover 
(subject) relates with the beloved (object). The last feature we will look at is that 
love occurs in different forms (for different types of relationships). 
Love is expressed in different ways for different objects; all of the 
relationships associated with love are conducted in different ways and for different 
reasons. We use the same term, “love” because, in most cases (exceptions being 
when the term, “love” is used metaphorically which I will discuss later), we believe 
that “love” expresses our feelings, emotions, beliefs, relationships, etc. for our 
family members and romantic partners and our friends, pets, etc. in terms of the 
significance they have to us. Each type of relationship has this irreplaceable 
significance which gets us to experience love. The conduct within that relationship 
however merely determines what type of relationship it is or the form that love 
takes. 
The different forms of love therefore have different behaviors, beliefs, 
emotions, feelings, etc. that go along with them. Romantic love has a sexual, 
exciting element that generally gets us to have sweaty palms and a higher heart 
rate, while familial love has the elements of a similar bloodline and respect and 
authority, love of a pet requires, at least, a person to have a pet, etc. Of course 
these are just general elements of these types of relationships. Each relationship 
has certain elements that make it a specific type of relationship. As we will see 
later though, these types of elements are not what create love, only its form. Love 
on the other hand has to do with the object becoming significantly irreplaceable, 
and any object can be that. 
Regardless of what form love takes, love in general, is based heavily on the 
culture in which we are raised. The cultural, or social, influence of love is a major 
part of the phenomenon, which is why I will go into it in more depth later in this 
work. Culture often dictates who and what we ought to love and the culturally 
acceptable forms of love. With loving being a relational process made up of 
beliefs, feelings, and emotions, a society has the ability to instill and mold these 
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phenomena in people. As with the example I used earlier about being sad when 
confronted with death, I feel that way because I have come to believe that dying is 
a sad occurrence. This is because I believe that the loss of a living thing is a 
negative aspect of life. Perhaps if I lived in a society that celebrated death more, or 
was raised to think that way, I would be more inclined to not be sad when 
confronted with death. Societies and cultures play a large role in our behavior and 
relationships and since love is a type of relationship, our society plays a major role 
in love (as well as all other types of relationships). 
For instance in the United States and many other western countries, it is 
customary to love your family, grow up, find a partner of the opposite sex to 
romantically love, have children and love them and perhaps love pets along the 
way as well as possibly God. This example of different objects of love, and the 
forms of love between them, portrays a social norm in today’s time. We are 
influenced by our society to have certain values and are instilled with the desire to 
do so through television, books, and many other forms of subliminal pressures as 
well as through family, friends, and teachers. For instance, two hundred years ago, 
women were not looked upon, in America, as having the same rights as men. 
Treating women differently by not allowing them to vote for instance, was 
acceptable and part of the culture of that time. Fast-forward to now, and we see 
that females and males are equals, or at least more so. Because the culture has 
changed to be more equal, people’s beliefs and feelings have changed about 
women and men.17 The relationship between men and women has followed from 
how the society as a whole began understanding equality between women and 
men because it has become and is becoming even more a part of the social norm. 
What this shows is that when a society’s values are altered, the children 
being born into that society begin having that changed value. So in the case of 
American sexism, when society as a majority began accepting the equality of 
woman and men, the values of equality began to get passed down to the future 
                                                          
17. I am aware that for a culture’s perspective of a situation to change, it 
means that the beliefs of that culture must change first. The point that I would like 
to get across here though, is that the way society and culture is, affects the 
upcoming generations of people. So for this instance, culture does affect beliefs, 
values, feelings, etc., maybe not for the present generation but for the younger 
generations to come.   
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individuals as the common values of the society. So whatever the society believes, 
those beliefs get passed down to the next generation in that society. A child’s 
perspective of the world is largely affected by the culture that he or she is brought 
up in;18 thus, if a society is more accepting of homosexual relationships, then the 
message taught to children that shape their perspective on homosexuality will be 
positive. In many western countries, people are beginning to be much more 
favorable to the idea of homosexuality which is why many societies are dealing 
with the issue of same-sex marriage. Homosexual romantic love is more accepted 
now than in the past just as it seems the social belief and love for God is becoming 
less popular with the developments of a science minded culture. The beliefs of a 
culture influence further beliefs of newer generations, which is why laws in many 
countries that have prohibited same-sex marriage are being overturned. 
Assuming our societies had different values than they do now, the individual 
perspective about issues associated with those values would also be different. So 
if our culture as a whole believed homosexuality was wrong, then the message 
taught to future generations would be negative and laws would not be changing in 
favor of same-sex marriage. With more and more individuals becoming more 
accepting of homosexuality though, the future generations are being brought up 
with the perspective that same-sex marriage is just as acceptable as traditional 
marriage. Furthermore, by altering a society’s values we may change the way 
people in that society look at relationships and therefore different love objects. 
In terms of cultural values associated with love, it would seem as though 
the objects of love are often what is significant to a culture at a given time; which 
may explain why during the medieval times, God was a major object of love, or 
why the quest for truth was at the heart of love during the time of the ancient 
Greeks, and why now, family, friends, and romantic partners are the object of love. 
Because love is a way of relating, society plays a large role in the things we love 
through its influence, and by understanding a culture, we are provided insight into 
love. If it is common practice to love your family, friends, and somewhere along the 
road, find a romantic partner and love him/her, then those will most likely become 
                                                          
18. Shali Wu and Keysar Boaz, "The Effect of Culture on Perspective 
Taking," Psychological Science 18, no. 7 (2007). 
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the objects of our love. While family and friends may be the significance holders in 
one society, all humankind, or nature, or romantic partners may be in another. 
This explains why, throughout history, there have been different love 
objects. We have focused on the love of God, the love of ideas such as Truth, 
romantic partners, material possessions, and this trend of changing love objects is 
due to the social values that we push on each other and future generations. While 
social influence and a culture may determine love objects, the phenomenon of 
love always remains the same and my aim in this work is to explain what that is – 
what has stayed the same despite the fluctuating objects of our love. Regardless 
of culture, or societies’ influence, love is a process of relating to an object. This is 
what I intend to show however in doing so, I will have to address social issues, 
which will be looked at in the later stages of this work and will include the different 
ways we as a society use the word “love” and the influence society has in terms of 
our love objects. 
Saying that love has different forms for different objects, like romantic love 
with our partners or brotherly love for humanity, is not consistently agreed upon. 
Some societies for instance do not acknowledge the translation of the word “love” 
as having different forms. In Italy, the Italian translation of “love” is “amore,” which 
is only used to refer to the love between romantic partners. “Amore” would be 
inappropriately used if someone was referring to a family member or God. Since 
“love” (or “amore” in this case) is used only to refer to one type of relationship, the 
term “amore” does not consist of different forms. The difference then, between 
“amore” and “love” is that one culture uses the word very specifically (referring to 
one type of relationship), while the other uses it more generally (referring to 
multiple types of relationships). The English equivalent of “amore” is more 
accurately represented as being, “romantic love,” because the English equivalent 
is such that “romantic love” and “amore” both only refer to this type of romantic 
relationship. Furthermore, “amore’s” non-association with the forms of love 
delineates the specific type of relationship opposed to other forms such as family 
and friend relationships, and as I have expressed earlier, the elements that give 
the relationship the form that it has, is not love and do not exist as conditions for 
love. 
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When a loving relationship begins, it does so in a specific form. These 
forms of love do not denote superiority. Familial love is not a stronger type of love 
than romantic love, or if someone has a sexual lover, then they are not required to 
hold a person that he/she has as a familial love with any higher in status or rank. 
Wives and husbands are not more important love objects than parents or children, 
or more important than pets. The importance of the type of relationship is 
subjective to the lover. Popular American culture as represented in movies, 
television and books often deems a specific hierarchy of love such that family 
trumps friendship, romantic partners trump family, and children trump romantic 
partners; however, this is not the case for everyone, which I will argue in the third 
chapter. Perhaps we watch movies where the characters make a comment about 
blood being thicker than water when referring to friends and family, or see a 
television show where the husband sits in the hospital and tells the doctor to save 
the child over the mother because only one can live, and even teenagers deserting 
their families so that they can run away with their romantic partners, but these 
representations do not accurately represent the phenomenon of love in general 
but a subjective view of the hierarchy of love objects – which is different among 
individuals. There are also many other types of love that exist in addition to the few 
that have been previously mentioned like the love of objects, religious love, or 
brotherly love. The different forms of love only express the added prerequisites or 
reasons for understanding the types of relationships we have, and types of objects 
that we love. Every form however shares the foundational conditions that make the 
relationship one of love. 
So regardless of the translation, the relationship between family members, 
romantic partners, friends, etc. all have a common theme, and that theme is what 
we generally refer to in English as “love” which consists of the four features I am 
laying out here. If for instance we have different instances of love, meaning that 
we have different experiences of loving different things in different ways for 
different reasons, the concept “love” should represent the phenomenon to which it 
refers. “Love” refers to a specific phenomenon that occurs in the world and if the 
concept does not match up to the phenomenon, then the concept is problematic. If 
therefore we were to think of love only being romantic love (“amore” for instance), 
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then our concept of “love” would be misused in all other instances in which we use 
it. Perhaps then the different forms of love I have alluded to are not the same or 
we constantly misuse the term that explains these phenomena. Maybe we are 
using the term “love” correctly in the sense of romantic love but are using it 
metaphorically in other situations, such as the relationship for family members or 
pets. While this may be the case, if there is a way to link the different forms of love 
and attitudes that are expressed whereby defining the concept so that it explains 
the phenomena, then perhaps that would be a better solution than assuming the 
misrepresentation of a concept. Again, our knowledge of love is based on the 
features that are mentioned here – experiencing a relationship to an object in 
which the object is irreplaceably significant. Any mention of love being only a 
specific form of those features, such as romantic love, would require an 
explanation as to why it and not other forms count as being love, which would 
most likely be too excluding since we experience, behave, feel and emote so 
differently to similar phenomena. For instance, we often experience sadness in 
different ways. Some of us cry, some of us laugh or make jokes, we become silent 
and mask our sadness by ignoring it and dedicating ourselves to tasks. To then 
suggest that only crying exemplifies sadness is to misrepresent the phenomenon 
just as referring to love as “romantic love,” or “parental love.” 
As I will cover later, basing a phenomenon like love on the idea of specific 
behavior and actions, feelings, etc. cannot get us to uncover the nature of love 
because we often react to phenomena differently. Love must be uncovered by our 
phenomenological experience of it with our ability to extract a common theme from 
those varying experiences. Because of the varying experiences, we cannot take 
every piece of information from every experience of love as a feature of love; 
otherwise, we would have too much contradicting information to construct a theory 
of anything. For example, if a mother experiences unconditional concern for her 
child, but another mother does not, we would not be able to suggest that 
unconditional concern is a feature of the phenomenon of love; because, both 
women may experience love, but opposite features and a phenomenon ought not 
elicit contradictory features, only contradictory experiences of the phenomenon’s 
features (which will be explained further in chapter three). Instead, a theory of love 
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should refer only to the commonalities of the experiences of the phenomenon, 
which will tell us what the nature of the phenomenon is. We can then use their 
commonality to group them together and refer the concept, “love” (in this case) to 
the phenomenon.  
The concepts that we use to refer to a group of phenomena ought to 
therefore, either explain some fundamental principle within those phenomena or 
be willing to exclude some of the phenomena. For instance, when we look at 
Wittgenstein’s explanation of games and “family resemblances,”19 since words that 
we typically use to characterize games such as “competition,” “playing,” “activity,” 
etc., do not link all of the things that we consider as games, then there is either 
one of two possibilities: 1) these concepts are not adequate descriptions of what a 
game is and we should continue to examine the phenomenon of games for a 
definition that captures their nature, like how Bernard Suits defines games20 or 2) 
re-conceptualize “games” so that the concept has a specific meaning and 
definition and excludes phenomena that does not fall within that definition. The 
problem with possibility 1 is that it can sometimes be difficult to construct a 
conceptual analysis of phenomena. The problem with possibility 2 is that we ought 
to provide reasons and justification for excluding certain phenomena from the 
definition of “games.” In some instances both actions need to be done, like with 
what I am attempting to do in this thesis with “love.” By suggesting an answer to 
the problem of having concepts with no clear reference to phenomena such as 
overlapping similarities, we create a wide divide between concepts and 
phenomena. 
Surely just by looking for similarities between phenomena we can manage 
to group any phenomena in almost any concept that refers to those phenomena, 
such as the case with Wittgenstein’s, “family resemblances.”21 I could suggest that 
building a house is a game because it is an activity and games are activities or 
playing drums is a game because games are played, or my trying to publish this 
                                                          
19. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. 
Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), 32.  
20. Bernard Suits, The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia (Toronto: 
Broadview Press Ltd., 2005), 55. 
21. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 32 
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philosophical work so I can get a job is a game because I am competing against 
other philosophers and games are a type of competition. We would not consider 
writing a thesis or any of these as playing a game though because writing a thesis 
and playing a game have commonalities that might suggest they are part of the 
same “family.” Games and writing a thesis are both challenging, require a certain 
amount of thought and ability, take a certain amount of time, etc. We can compare 
two things together in any number of ways so to suggest that the forms of love are 
not grounded by some uniting feature, and are merely just “family resemblances” 
of one another is to suggest nothing about the forms of love. Like games, 
something specific makes games, games. Otherwise we can say that anything that 
exists is a game.  
Furthermore if we have different instances of a phenomenon, like love, and 
we do (family love, romantic love, love of pets, friends, ideas, etc.), then an 
explanation of those phenomena should capture their nature – what binds them 
together – or the explanation is simply unsatisfactory. In addition to explaining 
what binds the forms of love together I will also explain why instances that we 
often believe to be love (because of their resemblance to love) are not examples 
of love. 
 
Summary 
I have now revealed information that will aid in uncovering the nature of the 
phenomenon of love. By acknowledging features of love, I will be able to devise a 
theory that accounts for the multitude of experiences that occur with love. To do 
this, I will build on the grounds that love is exhibited in different forms, is 
subject/object dependent, that it can be expressed in different ways, and the 
object of love is irreplaceably significant, which will give me a way to verify 
previous theories of love. From there I will investigate prominent theories of love 
and begin my analytical work – deducing what creates our experiences of the 
phenomenon of love and what conditions must be met for a relationship to be one 
of love. In the next chapter I will argue that among the many theories of love that 
we will look at, none are able to capture all of the features that I have expressed in 
this chapter as being phenomenologically vital for a theory of love. The features 
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that have been mentioned will help us to both critique the previous theories as well 
as help explain what conditions must be met for love to occur. 
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Chapter 2 
Theories of Love 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will focus on briefly examining prior theories of the 
philosophy of love in order that I can later go on to show how they are equivalent 
phenomenologically, despite their explanatory differences. The chapter is divided 
into sections for each theory that we will look at (six theories, six sections). Each 
section will consist of an exposition of the theory as well as a critique of it. My 
intention with this investigation will be to gain a general understanding of how love 
has been perceived by different groups of people throughout history and whether 
or not the theories that come out of those groups can account for the features that 
are currently at the forefront of our experience of the phenomenon of love. The 
features that were discussed in the last chapter will serve as the point of reference 
by which to assess prior theories of love because if the prior theories that we will 
look at in this chapter are expressed according to the experiences of the theorists, 
then any new theory of love must account for the variety of different experiences of 
the different theorists. So whether we refer to the phenomenon of love as it was 
experienced thousands of years ago or love as it is experienced now, an 
exposition into its nature should acknowledge and account for any differences in 
experiencing an object that is irreplaceably significant to the subject. 
If for instance a person experiences love for a romantic partner and another 
person experiences love for a cat, an investigation into the nature of love should 
acknowledge that both a romantic partner and a cat can be objects of love. If a 
theory of love then states that either romantic partners or pets cannot be objects of 
love, then that theory would not account for a person’s experience of love; and 
people’s experience of love are the necessary basis for understanding the 
phenomenon. To then disregard an experience of an object being irreplaceably 
significant to a subject would be counterproductive for devising a theory that 
uncovers the phenomenon of love. The features of love that I identified in the 
previous chapter are therefore either common to the multiple theories of love that I 
will examine in this chapter or express the idea that the phenomenon of love can 
be experienced differently – as we will see by looking at different theories. 
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I will conclude in this chapter that none of the theories that we will be 
looking at are capable of fully explaining the phenomenon of love. Each theory 
however provides me with an account of the experiences that other theorists and 
societies have had of love so that I can compile those experiences and incorporate 
them into my own theory of love – constructing a theory of love that recognizes 
different experiences. I therefore want to incorporate other theories into my 
exposition on love because each theory of love that we will look at in this chapter 
(as well as other theories of love) expresses different aspects of the same 
phenomenon. Thus, a theory of love should acknowledge that any experience of 
love is accounted for as being a potential, genuine experience of love; otherwise 
the theory would inadequately explain the phenomenon.   
The theories of love that I will examine in this chapter have been selected 
because they aim at trying to understand the nature of love – by asking the 
question: “what is love?” Many other theories that have been put forth by 
philosophers focused on different questions about love that I am not concerned 
with in this thesis. For example, some philosophers try to understand love in terms 
of its teleological function rather than what it is. Schopenhauer suggests the 
reason we love is because of our psychological urge to procreate, for Nietzsche 
love affirms life, while Proust suggests that love is a relationship based ultimately 
on loss and fear.22 These are just a few examples of the kinds of philosophical 
questions that I do not aim to address, however these, along with other similar 
theories, do not explain what love is. They do not explore why love is a 
relationship or an urge or whatever it may be and what conditions need to be met 
for that type of urge or relationship to occur apart from other urges and 
relationships. Furthermore, these types of theories pose a different question than 
the one I am concerned with here. Regardless of why love exists, my efforts here 
are to theorize about what the phenomenon of love essentially is and what are its 
                                                          
22. Arthur Schopenhauer ,The World as Will and Representation 2, trans. 
David Carus and Richard E. Aquila, ed. Daniel Kolak (New Jersey: Pearson 
Education Inc., 2011). CF. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, ed. Bernard 
Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). CF. Marcel Proust, 
Remembrance of Things Past, trans. C.K. Scott Moncrieff (New York: Random 
House, 1934).  
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conditions of existence. In order to understand this phenomenon I will focus on 
specific philosophies of love that help us to see what are the central features of 
love based on how it is experienced – which will allow us to understand the 
phenomenon. 
This chapter is organized into six parts, each of which exposits a different 
theory of love. The purpose of examining these theories is to look at love from a 
perspective which will provide us with a means of comparing one theory to 
another. Within each exposition, I will make note of love’s features based on the 
way that the phenomenon is experienced. At the end of each section I will then 
compare the theory with the other theories that I will mention in this chapter as well 
as with our current phenomenological experiences in order to better understand 
themes which overlap among these theories. These common themes will refer to 
some of the features that we examined in the last chapter such as the object of 
love being irreplaceably significant and the need for a subject/object relationship 
as well as conditions that must be met for these features to occur. These themes 
will also help me in the next chapter construct a theory that can explain the 
different experiences of love and avoid the problems that are objected to in the 
theories examined in this chapter.   
The history of love has produced many different theories of love. 
Philosophers, novelists, and poets have examined the phenomenon of love and 
have explained it in their own particular way. In the Symposium, Plato defines 
love, through a dialogue, as a quest for ultimate Truth and Goodness. Love thus, 
for Plato, amounts to a process of attempting to obtain Truth, and for Plato, Truth 
was of major importance. Trying to acquire knowledge and obtain truths was to 
see the beauty in those truths, which was the ultimate good. Love for Plato was 
therefore the process that led to Beauty and Truth.23 Another theory of love is that, 
love is God, which was put forth by St. Augustine, in the Medieval Era as well as 
later in the nineteenth century by Kierkegaard24 and many other theologians. For 
them, God created everything and is the source of everything, therefore He is love. 
                                                          
23 Plato, Symposium. 
24 St. Augustine, City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin 
Books, 1984). Cf. Soren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, ed. and trans. Howard V. 
Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 9-10. 
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Other historical theories of love, including the prominent ones today, are defined in 
terms of companionship or a type of social connection we have with others – an 
entanglement of desires and concerns for another person.  
One such theory defines love as a union, connecting two people, while 
another defines it as having a robust concern for another. There are also value 
theories of love, in which love is either recognizing value in another or giving value 
to the other. Each of these theories tells a story about the phenomenon of love, 
why we experience the things we do when we are in love, and what the defining 
characteristics or conditions are for love to occur. More to the point, these theories 
are attempts at telling us what love is. 
None of these theories however, get it right. Is love a process of obtaining 
truth? Is it God? Is it the coming together of two people or souls? Is it an emotion, 
a feeling? Is it an attitude or action of caring? These have all been questions 
regarding the nature of love throughout history and each question has failed to 
produce and answer that can fully capture the different experiences of love. They 
do however express an experience of love and taken together with the other 
theories and the experiences they express, I will be able to devise a theory of the 
conditions underlying all love-experiences and can capture what the phenomenon 
of love is.      
The theories of love that we will look at in this chapter pinpoint certain 
experiences of love rather than an explanation of what love is. They all have 
something to offer to our understanding of love because each theory expresses an 
experience in that the object of love is something that is held to the highest regard 
in its importance. That object is held to be valuable, irreplaceable, and can be 
consuming for our desires and concerns. These theories describe certain 
instances of love rather than its nature. They describe conditions; they describe 
effects, but do not explain love itself in a way that can accommodate different 
experiences that we have come to believe are genuine experiences of love. Love, 
as a whole, under these theories is unexplained because of the fact that a theory 
of love is weakened when focused on only one kind of object or experience. 
The trouble with focusing on one specific object or experience of love is that 
experiences outside of those instances are unexplained phenomena and therefore 
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the theory fails to capture an aspect of what love includes. As a quick example, let 
us consider the idea that love is the desire that makes us want to procreate (as 
expressed by Schopenhauer).25 If this were the case, then anyone who does not 
want to procreate could not be in love. We therefore would not love our parents or 
children, pets, god(s), etc. In addition, romantic relationships where the 
participants do not want to have children would also cease to be relationships of 
love, which would be an absurd claim to make. Since in our current society there 
are situations where people love one another and do not want children or we 
express love for our family and friends, then a theory of love that only focuses on 
sexual couples of the opposite sex cannot fully capture the nature of love. To deny 
the existence of love in these relationships would be troublesome for a philosophy 
of love. One would have to defend why these scenarios do not count as love and 
thus deny experiences that we hold to be examples of love. While this example 
does not do justice to the theories that will be mentioned, and is quite simplified, 
the theories that will be examined in this chapter have the same shortcomings. 
They focus on a specific experience, usually much broader than the one I have 
provided, but then do not account for all the different experiences of love. Because 
our understanding of love comes from the experiences we have of it, it is essential 
for a theory of love to account for all the different experiences. This of course 
brings into question: “what if some people are mistaken about whether or not what 
they are experiencing is love?” How do we know we are in love? What is the 
criterion for love?  
To answer these questions, all we need to do is look at a specific feature of 
love – experiencing an object that is irreplaceably significant. All of the theories of 
love express a specialness of the beloved. As I mentioned earlier, objects that are 
loved cannot just be replaced by different objects and the relationship be expected 
to stay the same. The intricacies of the relationship change even if the functional 
role of the relationship does not. But saying this, how do we know if something is 
irreplaceably significant or not? We unfortunately do not know. It is a question that 
has a first person subjectivity to it, like that of having a headache or a belief about 
something. We may be unsure about our beliefs or whether an object is 
                                                          
25. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation 2.   
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irreplaceably significant however once we believe that an object is irreplaceably 
significant, than it is. This means that if a person believes that something is 
irreplaceably significant  to him/her, then we ought to accept it as being so, and if a 
person is unsure if something is irreplaceably significant than it may or may not be. 
Either way, we have a very subjective experience of the matter that cannot 
be verified, except by the subject that perceives the object as irreplaceably 
significant. Love is a first person experience and as such, we must acknowledge 
and take account of any experience that is had of it. So if someone believes that 
he/she is in love, in that an object has this irreplaceable significance, then we have 
to acknowledge that they are indeed experiencing love. I will come back to this 
issue later which will also include a brief discussion of infatuation; but for now, all 
that is require is that we accept that individual understandings about the 
experience of love are genuine, like the fact that we feel love, we express it, we 
love different objects and react differently to being in love, some people become 
happy, others scared, and many other things.   
The historical theories that we will soon look at do explain certain features 
and experiences, however they do not seem to be able to explain love completely 
in terms of an over-arching phenomenon that is common for all the forms of love 
and the behaviors and experiences that occur as a result. Since love has different 
forms, it cannot be explained by specific experiences or instances. “Love” refers to 
a general phenomenon that includes multiple forms and can be directed at 
different types of objects. Love is a process that allows us to experience the 
versatility of the phenomenon.  
Each of the theories that I will look at explain aspects of love26 and help to 
uncover problems that arise in theorizing about what love is. Despite not fully 
capturing ‘what love is,’ each of the theories show us a way of experiencing love, 
an effect of love, what causes love. Love is not solely an emotion or a feeling. It is 
not just a quest for truth or just having robust concern for another person. Love 
                                                          
26. The section on God is used to explain a compromise between my theory 
and the existence of God and does not undermine either my theory or the Judeo-
Christian doctrine. Whether we believe God to exist or not, neither confirm nor 
deny the experiences of love. Love for God is either taken as the love of an actual 
being, or an idea depending on one’s beliefs; plus if God does not exist, His love 
for humankind is irrelevant.      
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may often include these things but they are not intrinsic to its nature. Love is a 
process of relating, a relationship between subject and object. It is a combination 
of some of the things these theories identify, particularly the value theories. The 
value theories provide the greatest influence for my theory, so as well as 
explaining them later in this chapter, I will also be revisiting them in the third 
chapter where I will rigorously describe the processes of the value theories 
(Appraisal and Bestowal), which I will argue must be incorporated as fundamental 
conditions for an adequate theory of love. 
The theories of love that I will be looking at include examples of different 
types of objects that can be loved and the types of experiences love typically 
causes. We may think that love as a quest for ultimate Truth or that love is God is 
a strange idea, but these ideas are examples of love. The quest for Truth can be 
an object of love, and God may in fact be the source of love. The problem with 
these theories is that they do not explain our experience of love. They do not 
capture the phenomenon. God may in fact be love or more accurately the source 
of love, but that does not explain how I relate to my parents or romantic partners – 
why they are the people I love rather than others. Similarly, people may love the 
idea of truth and ultimate knowledge, but they do not seek Truth by loving their 
dogs or pets. They love their pets because they relate to them in a special way 
that makes their pets irreplaceably significant to them.  
The expositions of the theories that follow provide an understanding of how 
love has been viewed over time and examples of love’s features, namely that it is 
a process between subject and object, it can be directed at different objects, it 
creates a sense of importance of an object, and many other things that we will look 
at in more detail later. We would be mistaken to think that previous theories of love 
have had nothing to contribute to this understanding of love and its features. If the 
Ancient Greeks believed that love was a quest for the ultimate Truth, then perhaps 
an explanation of love ought to explain why that was the case. If people today 
believe that love consists in recognizing specific qualities in another person that 
makes a relationship with them desirable, then an explanation of love will need to 
incorporate that. A theory of love needs to explain the different experiences we 
have when in love. Therefore, it needs to agree with our present understanding of 
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the features of love, such that believing an object is irreplaceably significance can 
affect our bodies and the way we think and feel, just as it ought to be able to 
incorporate any other theories of love. With love being an experience that we 
have, it is no doubt subjective, meaning that we perceive it differently from one 
another and any theory of love should account for the different experiences that 
occur, the different objects that can be loved, and so on. That being said, we must 
try to reconcile the theory of love with previous theories of love in order to 
acknowledge that each theory sought to explain a genuine experience of love.   
In the third chapter of this thesis, I will revisit all the theories of love that 
feature in this chapter in order to explain how a comprehensive theory of love is 
able to incorporate them under a general understanding of love. Despite the 
varying claims about love that are made in the numerous theories, the nature of 
love is always the same. Each culture or individual may experience the 
phenomenon differently from others, yet what gets us to respond, what gets us to 
experience the phenomenon of love is constant. For love to occur, we must 
respond to an object in a specific way that follows the conditions for what it takes 
for the phenomenon of love to occur. The historical and current theories of love 
that will be the focus of this chapter are no exception. Each theory exhibits the 
specific response to an object that creates love; thus, all follow the same 
conditions of love. After examining each of these theories of love, I will show how 
each falls short of capturing the nature of love. Later, in the following chapter, once 
I have expounded my theory of love, I will revisit each of the theories that I cover 
here so as to contextualize them according to my theory of love, to show how my 
theory can incorporate the different theories that have come before it. 
 
2.1 Love as the Quest for Truth 
Around 400 BCE, Plato wrote about love, describing it as the quest for 
Truth. Of his works that discuss love in detail, the Symposium is perhaps the most 
famous. In the Symposium, Plato explains his theory of love through different 
characters’ stories of what they believe love to be. The different stories the 
characters tell, act as a functional process of love. Each story explains a piece of 
the process which begins with physical beauty and ends in Truth. The last of the 
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characters to speak on love is Socrates, who gives a complete analysis of the 
process in his story. Socrates’ story of what love is comes by way of a 
conversation he had with Diotima, a wisdom-filled woman. Diotima tells Socrates 
that love is the desiring of the good and that which is good is beautiful; therefore, 
love is to be understood as the desiring of beauty. Not only does one desire the 
good, or beauty, but one should aim at attaining it forever. Diotima states, “In a 
word, then, love is wanting to possess the good forever . . . . This, then, is the 
object of love. [And Lovers pursue it by] giving birth in beauty, whether in body or 
soul.”27 She goes on to conclude that giving birth is the only act by which humans 
can become immortal and that immortality is what is most beautiful in the world. 
Through the process of reproduction, our desire for immortality is recognized, thus 
constituting beauty, and therefore the object of love. By creating offspring, the 
parent is replaced by the child, preserving life. Once again, Diotima explains the 
process of immortality to Socrates, this time in terms of knowledge: 
And what is still far stranger than that is that not only does one branch of 
knowledge come to be in us while another passes away and that we are 
never the same in respect of our knowledge, but that each single piece of 
knowledge has the same fate. For what we call studying exists because 
knowledge is leaving us, because forgetting is the departure of knowledge, 
while studying puts back a fresh memory in place of what went away, 
thereby preserving a piece of knowledge, so that it seems to be the same. 
And in that way everything mortal is preserved, not, like the divine, by 
always being the same in every way, but because what is departing and 
aging leaves behind something new, something such as it had been. By the 
device . . . what is mortal shares in immortality, whether it is a body or 
anything else, while the immortal has another way. So don’t be surprised if 
everything naturally values its own offspring, because it is for the sake of 
immortality that everything shows this zeal, which is love.28 
Through Diotima’s analogy of the immortality of knowledge, she describes the 
beauty of reproduction. New pieces of knowledge replace those forgotten like 
children who replace elders who pass. Life becomes everlasting through the 
reproduction of life, and knowledge becomes everlasting by generations 
continually learning new things.  
In the Symposium, Plato uses man-boy love and the passing of ideas and 
knowledge as the theme of immortality. Man-boy relationships would produce high 
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levels of engaged thinking and conversation that often led to great things such as 
poetry, philosophy, science, theater, etc. With these great accomplishments, 
knowledge would become immortal in the rebirth of the boy’s ideas, which would 
then be transferred to the next generation and so on, creating an immortal chain of 
rebirth through knowledge.29 Diotima discusses how this process of immortality 
works with the soul. She states that this form of rebirth begins with a man’s finding 
beauty (goodness), physically, in an adolescent. She goes on to make the final 
point with regards to love as this: 
After this he must think that the beauty of people’s souls is more valuable 
than the beauty of their bodies, so that if someone is decent in his soul, 
even though he is scarcely blooming in his body, our lover must be content 
to love and care for him and to seek to give birth to such ideas as will make 
young men better. The result is that our lover will be forced to gaze at the 
beauty of activities and laws and to see that all this is akin to itself, with the 
result that he will think that the beauty of bodies is a thing of no importance. 
After customs he must move on to various kinds of knowledge. The result is 
that he will see the beauty of knowledge and be looking mainly not at 
beauty in a single example—as a servant would who favor the beauty of a 
little boy or a man or a single custom (being a slave, of course, he’s low and 
small-minded)—but the lover is turned to many gloriously beautiful ideas 
and theories in unstinting love of wisdom, until, having grown and been 
strengthened there, he catches sight of such knowledge, and it is the 
knowledge of such beauty.30 
Moreover, Diotima concludes that love is the desire for knowledge or Truth. Truth 
is therefore the source of unqualified beauty, and is the ultimate good. Though 
Plato goes through a lengthy story of multiple discourses to explain, at the end, 
that the source of love is the desire for Truth, the beginning of the story is not 
                                                          
29. Diane Ackerman, A Natural History of Love (New York: Random House, 
1994), 21-23. Cf. Morton M. Hunt, The Natural History of Love (New York: Barnes 
& Noble, 1959), 42. It was not unusual for a teenage boy and an older man of 
society to become sexually engaged. Their relationship was considered ideal for 
the education of the boy and gratification of the elder. The boy could provide a 
level of thinking and communication that was not common among girls, and the 
elder would see the boy’s beauty in his potential and adolescent face. This 
relationship between the boy and elder was not merely one of sexual interaction. 
The elder would become a role-model to the boy, teaching him about philosophy 
and art, instructing the boy how to become a man, through lessons in politics and 
mannerisms. The boy’s acceptance and appreciation of being taken in by the elder 
would consist in sexual deeds until the time when the boy became a man. Then, if 
it were his place, he would take on a pupil just as his elder did with him. 
30. Plato, Symposium, 493. 
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wasted dialogue. In fact, all of the stories about love, told by the men at the party, 
contribute to Plato’s theory of love, being that of desiring Truth.31 Before Socrates’ 
speech, five others produce accounts of what they believe love to be. In these five 
speeches, the characters present different pieces of the process of love that Plato 
describes through Socrates and Diotima. The first speech, for instance, is told by 
Phaedrus and focuses mainly on man-boy love. He periodically refers to male 
superiority over women and states that “those who are inspired by her 
[Aphrodite’s] Love are attracted to the male: they find pleasure in what is by nature 
stronger and more intelligent.”32 He then goes on to give examples of feeling 
ashamed if the beloved (boy) were to see the lover (elder) doing something 
shameful and vice versa.33 Phaedrus’ philosophy of love is built upon by the rest of 
the party speakers. Pausanias adds to Phaedrus’ story by adding the love of the 
soul to his, more or less, physical theory of love. The speakers at the party 
continue to build upon one another’s philosophies; Eryximachus adding a theory of 
love of all things such as gods, plants, and animals; Aristophanes contributing with 
the gods’ reason for creating love; and finally Agathon’s addition of beauty and 
celebration to the gods for such a gift as love. Collectively, all of the speakers 
unknowingly touch on a piece of Socrates’ speech, which ties into the whole of 
Plato’s philosophy of love. Plato strategically uses each of the character’s stories 
to slowly build up the process, a complete philosophy of love, beginning with 
physical love and ending in Truth. 
The main problem with Plato’s theory of love is that it does not contain all of 
love’s core features that were set out in the previous chapter. Love is, to reiterate, 
a subjectively experienced phenomenon with different objects and forms to which 
the lover perceives the object of love as being irreplaceably significant. Plato’s 
theory seems to acknowledge the need for an irreplaceably significant object of 
love, which covers two of love’s core features; however, the problem arises when 
we compare Plato’s theory of love to a modern theory. Theories of love in the 21st 
                                                          
31. Irving Singer, The Nature of Love 1: Plato to Luther, 2nd ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984), 50. 
32. Plato, Symposium, 466. 
33. Jerome Neu, Plato’s Homoerotic Symposium, in The Philosophy of 
(Erotic) Love, edited by Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins (Lawrence: 
University of Kansas Press, 1991), 317. 
49 
 
century do not describe a phenomenon that exists because of a quest for Truth. 
They tend to describe love as a way of relating to an object, such as a person or a 
pet. Plato’s theory does not address the multiple, possible objects of love. For 
Plato, love is directed at this abstract idea of Truth. According to Plato’s theory, 
love does not have different forms such as romantic love or brotherly love; it 
consists only in our particular response to one specific object, namely, Truth.  
Furthermore, restricting love to only one specifying object leaves out the 
many different experiences that people have had in other cultures throughout 
history. By defining love as the search for Truth and goodness, Plato does not 
account for the experience of love we find familiar in the present day. Nowadays 
we typically think the concept of “love” refers more to a type of feeling or an 
emotion directed at another person, or thing. It is also often thought of as a type of 
relationship or connection between individuals. Whatever we experience love to 
be, it seems a bit odd to think of it in today’s times as a quest for absolute 
knowledge and goodness. Perhaps in Plato’s time the object of love was 
something different than people and pets. Maybe Plato was right when describing 
Phaedrus’ story of love (the one most like the type of love we experience now) in 
that it is only the beginning to what love actually is. By that token however, this 
type of love we experience today is not real love at all. It is merely the beginning of 
a process of obtaining love that western culture has ignored. Again though, this is 
inaccurate. This process would make those that we think we love, such as 
parents, children, romantic partners, and so on, into means rather than ends. To 
see the beauty in them would be the means to see the beauty in all of society, 
which in turn would be the means to see the beauty in God(s) and eventually Truth 
and Knowledge. This however is not how we experience love. I do not try to obtain 
a greater understanding of the world and Truth by loving my dog. I do not use my 
loved ones as means to obtaining Truth. Even if it were the case that love in 
modern society was just the path of obtaining Truth through Knowledge, Plato 
does not tell us why this would be the case or offer any proof for it. Plato suggests 
that the love we experience with a husband or child gets us to open our minds to 
the possibility of a greater understanding of knowledge, thus taking the first step in 
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the process of love; but this does not accord with how we in the 21st Century 
experience love.   
If we accept Plato’s theory of love, we would have to acknowledge a very 
definitive stance on love that most of us do not seem to hold. The love we have for 
our mothers, fathers, children, husbands, wives, etc. would not be love at all. Or 
perhaps Plato would think of these relationships as lesser forms of love, consisting 
in the process of obtaining Truth. The love shared between partners or family 
members is the stepping stone to Love – obtaining Truth and Beauty. The kind of 
love people have for one another or even the love that people have for god(s) 
would not be as complete or as pure as the love a person has for Truth. If taken as 
a lesser form of love, the relationships we form with other people would not be an 
end in itself. Instead the love that a person has for another person would be a 
means to loving Truth; and therefore, any lover that loves another person and 
believes that his/her love is an end in itself would be mistaken. This idea of loving 
in a lesser form to love in a complete form seems to not only leave out the 
experience and phenomenon of love, but it expresses a type of circular argument: 
we need love in our relationships to Love. If this were the case, then we would be 
using love in two different ways and we would need to explain the phenomena of 
both love in the lesser sense, and love in the greater sense, because it would be 
fallacious to think of both forms of love as the same and then use one to get to the 
other. A phenomenon cannot be the same as the phenomenon that it causes. 
In addition, Plato’s theory would have difficulty in accounting for how love 
might be thought to be God, as was common in the medieval times by 
philosophers like St. Augustine, St. Aquinas, and later Kierkegaard. The case 
could be made that the idea that love is God is the same as that of love being 
Truth because God could perhaps be considered to be Truth as well. However, 
Plato’s theory would still not be able to acknowledge love as we presently 
understand it, as being a type of emotion or feeling or relationship with another 
person or thing. Even if Plato was right and love consists of this process of 
obtaining Truth and the relationships we have in the world are just lesser forms of 
love, he still does not explain why we have the experience of love that we do.  
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In any case, Plato does not provide convincing reasons why it should be the 
case that the love I have for my parents, friends, and dog is really just a piece of 
my trying to obtain some ultimate understanding about the world. Plato’s theory 
does not explain why we love certain objects rather than others or why we love in 
different ways, like familially or romantically. A comprehensive theory of love has 
to address these issues. It must explain the experience of love throughout history, 
which means accounting for different experiences that have been had of love. 
There are however two important aspects of Plato’s theory that I would like 
to keep. First, the object of love for Plato is an object other than a person or 
animal. Plato seems to hold up this notion of Truth and Knowledge as the most 
important things in life. It is important to him like our husbands and wives or 
parents and children are important to us today; thus, Plato’s theory of love 
provides a feature to remember, which is that a theory of love may need to 
consider that ideas or objects apart from people and animals can be objects of 
love. In the next chapter I will argue that ideas can be just as much an object of 
love as other people can. The second aspect about Plato’s theory that I would like 
to keep is that Plato describes coming to love through a process. I will show in the 
next chapter that love requires the subject to act according to a specific process 
for it to occur. The process is very different from that suggested by Plato; however, 
as with Plato’s theory, the process serves as conditions that must be met for love 
to occur. These two aspects of love will be considered in my examination in the 
next chapter in order to show how a theory of love can encompass a variety of 
experiences, so they will be important to remember. 
 
2.2 Love as God 
God has also been a major object when speaking of love and still is to this 
day among many committed Judeo-Christians. During the Medieval Age 
especially, God was the object of love, as both the object of love and the source of 
love. Rather than Plato’s “truth is love” theory, the Judeo-Christian population 
believes that God is Love.34 According to Irving Singer, “Christianity . . . is the only 
                                                          
34. The God referred to in this section is the Judeo-Christian God. 
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faith in which God and love are the same.”35 In Christianity, all love comes from 
God. God creates the world from love, and in our acceptance of him, we 
reciprocate the love provided to us by God. Singer goes on to say: 
The Christian God . . . draws everything to himself by being loved. But also 
he is a lover; indeed all love originates with him, inasmuch as nothing could 
love unless he loved it first. Through this kind of idealization the Christians 
could see in the cosmos a meaning and a purposefulness that no one else 
had ever found. Their God takes a personal interest in whatever nature 
produces. He himself contains the highest Platonic form, the very essence 
of goodness or beauty. At the same time, he is infinitely powerful, 
authoritative, wise. He is a great benefactor who always arranges for the 
best. And, finally, none of the love he generates is ever wasted; eventually 
it all comes back to him. However circuitously, God always loves himself. In 
being love, he constantly descends into his creatures; yet they too have 
ultimately no object but the Godhead. He is therefore both alpha and 
omega, the beginning and the end, the apotheosis or eros, the perfection of 
purposive self-love.36   
Love and God become a circle in that, because of God’s love, humanity can 
love, and therefore love God, which contributes to God’s glory37 and the 
existence of life. God creates everything in the world, including love, creates 
humans in his image, and gives them the capability to love. Those that believe 
in and desire God, direct their love towards Him making Him the recipient of 
the love that He created. Before going any further though, I should clarify what 
type of love I am talking about here because there are potentially four different 
kinds of love in the Judeo-Christian religion. Each word gets its reference from 
the Greek language. 
The Greek words “eros,” “agape,” “philia,” and “nomos” are used to refer 
to four types of Christian love.38 Of these four types of love, we need to go in 
                                                          
35. Irving Singer, The Nature of Love 1,159. 
36. Ibid., 162-63.  
37. John M. Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God: An Introduction 
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1994). CF. Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An 
Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1994). The 
Protestant view of Christianity and God is the position that I have adopted for this 
thesis. Moreover, I will occasionally refer to God’s glory as being the reason for 
creation as cited in Fame’s, Apologetics to the Glory of God because God is both 
the source and object of love. What is important to us for the understanding of the 
position of God as love is the belief that God created and loves humanity and 
through that love, humans are given the ability to love God, by desiring him.  
38. Irving Singer, Nature of Love 1, 160.  
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depth into the definitions of “eros” and “agape” a little more than “nomos” and 
“philia” because the ideas of nomos and philia can be expressed through 
agape and eros. Agape and eros are the types of love that are the focus of the 
philosophy of love – eros being human love (for God) and agape, God’s love 
(for humanity). 
Before jumping into eros (the love of humanity for God), we can quickly 
mention philia and nomos, since they are not entirely irrelevant. Philia comes from 
Aristotle and is his term for perfect friendship.39 The Christian interpretation of 
philia can be referred to as the love people have for each other. This is expressed 
by the relationship that a spouse has in marriage or a person amongst friends.40 
Nomos, on the other hand, according to Singer, “is the idea of love as 
righteousness, acceptance of God’s law, humble submission to his will.”41 Nomos 
comes into play when we accept God’s power over us. While this type of love 
plays a significant role in becoming close to God, the point of human love for God 
can be similarly expressed through the discussion of eros. 
Eros’ role in the love of God by humanity provides the ability for humans to 
love. Through eros, a person can understand love. By working to discover the love 
of God, or love for God, one sets forth on a life-long journey for good, because 
loving God (submitting oneself to God and obeying God’s laws) creates goodness. 
Since God is assumed to be omnibenevolent, his love and the love of himself 
constitute life. Singer speaks of Augustine who describes love as the reasoning 
force within the world,42 meaning that since God is all-good, he loves all people 
and gives them the ability to be good (by loving God, because goodness is to love 
and follow God). If God is therefore the highest good, by loving God, people are 
                                                          
39. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by 
Jonathan Barnes, 9th ed., 2 vols., The Revised Oxford Translation, Bollingen 
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41. Irving Singer, Nature of Love 1, 160. 
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doing the most good they can. God’s initial love is thus the reason for creation and 
humanity and is what brings God glory (which again is the purpose of creation).43 
Agape differs in that it is the love that God has for humanity. By loving 
humans, God allows humans to achieve the highest good, that being to love God. 
“Agape is God suffusing all things with spontaneous, unbounded love. It may 
possess a man, but it cannot be possessed by him. In varying degrees, agape 
sustains the being of everything. Without it, nothing could have existed at all. The 
concept of agape . . . divinizes love.”44 In creating humans, God bestows value on 
them by giving them the chance to love God. Loving God is humanity’s ultimate 
good because God is the ultimate good. According to Singer: 
Agape does more than just idealize bestowal. Agape is not human love. It is 
God’s love, and for the Christian, God himself. Bestowal is just a category 
of valuation: a way of responding, an attitude that gives to objects value 
they would not have apart from the lover. To some extent, agape does the 
same. It is God’s way of responding, and apart from his response nothing 
could have value at all. But when the Christian says this, he means that 
God makes value in the same objective sense that he makes reality. Agape 
creates goodness. Values exist only in relation to God’s will, whether or not 
human beings recognize them.45 
God gives humans an importance (the ability to choose to glorify God) by placing 
value on them that would not have existed without God. People therefore have the 
option, through free will, to love God and provide glory to God.  
Under the Judeo-Christian view, God’s glory is important in love because 
essentially every action performed by people is done for the purpose of glorifying 
God; and therefore, since humans have a part in glorifying God, they can feel the 
ultimate good of God’s goodness.46 Furthermore, God creates humans to love 
Him, and through loving God, humans glorify God and play a role in God’s glory 
which He then praises humanity for loving Him and taking part in the ultimate good 
(loving and glorifying God). 
This theory of love runs into many problems. The first that comes to mind is 
the very existence of God. If God does not exist then the theory that love is God is 
surely wrong. There are more people in the world that do not believe in the Judeo-
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Christian God than there are that do, which means a major population in the world 
does not agree with the theory that love is God. While just because a minority – 
that is continuing to shrink even smaller – holds the belief that Love is God, does 
not necessarily mean that the theory is wrong. The problem lies in the fact that the 
shrinking minority of Judeo-Christian believers have no way of providing evidence 
for their belief in God, let alone the theory that God is love.  
This brings me to another problem with the idea that love is God, in that our 
experience provides no evidence for the theory. Our experience of love today, 
seems more like the idea of philia that is put forth by Aristotle. Love is not an 
object, but a way of relating to something, as we typically relate to our parents and 
husbands and wives and children and so on. In the Judeo-Christian texts we are 
never explicitly given an explanation of love. Instead we are provided with features 
and characteristics that may or may not be true. Paul, in Corinthians, writes about 
love and God as being kind, patient and enduring;47 however these features still do 
not explain how we love, why certain things receive our love and others do not, 
and what exactly the phenomenon of love is. If however these features are meant 
to be conditions of love, the problem of pinpointing specific features does not 
apply; however, all instances of love would have to exemplify these conditions. 
This however, seems to fail to incorporate our present notion of falling out 
of love. If love were enduring then it could not cease. Falling out of love however is 
a very common occurrence. Most people fall out of love numerous times in their 
life. When we are teenagers we typically have romances that do not last or we 
grow up to have marriages that die out. While it can be that teenagers do not 
actually experience love and that their relationships are more like infatuation 
because they typically start and stop so abruptly, I will make the case in the next 
chapter that this is not so. Later in this thesis I will refer back to this section in 
which I will conclude that love must not endure to be love. I will argue that 
infatuation is often wrongly attributed to teenage relationships and that infatuation 
is really just a type of obsessive desire or liking of something. Love is very 
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different; which again I will compare and contrast with infatuation in the second 
chapter. 
Furthermore, the idea of God as love seems to go against what the popular 
belief nowadays of what love is. While God may have been the creator of love, 
and have love for humanity himself, there seems to be a missing explanation of 
the feelings, and emotions that are possessed when people experience love. Love 
can be God, but how does that love relate to our experiences of what we deem 
love to be like now? Surely my love for my partner exists (perhaps through philia, 
because of God), but how can we reconcile the phenomenon of love as we 
experience it with its metaphysical origin – why/how it was created?  
The theory of God as love is very enigmatic. The theory is difficult to 
disprove because it is based on faith rather than evidence but is also difficult to 
prove because of the same reason. Again, the questions that arise for the theory 
that God is love do not necessarily pose it to be an insoluble problem. I think at 
most however, the existence of love can be explained through God, but that 
explanation will not fully capture the workings of the phenomenon. In the next 
chapter I will try to show how my theory of love does not negate the idea that God 
is love, but explains the phenomenon of love in  a way that whether or not God is 
love, the theory will account for the experience of love as expressed according to 
the Judeo-Christian faith. Without this explanation of the phenomenon, the notion 
that God is love, similarly to Plato’s definition that love is the quest for ultimate 
truth and goodness, is one in which there is little evidence to support it. They are 
both ideas based on faith alone rather than theories backed by evidence. 
Nevertheless, there are features of the theory that God is love that we can 
examine further that will help us with an understanding of love. Before addressing 
them however, I will quickly mention that the idea that God is love is a proposition 
that regardless of its truth, will only really tell us about the origin of love – where 
love comes from, rather than what it means to relate to certain objects and not 
others in a loving way. That is to say it tells us about what creates (God) but not 
what love is. The phenomenon that we experience, that we refer to as “love” 
however is something much different than the being that created it; it is the 
metaphysics of love that I am concerned with here. For the purposes of 
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understanding the phenomenon that we refer to as “love,” we need to look at 
God’s love for humans and human’s love for God (agape and eros) – meaning the 
examination of the relation that exists between subject and object.  
What we can take away from the theory that God is love is that firstly, love 
can exist in a single direction, in that love does not need to be reciprocal. I can 
love an object without the object loving me. The reason for this is due to the 
possible outcomes of relationships. If God exists as the Judeo-Christian faith 
suggests, then God loves humans, but not every human loves God. If God does 
not exist then He does not love humans, but there are people that love God (the 
idea of Him). What we can conclude is that the experience of love can be one 
directional and does not require reciprocity. The second thing that we can take 
away is that we can experience love for different objects. We would, if God is love, 
possess the ability to experience love without truly knowing the object of that love. 
God is not known to people in the same way their parents or partner is known. 
God is known through faith and belief, in a removed sense. Without scriptures 
telling us about God, we may know very little if anything at all about Him.48 What 
this means for the philosophy of love then, is that love can potentially be had for 
ideas (or ideas of people/gods/things) just as was the case with Plato and Truth. 
A suggestion could be made that the love God has for humanity is the only 
genuine form of love, and the love of people for God or between people and other 
people is a lesser or derivative kind of love. However if that were the case, then 
we would wind up with the same problem we had with Plato and the idea of lesser 
forms of love. Also if there are different kinds of love, then we would still need to 
explain what about them is different and what love (between people, as well as the 
love of God) is. Instead, we can accept that love is experienced for different types 
of objects. Whether a person claims to love God or his/her partner, we ought to 
accept his/her testimony as referring to a genuine experience of love, thus love 
can be had for different types of objects.  
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nothing of God. We may possibly have some feeling or knowledge based on our 
souls if God is the Judeo-Christian God and we actually do possess such 
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For Christianity, the significant object is God (or humankind if we are talking 
about God’s love for people) while for Plato, the significant object of love was 
Truth. In these two theories, different objects have been the object of the 
phenomenon of love. In both instances however, the objects have been specific 
rather than general, therefore the theories ignore experiences of love that have 
different objects. If God is the object of love, then I could not love my spouse, or if 
humankind is the object of love then I could not love God; and, even if these 
objects are just representatives of the multiple things that can be loved, we still do 
not have an explanation of the conditions for our responding to these objects in a 
way that makes them objects of love. 
 
2.3 Love as a Union 
The union view of love is a type of companionship love that we are more 
familiar with today. The companionship idea of love also became popular in the 
Middle Age, with the idea of courtly and romantic love. 49  While the writings that 
primarily focus on union love explain it in terms of romantic love (sexual, romantic 
partners) the idea can easily be extended to other types of relationships such as 
between parents and children, friends, siblings, etc. By applying the theory of love 
as a union to other types of relationships rather than just romantic relationships, 
we can make a stronger case for the union view being an accurate account of 
love. We still however have to note that the union view may run into problems 
when it comes to the union between humans and animals and other objects like 
art or nature, but I will discuss those objections at the end of this section. 
Meanwhile, examples I provide in this section will be heavily based on romantic 
love between men and women, yet by no means is romantic love between men 
and women the only form of love that applies to the union view. To be charitable to 
the union view, we can assume that love can occur between people of any 
combination of sex and across multiple types of relationships (i.e. family, friends, 
siblings, etc.). 
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The union theory of love became popular in the middle ages and then later 
in the Romantic Era. The idea that love is a union between people is not just a 
view that has been held by philosophers; novelists, poets, and playwrights have 
also held this view, with such notable characters as Romeo and Juliet, and 
Catherine and Heathcliff. In addition, philosophers such as Kant and more 
recently, Robert Solomon and Robert Nozick have advanced the idea that love is a 
union, a coming together of two autonomous beings in order to create a single 
couple. The independence of one person combined with the independence of 
another person creates a unity in which they become a unit, a couple. As a couple 
the individuals act as a team, and as a team each person considers what is in the 
best interest of both participants rather than just him/her.  
Under the union view, the participants form a bond, linking them together, 
creating a ‘we’ or ‘us’, a team. Whether the ‘we’ that is formed is a new entity in 
itself or the ‘we’ is merely a metaphoric connection between partners is irrelevant 
to the argument at hand.50 With the united couple, any problems that face one are 
problems that face both. Each person concerns him/herself with the concerns and 
cares of the other. Since the partners act out of concern for each other’s interests, 
they cease to be autonomous beings that act for his/her own self, and become 
part of a team that act for each other, so what happens to one, happens to both. 
Robert Nozick expresses this clearly by stating, “[y]our own well-being is tied up 
with that of someone (or something) you love.”51 
Nozick’s use of ‘well-being’ is expressed in a set of criteria that he sets out 
in the footnotes of The Examined Life. The list is as follows:  
(1) You say and believe your well-being is affected by significant changes in 
hers; (2) your well-being is affected in the same direction as hers, an 
improvement in her well-being producing an improvement in your own, a 
decrease, a decrease; (3) you not only judge yourself worse off, but feel 
some emotion appropriate to that state; (4) you are affected by the change 
in her well-being directly, merely through knowing about it, and not because 
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it symbolically represents to you something else about yourself, a childhood 
situation or whatever; (5) (and this condition is especially diagnostic) your 
mood changes: you now have different occurent feelings and changed 
dispositions to have particular other emotions; and (6) this change in mood 
is somewhat enduring. Moreover, (7) you have this general tendency or 
disposition toward a person or object, to be thus affected; you tend to be 
thus affected by changes in that person’s well-being.52 
Each of these alterations signifies the togetherness of the couple. When in love, 
changes in the beloved’s well-being, causes a change in the lover.  These points 
can be acknowledged for other forms of love as well and not just romantic love. 
For instance parents often feel this way with regards to their children, and friends 
feel this way about other friends. Given that the relationship is a loving one, 
parents will be affected by what happens to their children and friends will be 
affected by what happens to their friends. All six of the criteria seem to explain a 
very important aspect of what love is traditionally (in western culture) supposed to 
involve. Each participant reacts similarly to the other’s ‘mood’; when one is sad, 
the other is sad (as if whatever made one sad also makes the other sad). It would 
seem quite un-loving for a man to be happy when he comes home to find his wife 
sad; or, upon seeing his wife happy, because she just sold a painting she had 
been working on for a long time, becomes depressed and upset. These scenarios 
in which the lover and beloved are not intertwined become somewhat questionable 
if we are supposed to think of love as a coming together. Love is the reason why 
the points made by Nozick occur, because as a unified entity, both the man and 
woman act in harmony with one another (as one entity). The union that is created 
in this case is metaphorical; however the implications of the alignment of emotions 
and feelings make the experience seem as if both participants are connected. This 
of course does not necessarily mean that when the husband sees the wife sad 
and needing comfort, that he begins to feel sad and needing comfort identically. 
Typically upon seeing the wife sad when coming home, the husband will, although 
feeling sad, try to be strong and cheer up the wife, which will in turn, lift his mood 
as well. This typical type of behavior would represent more of a metaphorical 
approach to the union view. 
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Solomon’s perspective on love as a union is slightly different, assuming that 
the union that is created by the participants is not metaphoric, but real. Love is a 
process of identifying one’s self, with another. Through affection, the lover 
becomes identified (becomes complete, whole, defined) with his/her partner. In 
About Love, Solomon explains the union of love in terms of the self and its identity 
by stating: 
Our selves are underdetermined by the facts about us – our appearance, 
our physical and mental abilities, our past history of accomplishments – and 
they are mutually rather than individually defined, defined with and through 
others….Love is the concentration and the intensive focus of mutual 
definition on a single individual, subjecting virtually every personal aspect of 
one’s self to this process.53  
He also states that: 
 [L]ove is not a mysterious “union” of two otherwise separate and isolated 
selves but rather a special instance of the mutually defined creation of 
selves. Who and how we love ultimately determines what we are. It is, 
accordingly, primarily a theory of the self, but a shared self, a self mutually 
defined and possessed by two people.54 
Under this view of love as an actual union, the identity of each person becomes 
the identity of the relationship, as each of the partners identifies him/herself in 
terms of their union. So rather than each partner identifying him/herself as an 
individual, both identify themselves as being a unit. From this, the participants in 
the relationship would act similarly to how the metaphorical view says they would, 
such that their moods would often synchronize so that when one feels happy, the 
other does too. With the actual union however, the two participants would act as 
one by making decisions on behalf of both rather than for oneself and concerning 
themselves with each other’s well-being because as a mutually defined entity, 
each person is shaped by the relationship, so that when one person’s well-being is 
affected, the relationship and therefore the other is affected. Take for instance a 
similar scenario as above in that a man comes home to find his wife in an ecstatic 
mood. He would also become ecstatic (or exhibit some similar emotion/behavior) 
because the wife’s mood affects the way she is in the relationship, her behavior 
towards him. Each of the partners makes up the relationship so alterations in one 
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alter the relationship which brings about alteration in the other. Through this 
phenomenon of altering each other, both participants begin to develop similar 
interests, beliefs, behaviors, etc. 
Again, this union theory can also potentially be extended to non-romantic 
relationships. We could suggest that families love each other by the creation of 
their bond, the union as family members. They act in each other’s interest and are 
connected to each other through moods and dispositions to take care of one 
another. The same goes with friends and the unity of people as part of the same 
species. As humans we can love other humans because we share in the bond of a 
common humanity. So an example of love under the union view that takes the 
form of humanity love could be when natural disasters pull people together to work 
for the common good. A bond is formed in which a union type behavior is 
exhibited. While I do not intend to argue that this example of coming together is in 
fact an example of a different form of love under the union view, I believe that we 
must try to provide charitable interpretations of all theories in general. 
In addition to looking at love as a union, metaphorically or actually (in a 
behavioral sense), some popular writers have often thought of love’s union in a 
spiritual sense. The notion of ‘soul mates’ has played a very philosophically 
interesting part in literature and the philosophy of love. One instance of this is 
described in Wuthering Heights. In Emily Bronte’s famous novel, Catherine 
marries Edgar Linton despite being soul mates with Heathcliff. For the characters 
in the story, the efficacy of a union (marriage) was much more important than 
actual feelings and emotions, toward the other. Catherine therefore decides to 
marry Linton because of his wealth, status, looks and the security that he can 
provide her with. Despite their being well suited for each other, Heathcliff is the 
one that Catherine actually loves, because it is Heathcliff’s soul that she feels hers 
is united and connected with, meaning that her being/essence is one with 
Heathcliff’s. Catherine explains this form of love for Heathcliff while talking to Nelly 
about her marriage proposal with Linton. She says: “I love him [Heathcliff]: and 
that, not because he’s handsome, Nelly, but because he’s more myself than I am. 
Whatever our souls are made of, his and mine are the same; and Linton’s is as 
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different as the moonbeam from lighting, or frost from fire.”55 She goes on to say, “I 
am Heathcliff! He’s always, always in my mind: not as a pleasure, anymore than I 
am always a pleasure to myself, but as my own being.”56 Catherine suggests that 
the love for Linton, the love of him being a good man, handsome, wealthy, and 
kind, is nothing compared to the way she feels for Heathcliff. Catherine’s love for 
Heathcliff transcends the reducible characteristics of a person and prophesies a 
spiritual, emotional, physical, mystic bond that ends up being unbreakable, even in 
death. Once dead, Catherine and Heathcliff’s spirits are still heard around the 
moors, together, always united, for better or worse. 
Even though Catherine and Heathcliff cannot manage to make each other 
happy and while Catherine marries and spends her life with Linton, Heathcliff is 
the man she loves. Heathcliff is the one united with Catherine, despite the fact that 
they make each other unhappy. By never pursuing one another, for the social 
reasons of that time (whether because Heathcliff was orphaned and thought to be 
destined to a life of poverty or Catherine’s commitment of marriage with Linton), 
Catherine and Heathcliff make each other’s lives miserable as well as everyone 
around them.57 
The thought of being destined to be with another or having one soul 
possessing two bodies, or two halves of a soul searching for each other seems 
like the plot of a fantasy story. Emmanuel Kant, however, takes on the task of 
uniting the lover and beloved in a similar yet more rational way. Kant’s philosophy 
with regard to sex and possessing the other shows an example of how the union 
theory of love can be rationalized. For Kant, sex, taken by itself, is immoral due to 
treating the other (object) as a means to the subject’s ends (i.e., his/her pleasure). 
By doing this, the subject uses the object as a tool and not like an end in 
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57. This version of the union view (a more spiritual version) is different from 
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him/herself that he/she is. The object becomes the “object of appetite.”58 The 
subject does not respect the object’s autonomy and therefore acts immorally, 
casting the object into a life in which he/she is “a thing and can be treated and 
used as such by everyone.”59 Singer explains Kant’s position with regard to sex as 
an analogy of love in which he states: 
The lover and beloved must enter into a contract that allows each to treat 
each other as a means. By entering into a contract, like a marriage, the 
lover and beloved are able to relinquish their autonomy to the other, thus 
gaining the other’s permission and independence. In the act of gaining the 
other, each regains him/herself in the other. Since both the lover and 
beloved gain themselves back from one another, they never lose their 
autonomy and therefore cannot be merely used for the selfish pleasure of 
intimacy. Furthermore, both parties become one, combining their being with 
the other. They both control the fate of the other yet do so together in 
accordance with their contractual agreement.60 
This line of reasoning coincides with the union view and the sharing and/or the 
uniting of souls. Catherine’s claim that she is Heathcliff then makes sense, in the 
sense that Catherine believes she has given her being, her soul, to Heathcliff and 
feels that he has done the same to her. Even though there is no binding contract, 
Catherine and Heathcliff can be seen to exhibit what one can imagine as a slightly 
varied form of Kant’s sexual morality but applied to love (as Singer does). They 
give themselves to each other and know that the other has given him/herself in 
return. While this typically makes for a comforting feeling, both Catherine and 
Heathcliff are driven mad by the knowledge that they love one another and yet 
their characters and circumstances keep them from being together. 
Whether we take the metaphorical interpretation or the actual interpretation 
of love as a union, we run into problems. Bennet Helm suggests that an actual 
interpretation of the union view does not work because of the problem of 
autonomy.61 If I am an autonomous being with certain characteristics that excludes 
anyone else, then my connection with another person means that those 
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characteristics no longer exist and my autonomy is lost. Moreover, I am a person 
free from others; I am not my father or mother or brother of friend or partner. They 
are all independent like me. If I were to enter into a loving relationship with a 
partner however, I as a self-determining being would have to become part of an 
“us” where my autonomy becomes connected to another and is therefore lost. Is 
my autonomy lost when in a loving relationship? Is a new autonomy created, the 
“us?” Is a new autonomy created but my original autonomy and my partner’s 
autonomy are preserved so that there are three beings, me, my partner, and “us?” 
These questions make the actual interpretation of the union view difficult to work 
out. It would seem that our individuality is not lost or given up when in love so the 
union that is created must be metaphoric. Only if the union view is metaphoric 
does it escape the problem of a person keeping or losing his/her autonomy. 
The problem that occurs however when thinking of the union view as a 
metaphor for caring about the other as if he/she were part of oneself is blurring the 
line between caring for a person’s interests for his or her own sake and caring for 
a person’s interests for one’s own sake. 62 Since both the lover and beloved are 
unionized any care that is given to the beloved is also given to the lover so that it 
would seem that any action or concern is done so selfishly, and the modern day 
conception of love is that it is selfless.  
Along with these two arguments, the union view assumes that the object of 
love is restricted to humans and perhaps some animals. If the union view suggests 
that my being is connected with another being then it will limit the objects that can 
be loved. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, under the union view of 
love, the idea that we love art or god(s) will not be recognized as love. The union 
view thus excludes the feature of love that suggests that different objects can be 
the object of love. Can we therefore not love God? Was Plato’s experience of Love 
not genuine because the object was Truth? Perhaps we can limit the union view of 
love to romantic love, but then we would need an explanation of the differences 
between that and the love for our parents and children and pets. By accepting the 
union view, we would need to explain why Plato and Kierkegaard and St. 
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Augustine got love so wrong. And what about my love for a painting or a song, can 
I not genuinely love them? 
For instance my love of a painting does not create a type of union that the 
union view specifies. I do not exhibit a desire to be together with a painting like I 
would with my mother or father and surely the painting and myself would not 
become an “us” or “we.” For example, my love of the painting, Princess Diaries II 
by Fabian Perez does not require me to unite myself with it and therefore concern 
myself for its well-being, and it cannot concern itself with my well-being. I will care 
for it of course in that I do not want to see it destroyed so I can continue to look at 
it and admire it; however later we will see why concern for an object does not 
make it an object of love. Since I therefore do not create a union with the painting 
actually or metaphorically, I would, under the theory, not be able to love it, 
although I do. I experience many of the phenomena associated with love such as 
an increased heart rate, the desire to own and look at the painting and the belief 
that the painting is extremely important to me. It is not difficult to think of situations 
in which people save precious paintings or pictures, or even artifacts and other 
inanimate objects from a burning building and do so not because their monetary or 
cultural value, but because they have an attachment to the item that is a love-
attachment. Some supporters of the union theory might suggest that I do not 
actually love the painting; however, if that is the case, then many people would 
have relationships with objects or ideas that are more significant to them than their 
love relationships with people. Would it make sense for Plato to love his wife but 
place Truth on a higher pedestal? Socrates could have been said to have died for 
Truth, but would he have died for his wife?  Can I love my family but given a fire in 
our house, save a painting before I save them? A common experience of love is 
that the object of love is more significant than objects that are not loved, not the 
other way around. So if God is more significant to me than my wife, and I love my 
wife, then why does it make sense that God is more significant to me in my life 
other than that I love God? 
Later I intend to argue that loving inanimate objects is a form of love and we 
love them in a similar way that in which we love anything else. To suggest 
otherwise, a theory must state why my love for a painting or other inanimate object 
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is not really love, even when I care so dearly for it. Furthermore, the union view 
does not explain what love is but describes an aspect of love. A union may be able 
to explain an aspect about a type of relationship between romantic partners but on 
a general scale of loving in all forms, the union view does not succeed. The union 
view does not acknowledge the need to account for all the objects that I insist are 
genuine objects of love because just like the first two theories, the union view is 
focused on a specific aspect of love rather than explaining the nature of the 
phenomenon itself.  
Moreover, what is important about the union view is that love involves a 
coming together of subject and object. Something binds the lover and beloved and 
that bond is the relationship that is formed. In order for the phenomenon of love to 
occur, there must be a subject and an object that relate in some way. So while in 
the first two theories we can see that love can be had for objects other than 
people, the union view helps us to understand that the phenomenon of love is 
experienced as relating to an object, uniting them in some way. While this could 
possibly have been deduced from the previous theories of responding to Truth and 
God, the idea that will be important in the next chapter is that we feel as though we 
are connected to the objects that we love.  In the next chapter when I refer back to 
the union view I will provide an explanation of why we may experience love in this 
way, which is very different from what is promoted by those theories we have 
looked at in this section. 
 
2.4 Love as Robust Concern 
The theory of love as robust concern often resembles the union view. It 
suggests that love is the act of caring for another’s well-being and treating the 
concerns of the beloved as if they are the lover’s own. The lover shows care and 
sympathy for the beloved’s endeavors, concerning him/herself, selflessly with the 
beloved’s life. This view of love is promoted strongly by Harry Frankfurt.  
The Robust concern view, differs from the union view in terms of the ‘we’ 
that it says is established. Under the robust concern view, love does not depend 
on whether or not there is a union between the subject and object, only that the 
subject concerns him/herself with the object for the object’s sake. The subject 
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loves the object because he/she cares for the object’s well-being and acts in its 
best interest. Frankfurt characterizes love as “a disinterested concern for the 
existence of what is loved, and for what is good for it. The lover desires that his 
beloved flourish and not be harmed; and he does not desire this just for the sake 
of promoting some other goal.”63 For instance, if a child wishes well for his parent, 
hoping that his father receives a pay-raise at work, the robust concern view would 
suggest that if he loved his father, his concern for his father’s pay-raise would be 
simply that his father gets the pay-raise because it will make him happy. If 
however the child was only concerned about his father getting the raise because 
his getting the pay-raise meant that he would buy him toys, then the concern the 
child had for the father would not be the loving concern as described in this theory. 
The concern has to be disinterested and selfless.  
According to Frankfurt, there is a feature of love that supports his theory 
that love is a specialized concern for the object of love. The feature is that, when 
we love something, it means the thing we love is important to us because it gives 
our lives meaning and purpose (to concern ourselves for its well-being). I consider 
this feature of love to be why I have classified the concern one has for one’s object 
as ‘specialized.’ As Frankfurt states in his book, The Reasons of Love: 
[Love] has to do with the particular status of the value that is accorded to its 
objects. Insofar as we care about something at all, we regard it as important 
to ourselves; but we may consider it to have that importance only because 
we regard it as a means to something else. When we love something, 
however, we go further. We care about it not as merely a means, but as an 
end. It is in the nature of loving that we consider its objects to be valuable in 
themselves and to be important to us for their own sakes.64  
He then goes on to add: 
Loving something has less to do with what a person believes, or with how 
he feels, than with a configuration of the will that consists in a practical 
concern for what is good for the beloved. This volitional configuration 
shapes the dispositions and conduct of the lover with respect to what he 
loves, by guiding him in the design and ordering of his relevant purposes 
and priorities.65     
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 Frankfurt seems to suggest that in loving someone (or something) our will dictates 
a level of concern that is more than just beliefs and feelings about an object. Love 
transcends our ability to give reasons why we have the level of concern we do. 
What gets us to care for the well-being of another is that the beloved must have 
some value in him/her/itself that makes itself important to us for its own sake. 
Furthermore, the object is valuable to us, and because of its value, we show 
robust concern for it. The examination of this idea that something is valuable in 
itself is not fully expressed under the robust concern view, which makes me 
question the causes and existence of this supposedly special value. Under this 
view however, there are no set beliefs a person should have for his/her object of 
love nor are there any feelings that are typically felt towards the object other than 
that he/she cares for it in this disinterested way.  
Apart from love being this “disinterested concern for the existence of what is 
loved,”66 a feature of the love as robust concern is “that [love] is not under our 
direct and immediate voluntary control…a person may discover that he cannot 
affect whether or how much he cares about [his object] merely by his own 
decision.”67 I thus, cannot help being in love with a parent or partner in the way that 
I can calm myself down from being angry. When I get frustrated or anxious I am 
able to take deep breaths, rationalize the circumstances that have left me in this 
state, and work to relax and not be frustrated. While these tactics may not work for 
everyone, I am merely trying to show that under the robust concern view, love as a 
phenomenon cannot be controlled. Again, love or the amount of concern a person 
has for his/her object is not determined by his/her beliefs about his/her situation or 
feelings. Love cannot be given and withdrawn at will or based on fleeting feelings 
and beliefs (which often lead to infatuation, lust, obsession, and a list of similar 
states). Love is natural and is expressed most clearly in the relationship between 
parents and their children. For Frankfurt, the concern of a parent for his/her child 
“offer[s] recognizably pure instances of love.”68 
Of the features that are essential to a theory of love, the robust concern 
view fails to acknowledge the love-object as standing apart, as being more 
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significant to the subject, from other objects that are concerned for but not loved. 
For instance, I recently showed concern for a seagull that was injured and in need 
of medical attention. I took care of the seagull, protecting it by making sure it did 
not run into the road where it could be hit by a car or disturbed by people passing 
by until animal welfare could come and take the seagull to a veterinary clinic. Even 
though I showed concern for the bird and had a desire to protect it, I did not love it. 
I was merely helping an animal that was in danger. If a person I loved was in 
danger I would also have helped and showed concern for him/her too. So what 
makes the people I love any different than the seagull I helped? Under the robust 
concern view, nothing; yet, I do not love the seagull. 
An object having irreplaceable significance makes it stand out among other 
objects. The things that we love cannot just be replaced and our relationship with 
them to continue on as if nothing has changed. This is because loving 
relationships are made from the intricacies of relating to an object within a specific 
type of relationship. Under the robust concern view of love, the object fails to have 
this level of significance. I therefore can relate to things in different ways and as 
long as my concern for them is selfless (concern for its own sake), then I will 
exhibit love for them. The problem with this claim is that we often give selfless 
concern to people that we are not in love with, such as people we like, people we 
admire, respect, etc. We may have concern for these people for their endeavors or 
for their own sakes and yet do not love them. 
Conversely, we may love certain people that we do not have robust concern 
for. J. David Velleman’s paper, “Love as a Moral Emotion”69 provides multiple 
examples of cases in which a person may experience love for someone, yet fails 
to show the kind of concern for him/her that the robust concern view requires for 
love; for example when a person love’s a partner he/she has divorced. While the 
couple may love one another, they cannot continue to interact together, showing a 
lack of desire to be with or robust concern for the other for his/her own sake. 
Similarly Velleman says: 
Certainly, love for my children leads me to promote their interests almost 
daily; yet when I think of other people I love – parents, brothers, friends, 
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former teachers and students – I do not think of myself as an agent of their 
interests. I would of course do them a favor if asked, but in the absence of 
some such occasion for benefiting them, I have no continuing or recurring 
desire to do so70    
    So even in instances when we believe we have love for a person, we do not 
necessarily have robust concern for him/her.  
 The robust concern view of love also seems to run into trouble by 
suggesting that the concern for a person is selfless/for the person’s or thing’s own 
sake. By stipulating that the concern for the object of love is for its own sake, this 
theory excludes objects of love that are not living (i.e. have no self-interest or well-
being). If for instance we assume inanimate objects or ideas do not have these 
properties, then acting for them cannot be selfless and therefore we could not love 
them. It would seem erroneous to have robust concern for an idea (perhaps God 
or Truth) or something like a painting. Likewise, loved ones that have died may not 
have a self-interest past their death either. If not, the body of the loved one simply 
becomes an inanimate object and the memory of the person is merely an idea. 
Our concern therefore is something that exists for our own sake rather than for the 
sake of a body that has no subjective experience. If someone I love dies, my 
concern for him/her no longer would make sense unless my beliefs suggest that 
dead people still have a well-being. If I believed that some form of him/her was 
living, then I could treat the dead as having a self-interest. 
Even with a painting however, surely we can suggest that a painting should 
not be ruined or left out in the rain. This is an interest that we give to it, though not 
an interest of the painting. Meanwhile, there may be an interest for the painter who 
painted it, not to wreck his/her work because it will make him/her upset (among 
many other things probably), but in terms of that specific piece, there is no interest 
it has for itself because it would have to be something that has some form of a 
self-maintenance71 If we go on to suggest that perhaps the selfless concern aspect 
of the robust concern theory is simply the regular concern we have for an objects 
continued existence then we will have lessened the meaning of love to something 
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that certainly does not possess the feature of an object having significant value. 
For instance I have concern for the books in my house. I aim to keep them orderly 
and try not to damage them; however, I do not love my books. They are a 
possession of mine and as such I take care of them, but they are not an object that 
I find to be irreplaceably significant. 
The robust concern view of love, like the union view of love aids our 
understanding of love because unlike the theories of Plato and the Christians, they 
express the idea that love is a way of relating to an object. Even though the robust 
concern view has problems, the method of trying to discern the nature of love 
through conditions in which a subject relates to an object in a certain way moves 
us closer to a plausible theory of love. To understand the nature of love we must 
understand what it is about relating to an object that creates love. What conditions 
need to be met for love to occur, and why do those conditions give us the 
experience of love?  
 
2.5 Love as an Appraisal of Value  
The idea of love as a way of valuing an object consists of two separate 
theories that both use the idea of value as the foundation for the theory of love. 
First, is the appraisal view (also referred to as the erosic form of love or property-
based love as coined by Alan Soble),72 in which the subject values the object 
because of particular characteristics that the object has. If the lover desires certain 
qualities in order to be in a certain type of relationship, than whomever or whatever 
possesses that set of qualities should be an object of love. The object would 
become important because of the fact that it has valuable qualities for the subject. 
For instance, if a woman is in a sexual relationship, her partner will hopefully 
possess the qualities that she finds valuable in a person she wants to relate with 
sexually (the quality of sexuality). These qualities could be that the person is 
attractive, good at giving her pleasure, has a similar sex drive, etc. These qualities 
that she values would make her partner important, therefore becoming her object 
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for sexual intimacy. Like this example of sex, lovers love their beloved because of 
some certain set of preferred qualities that he/she possesses. 
At first glance, the appraisal theory of Love is heavily exemplified by 
examples of romantic relationships, as is the case with the robust concern theory 
of love. As with the robust concern view, the appraisal view can easily fit into a 
general theory of love, meaning that just because examples are often given of 
romantic partners, the same principles apply for other forms of love too. 
Throughout this chapter I will try to provide examples in which the view highlights 
multiple forms of love and later in the third chapter, I will explain how a theory of 
value can apply to the phenomenon of love throughout its different experiences. 
Among those who hold this appraisal view of love, we will look at the theories of 
Alan Soble, Niko Kolodny, Kate Abramson and Adam Leite, who have advanced 
the theory. This appraisal view is more of an attempt to generalize the 
phenomenon of love than the other theories we have looked at so far, although 
there are a few problems that cause me to suggest that there is more to love than 
just the appraisal of value. 
To begin analyzing this theory of love, I draw attention to Alan Soble’s 
exposition of the appraisal view: 
When x loves y, this can be explained as the result of y’s having, or x’s 
perceiving that y has, some set S of attractive, admirable, or valuable 
properties; x loves y because y has S or because x perceives or believes 
that y has S. These properties of y are the basis or ground of X’s love and 
hence…love is “object-centric.73 
He later goes on to say: 
The central claim of the [appraisal view] is that something about y is central 
in accounting for x’s love for y; the emphasis is on the perceived merit of 
the objet as the ground of love.74 
According to the appraisal view, love is the result of subjectively perceiving value 
in another. This means that when I say I love my brother, I perceive him as having 
valuable characteristics, such as sense of humor, intelligence, and a pleasant 
attitude. Because I believe that he possess these qualities, I love him. For many 
siblings and family relationships however, these are not the kinds of qualities that 
are appraised for love. In many cases, siblings (or family members) do not love 
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one another because of character traits, but because they simply are family – 
which would still consist of subjectively valuing the characteristic “of being family.” 
The shared bloodline, the fact that they have been looked after and brought up 
together, etc. is the factor in which there is an importance about them that is 
valuable. Because of this specific trait, of being family, we see our family as being 
important to us and therefore love them, despite other character traits. 
Not all families positively appraise the trait of “being family” though. Since 
the appraisal view looks at the subjective perception of qualities, some individuals 
may not view “being family” as warranting love and value, and looks at personality 
qualities instead, like generosity, sense of humor, kindness, etc. Plenty of brothers 
do not love each other and there are mothers who do not love their children; there 
are children who do no love their parents, etc. Thus family relations do not by 
themselves constitute sufficient conditions for love. Just because a person is 
family, does not mean he/she necessarily has to be loved. Perhaps a son who has 
committed a terrible atrocity is no longer loved by his parents because they believe 
him to be a horrible person. In an instance like this, the parents would not solely 
appraise their son on the basis that he is “their son,” they would instead appraise 
him on the basis of his moral character. The subject appraises the object 
subjectively and therefore creates his/her own reason as to what values the object 
possesses – what the object has that is worthy of the response of love. 
One way to look at the theory of love as appraisal is through the Christian 
view of humanity’s love for God, that is, Erosic love. Man love’s God because God 
is The Supreme Being. He is omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent. Under 
the appraisal theory of love then, God is the ultimate object of love because of His 
perfect qualities. His qualities epitomize perfection making Him the most important, 
valuable thing in existence. Soble writes, “God has no defects that interfere with 
His attractiveness. God does not change or lose His perfections, and He is always 
available as an object of love.75 This Christian view of appraisal or Erosic Love is 
an important concept that will be revisited in the next chapter. 
This view of love as the appraisal of value that the object has can however 
be objected to in multiple ways which all stem from the same basic problem, 
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namely that if love is a matter of appraising an object for its value, then any object 
that has the same qualities ought to be appraised and valued equivalently. 
Similarly, if an object has the same qualities as an object that is loved, then 
theoretically the love-object should be replaceable by the object with the same 
qualities without causing unease. This contradicts the feature of love that suggests 
that the love object is irreplaceably significant. We would not be inclined to trade-in 
our loved ones for others that had the same or better qualities. Loved ones are 
special and significant for the reason that they are not fungible. For instance, if I 
were to be in possession of a cloning booth that would clone anyone that stepped 
into it, but also added qualities to the clone that I valued in a person, making the 
clone a slightly better version of the original person, and then I imagine my brother 
were to step into the machine. I would not love the clone in a familial way like I 
love my brother. Despite the clone having all my brother’s valued qualities, and 
some even more valued qualities (by me), I still would not love the clone or would 
want it to replace my brother. This is because my brother is irreplaceable 
regardless of his flaws. 
To therefore suggest that love-objects are those objects that we appraise 
as being most valuable for their qualities misses out on a fundamental feature of 
love – that our love-objects possess an irreplaceable significance to us. They 
cannot be replaced, copied, or exchanged for anything else, and this is what 
makes them special. The process of appraising an object for its value does 
however have merit in that there has to be reasons for why we love some things 
and not others, and those reasons need to pertain to how we perceive objects. 
Perceiving objects and responding to them in a way that they become love-objects 
requires our appraisal and valuation of them; however, appraising objects and 
simply valuing them from that appraisal requires something more for the 
phenomenon of love to occur.     
Niko Kolodny promotes the appraisal view of love but does so in a slightly 
different way.76 Kolodny believes that love is valuing the relationship that is had 
between the lover and beloved rather than valuing the qualities of the beloved. 
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Love is a kind of value where the lover values the object by seeing it as the source 
of his reasons for being emotionally vulnerable to it. Kolodny goes on to give a list 
of necessary requirements for a person to love the beloved. He states: 
A’s loving B consists (at least) in A’s: 
i. believing that A has an instance, r, of a finally valuable type of 
relationship, R, to person B (in a first-personal way – that is, where A 
identifies himself as A); 
ii. being emotionally vulnerable to B (in ways that are appropriate to R), 
and believing that r is a noninstrumental reason for being so; 
iii. being emotionally vulnerable to r (in ways that are appropriate to R). 
and believing that r is a noninstrumental reason for being so; 
iv. believing that r is a noninstrumental reason for A to act in B’s interest 
(in ways that are appropriate to R), and having, on that basis, a 
standing intention to do so; 
v. believing that r is a noninstrumental reason for A to act in r’s interest 
(in ways that are appropriate to R), and having on that basis, a 
standing intention to do so; and 
vi. believing that any instance, r*of type R provides (a) anyone who has 
r* to some B* with similar reasons for emotion and action toward B* 
and r*, and (b) anyone who is not a participant in r* with different 
reasons for action (and emotion?) regarding r*.77 
With this list of criteria, the lover sees the beloved as the cause and reasons for 
loving. Kolodny’s theory applies to appraisal love not in terms of finding value in 
the beloved, but in loving the beloved because of the value in the relationship and 
its components, such as responding to the object by being emotionally vulnerable 
and desiring to act in the beloved’s best interest.78 So in the case of my loving my 
brother, I would love him because what is valuable to me, is the relationship that 
we share and not his specific characteristics. Our relationship is pleasant, we 
laugh together, enjoy the same activities, and it is these things that make me value 
the way we relate to one another. Furthermore, since he is the other participant in 
this brotherly relationship that I value, he is the source of that relationship and 
therefore he becomes the object of my love. Our relationship may exist the way 
that it does because of his characteristics, however they are not what I value. 
What I value is the type of relationship that we have formed. I would love my 
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brother because our relationship has been pleasant and meaningful and because I 
value that type of relationship. 
To explain Kolodny’s view further, we can use an example in which a 
mother loves her child before the child has even been born. Kolodny would 
suggest that this is possible because the relationship and shared history that 
exists between the mother and the fetus/child is one in which the mother is 
emotionally affected by the child, cares for it, looks out for its interests and over 
that period of time, sees the child as the reasons (because of the relationship’s 
effect on her) for loving the child, or soon-to-be child. Love is thus, not valuing 
qualities in another person, but valuing the relationship and therefore valuing the 
beloved for his/her part in constituting that relationship. 
In the next chapter I will espouse a similar relationship focused theory of 
love; meaning that I take love to be a relationship and way of responding to an 
object rather than love being a feeling or emotion or concern for the beloved. Even 
though my theory of love is similar to Kolodny’s, there are still problems with the 
way that Kolodny goes about explaining love on the appraisal view. One of the 
problems Kolodny faces, as do other appraisal theorists such as Soble, is the 
problem of the love object’s fungibility or the doppelganger problem. This is the 
problem when the theory does not recognize irreplaceable significance in the 
object of love. According to the appraisal view of love, any objects that have 
identical characteristics to the beloved should also be loved for the same reasons. 
So if there is a duplicate of a woman’s husband, the wife would have no reason to 
love the doppelganger any less than she does her husband. She would be able to 
trade partners without loss because if their qualities were the same, they would be 
interchangeable. She could have a partner with the same qualities as her husband 
and have the same relationship with both so there would be nothing that separated 
her husband from the doppelganger. 
By loving someone based on qualities that they have, anyone with the 
same qualities should to be loved equally. Kolodny tries to get around this problem 
by using the history of the relationship as a reason for the wife loving the husband 
more than his doppelganger. What therefore would separate the husband from his 
doppelganger is that the husband has memories of their relationship and the times 
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they shared together. He admits however, that if the doppelganger had the same 
“shared history,” meaning that the doppelganger had the same memories of 
relating to the wife, than she would have to love him as well. Kolodny 
acknowledges there is a fungibility problem but does not think the problem affects 
his theory. Instead, he avoids the problem by giving an example of acceptable 
fungible situations in which loving a doppelganger is common practice. For this, he 
uses the example of parents that have two or more children. Kolodny suggests 
that the second child (and third and fourth, etc.) is a child doppelganger of the first, 
and in this situation, the parents are expected to love each child in the same way.  
While it makes sense for parents to love their children equally, classifying 
children as doppelgangers evades the fungibility problem. Having a second or 
third child is not a doppelganger of the first. They are different people that have a 
different history and relationship despite playing the functional role of “child.” The 
reasons for loving them would be different because their relationships are different 
in that since the children are different from one another, the parent behaves 
differently with each child. A parent may encourage one son to play sports and 
then interact with the child through sports while at the same time encouraging 
another son to learn music and connect and interact with him through music. So 
while a parent may love his/her children because they are both his/her children, 
the relationships between the parent and children are completely different and so it 
would not make sense to explain children as doppelgangers. 
For example, my family consists of myself, my mother, my father, and my 
brother. Since I am one of two children - the younger one - I would be the 
doppelganger of my older brother according to Kolodny. Even though we are both 
our parents’ children and they love us both, we have very different relationships 
with our parents. He is much more open with them and tells them things about his 
personal life, talks to them like a friend, argues with them, and seems to have a 
more emotional relationship with them. My relationship with them however is one 
in which we rarely argue. I am very emotionally closed around my parents and do 
not like talking about my personal life. Furthermore, there are qualities of both our 
relationships that our parents find valuable/important, and qualities that they do not 
like. For instance, both of my parents would prefer to not argue as much with my 
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brother; however they greatly appreciate that he tells them things about his 
personal life and confides in them because it makes them feel closer to him. With 
me on the other hand, my parents value my behavior in that we do not argue, 
although they feel regret that I do not share details about my life with them. So 
both my brother and I have very different relationships with our parents and 
possess different valuable qualities which show that, despite us both being loved 
by them, we are not fungible and I am not a child doppelganger. 
Kate Abramson and Adam Leite note another problem with Kolodny’s 
theory in that they think he has got the theory of love backwards. Love is not 
created by the relationship as Kolodny suggests, but the relationship is created 
because of the love. They explain, using reference to the characters Edward and 
Elinor from Sense and Sensibility, “It is not that Elinor’s reason for loving Edward 
is that she has a relationship with him (or even a relationship of a certain kind); the 
relationship is rather the context in which, as Elinor herself says, she has come to 
‘know him so well’ as to appreciate how his abilities, manner and person all 
‘improve upon acquaintance.’”79 Abramson and Leite suggest that love is the 
reactive attitude of the lover given the beloved’s “morally significant character 
traits.”80 Because Elinor experiences the moral worth of Edward’s traits, she can 
respond to him with love, which creates the relationship rather than love being the 
appraisal of value from the relationship as Kolodny maintains. 
For Abramson and Leite, the “morally significant character traits” are things 
like “interpersonal warmth, forthrightness and sincerity, compassion, 
considerateness, steadfastness and loyalty.”81 Love is not grounded in qualities 
like beauty or a sense of humor under Abramson’s and Leite’s view, which it could 
be for Soble. Abramson and Leite explain the reactive theory of love consists in as 
follows: 
[L]ove is familiar in everyday life and qualifies in every reasonable sense as 
a reactive attitude. ‘Reactive love’ is paradigmatically (a) an affectionate 
attachment to another person, (b) appropriately felt as a non-self-interested 
response to particular kinds of morally laudable features of character 
                                                          
79. Kate Abramson and Adam Leite, “Love as a Reactive Emotion,” The 
Philosophical Quarterly 61, No. 245 (2011), 676. 
80. Ibid., 674.  
81. Ibid.  
80 
 
expressed by the loved one in interaction with the lover, and (c) 
paradigmatically manifested in certain kinds of acts of goodwill and 
characteristic affective, desiderative and other motivational responses 
(including other-regarding concern and a desire to be with the beloved). 
‘Virtues of intimacy’ as expressed in interaction with the lover are agent-
relative reasons for reactive love, and like other reactive attitudes, reactive 
love generates reasons in its own right. Within a broad conception of the 
virtues, reactive love sheds light on the reactive attitudes more generally.82   
So by saying that love is a reactive attitude, Abramson and Leite claim that 
character traits like a person’s eyes are not a reason for love, but the way a 
person communicates with his/her eyes could be.83 This is because love 
requires the reactive attitude of the lover. The lover responds to the beloved 
with affectionate attachment, desire and concern, and other appropriate non-
self-interested responses to the beloveds characteristics. Love is therefore a 
reaction between lover and beloved. 
By suggesting that love is a reactive attitude, Abramson and Leite 
maneuver around the problem of fungibility that threatens other appraisal 
theories. While a doppelganger can cause problems for Soble’s and Kolodny’s 
view, it does not for Abramson’s, Leite’s, and Jollimore’s. The reason for this is 
that, if love is a reactive attitude, then the lover’s reaction to a certain situation 
or character trait is always different, even if only slightly. For instance, if a 
woman is sick and nursed back to health by a man who is sincere with her, 
considerate, and all of the other morally worthy ways of acting, then the woman 
may react to those traits of the person as being reasons to love him. Later 
however if she is presented with a man with those same exact character traits, 
she may not love him as she does the man who nursed her back to health. The 
reason for this is that her response, the way she reacts to the man with similar 
character traits will not be the same because her situation in life is not the 
same. She may not be sick and vulnerable now, she may not be single 
(because she’s married to the first man), she may have a different outlook on 
life, and all of these factors will cause her to react in a different way.  
This can be further illustrated by the case of me and spiders and other 
insects. When I am home alone at night and feeling quite tired I am particularly 
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scared of spiders and other insects. I have been known to scream and shriek if 
any insects are in my general vicinity. My reaction then to spiders and other 
insects is to be terrified; but, if it is the middle of the day and I am feeling awake 
and strong, or if there happens to be people or especially a woman with me, I am 
not scared of spiders or other insects. In this situation, because my circumstances 
are different (i.e. I do want to be seen as weak or a person who is irrationally 
scared of spiders and other insects commonly found in homes) I act calmly and 
capture the spider or other insect without fear or worry and gracefully place it 
outside in the garden. This is an example of how reactive attitudes are not 
grounded in the problem of fungibility. A doppelganger with all of the same traits 
would not appear and receive the same love from a person because the person 
would not be in the receptive mode for responding to the doppelganger in the way 
required for love. 
Abramson and Leite are on the right track in understanding love as a 
reactive attitude. I will take a very similar stance for my account of love which 
will also draw on Kolodny’s and Singer’s theories. Despite my endorsing a 
reactive-attitude type theory of love, I think that Abramson and Leite are 
mistaken when they come to define what reactive love consists in. The first 
problem is that Abramson and Leite’s theory is missing elements that are 
needed to understand the phenomenon of love as we experience it. For 
instance, an account of how reactive love generates reasons in its own right is 
needed. What does this mean, and how does reactive love do this? Secondly, 
the question may also be raised about Abramson’s and Leite’s theory in 
regards to the use of the phrase “morally laudable features of character.”84 Why 
are morally laudable features of character needed for a subject to react to an 
object with love? By characterizing some traits as being acceptable to count as 
reasons to love rather than other traits, Abramson and Leite exclude many 
instances of love. If there needs to be personal interaction between two people 
then instances of love at first sight would not exist, unless both people saw 
each other at the exact same moment so that their love would be 
communicatively reactive. While for some this may seem fine because they 
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may not believe that there is any such thing as love at first sight, a theory of 
love should once again not exclude an experience that people actually attest 
to, such as falling in love at the sight of a partner or pet, a piece of art work or 
something else – more examples of which I will provide in the next chapter. 
What is also troublesome about Abramson’s and Leite’s theory is that it 
does not recognize the love for God or of any religious deity because without 
the interaction between a subject and an object, the theory says that love 
cannot exist. Love is communicable and without being able to communicate 
with the object, we cannot love. So if we cannot communicate directly with our 
god, then we cannot love him/her/it. In addition, if love requires a certain 
interaction between objects, having love for something like an idea or nature or 
mankind would not be possible either. 
Once again a theory has not been able to account for the different 
features of love that we actually experience. While Soble and Kolodny were 
able to account for the different forms of love and the intentionality of love 
(which incorporates different manifestations of love), they were unable to 
explain how the love-object becomes irreplaceable to the lover. Abramson and 
Leite however show how an object becomes irreplaceably significant to the 
lover based on the reaction of the lover, but fail to address the different forms 
of love that are non-communicative. 
These theories will become the basis for my joint value theory (appraisal 
and bestowal) in the next chapter. I will then expand on Abramson and Leite’s 
thesis by changing parts, and connecting their theory with Soble’s, and 
Kolodny’s as well as Singer’s bestowal theory. Regardless of the problems that 
these appraisal views of love face, the idea that love is bound up in the value of 
an object for the lover is part of the theory that I will propound in the next 
chapter of this thesis. I believe that given more examination and a synthesis 
with the bestowal theory (which we are about to look at), the appraisal view will 
help us understand the conditions and process of love. 
 
2.6 Love as the Bestowal of Value 
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The second value theory of love is the bestowal view of Irving Singer. 
Singer’s bestowal theory describes love as the process of creating value in an 
object rather than the appraisal view, which describes love as recognizing the 
intrinsic value of the object. So while the appraisal view is about valuing the 
subjectively significant qualities of an object, the bestowal view describes love as 
the creation of value in the object. The bestowal view is therefore not based on the 
object’s inherent characteristics but on the subject giving the object an importance 
that it does not in itself possess because of how the subject relates to it. What we 
see with this view is very similar to Kolodny’s view; however, love, under this view, 
comes from the subject’s bestowal of value, rather than the value appraised of the 
relationship. The value that is given by the subject to the object is not intrinsic in 
the object – unlike the appraised value Soble’s theory states the object has. This 
value that is given to the object cannot be reduced to specific characteristics of the 
object.  
According to Singer, “love is a way of valuing something. It is a positive 
response toward the ‘object of love’—which is to say, anyone or anything that is 
loved. In a manner quite special to itself, love affirms the goodness of this 
object.”85 Rather than subjectively recognizing the value an object has, as with the 
appraisal view, a person bestows value on the beloved and creates a quality that 
is otherwise not present. Singer explains the act of bestowal thus:  
Love creates a new value, one that is not reducible to the individual or 
objective value that something may also have . . . . Individual and objective 
value depend upon an object’s ability to satisfy prior interests—the needs, 
the desires, the wants, or whatever it is that motivates us toward one object 
and not another. Bestowed value is different. It is created by the affirmative 
relationship itself, by the very act of responding favorably, giving an object 
emotional and pervasive importance regardless of its capacity to satisfy 
interests. Here it makes no sense to speak of verifiability; and though 
bestowing may often be injurious, unwise, even immoral, it can’t be 
erroneous in the way that an appraisal might be.86 
The bestowal creates a kind of value that is specialized in that it cannot be 
reduced to the value an object has intrinsically. Apart from being something of use, 
gratification, etc., the object is given meaning by the subject, in that it becomes a 
focus of his, something that he cares about and gives attention and his 
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commitment to.87 For example, a husband in a marriage does not love his wife 
because she is pretty or funny. These are qualities that can change or easily be 
instilled by someone else. He loves her because he has bestowed value on her, 
which makes her important. 
I once asked my coworker and friend why he loves his wife, I was curious 
as to the qualities that she had that were valuable to him. He looked at me as if I 
were crazy and told me that he loves her because she is his wife. His reply was a 
representation of the bestowal view. What I took from his answer was that his love 
for his wife is not determined by the qualities that he finds valuable. It is not 
because they get along well together or that she is cute, kind, and sincere (which 
is how he describes her/the relationship) He loves her because she is his wife, her 
significance to him is bound up in his response to her. She is important to him 
because of the value that he places on her. 
The problem with this theory of love is that it is underdeveloped and many 
of the ideas in it are vague. For example, as one of the aspects of love, Singer 
states that it affirms goodness.88 He distinguishes between liking something very 
much – which does not affirm goodness in an object, and loving something – 
which does bring out the good in an object; however, according to the bestowal 
theory, love cannot bring out the good in an object because goodness does not 
reside as a quality in the beloved. If every object had a good that was waiting for a 
lover to bring it out, then the bestowal theory would be reduced to the appraisal 
theory of love – recognizing value (goodness) in an object. If however, we take the 
phrase “affirming goodness,” to mean that by creating value in the object, the 
object becomes important and good to us, then we can avoid reverting to the 
appraisal view of love. 
Moreover, the same object can be seen as being good to two different 
people for different reasons, not because it has a goodness about it, but because 
of the importance that the lover gives to it thereby making it good. This makes 
sense when we think about objects being loved by one person and hated by 
another. The person who loves the object, gives it an importance, affirming its 
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goodness, while the person who hates it, probably affirms some negative 
characteristic. This is also problematic though because by merely taking goodness 
to mean that the object gains an importance, then the distinction between liking 
and loving and other similar ways of responding to an object like with admiration or 
respect becomes vague.89 Something must distinguish these phenomena, but 
under the bestowal view it is unclear what that is. Singer cannot have meant that 
the goodness of an object is equivalent to its importance. If he had, then there 
would need to be a more critical explanation of why that type of response 
separates an object of love from an object that is liked, admired, respected, etc., a 
problem that also plagues Troy Jollimore in his book, Love’s Vision.90 
Jollimore describes love in terms of it being a process in which a subject 
appraises the value of an object and then bestows on that object, “generous 
attention.”91 The love from the subject comes from appreciating what value is 
appraised in the object. The lover therefore responds similarly to how Kolodny 
described, responding to the object by being emotionally vulnerable and desiring 
to act in the beloved’s best interest,92 or at the very least, perceiving the beloved 
as being valuable for his/her valuable qualities. 
What Jollimore fails to express however is the way in which a bestowal of 
appreciation of the value of an object create a response that distinguishes love 
from related phenomena that are not love. With phenomena such as infatuation 
and admiration both exhibiting a subject’s appraisal and appreciation of the values 
that make the object valuable, it would seem that love is not a phenomenon that 
can be distinguished from kindred phenomena. Jollimore’s theory relies heavily on 
the appraisal of value without clearly explaining why “generous concern” is unique 
to the phenomenon of love, ultimately erring in the opposite way to Singer, but with 
the same result – not fully explaining the nature in which appraisal and bestowal 
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91. Ibid., 124.  
92.  This is very similar to the view that I will choose to adopt in the next 
chapter.  I will explain the phenomenon of love slightly different which will account 
for a variance of implications that are not suggested under Kolodny’s view.  
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work together to create the phenomenon of love and how they differentiate love 
from other similar phenomena. 
Max Scheler however, in his book, The Nature of Sympathy,93 is able to 
avert this problem of distinguishing love from phenomena such as respect and 
admiration by explaining the phenomenological difference of loving something, 
from judging it with respect, admiration, etc. In so doing, Scheler questions all 
appraisal theories because of the procedural way in which an object is appraised 
and judged for its value before it is loved. He suggest that love and appraisal occur 
the other way around and that the emotional response of love occurs, which then 
lead to the positive appraisal and judgment of the beloved as being valuable. He 
explains the occurrence of love thus: 
There may be emotional acts which presuppose the passing of a judgment 
(or rather, an evaluation). Respect, for instance, seems to me to be one of 
these. It presupposes that initial detachment from the object, which alone 
makes it possible for a value-judgment to precede the onset of the 
emotional act; and it also requires a specific awareness of the presence of 
the value by which it is evoked. But this detachment is just what is lacking 
in love and hatred. They are entirely primitive and immediate modes of 
emotional response to the value-content itself; so much so that, 
phenomenologically speaking, they do not even disclose a process of 
apprehending value (e.g. feeling, preference, etc.), let alone the making of 
a value-judgment. In particular, the value in question is not specifically 
envisaged beforehand, as it is in the case of respect.94  
The lover therefore does not appraise an object, judging it for its valuable qualities 
then proceed to deem the object as something worth loving. The lover simply 
responds with love to the object, creating the value in it. We can thus say that the 
value of the object is bestowed into it, by the lover – just as in the case of Singer’s 
theory of love.   
Scheler fails to explain exactly how it is possible for a person to respond 
lovingly (bestowing value) to an object, without reducing that bestowal to any 
type of appraised characteristics for their subjective value to the lover. Scheler 
may maneuver around the problems of fungibility and distinguishing between 
love and other phenomena such as respect and admiration, however, by not 
being able to explain the process of how the initial response of love to the 
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object occurs, it becomes unclear why some objects receive our love rather 
than others and why love is not a randomly occurring phenomenon. 
Singer’s theory is open to the same criticism by his claiming that the 
idea of bestowal does not recognize any prior interest the lover may have for 
the beloved. He states that “Bestowed value . . . is created by the affirmative 
relationship itself, by the very act of responding favorably, giving an object 
emotional and pervasive importance regardless of its capacity to satisfy 
interests.”95 Furthermore, love is the act of responding favorably to an object 
regardless of any satisfied interests. But if our interests in an object do not 
necessitate our giving it emotional or pervasive importance, then what does? 
Does love just occur magically? Surely there have to be reasons for love. 
Singer nonetheless draws the distinction between appraising something to 
bestowing value on it by stating: 
We are means to each other’s satisfactions, and we constantly evaluate 
one another on the basis of our individual interests [by appraising]. 
However subtly, we are always setting prices on the other people, and 
ourselves. But we also bestow value in the manner of love. We then 
respond to another as something that cannot be reduced to any system of 
appraisal. The lover takes an interest in the beloved as a person, not 
merely as a commodity [which Singer would suggest the appraisal view 
does].96  
Thus, in the case of love, the reasons for bestowing value on a love-object 
become irreducible. This account of love does not provide evidence for why a 
person bestows value in an object and therefore the theory is unsupported. For 
instance if we refer back to the conversation that I had with my friend at work, he 
stated that he loved his wife because she was his wife, but the reason for 
marriage, typically (beyond any social expectations), is that my friend and his wife 
are in love. A vicious circle arises in that my friend loves his wife because she is 
his wife, but she is his wife because he loves her. This is a problem that occurs 
when love is said to be irreducible under the bestowal theory. If love were 
irreducible, then the question, “how does love (the bestowing of value) occur?” 
would be enigmatic, which leaves the theory unsupported. So if the bestowal view 
of love states that the conditions that create a bestowal of value cannot be 
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reduced in any meaningful way, how can we understand the nature of love if we 
cannot understand the process that creates it? 
There must be conditions for love to occur that can be explained in terms of 
how we relate to our object of love. Love requires reasons, because if love is a 
way of relating than there has to be a reason for relating in the loving manner 
rather than relating in some other way. For instance when responding to an object 
with fear, our reason for being afraid may include believing that an object poses a 
threat to our health, social status, a loved one, etc. It therefore makes no sense to 
speak of love as if it cannot be reduced to reasons and is therefore a special 
phenomenon, different from fear and all others without explaining why and how 
this is so. I contend that it makes more sense to conceive of love as a natural 
phenomenon like other types of responses which can be explained by experiences 
and the reasons that create them. Similarly, love requires more than perceiving 
value in an object. A love object needs to be differentiated from objects that are 
merely respected, admired, liked, etc. The subject must perceive the object as 
being valuable but also respond to the object in a way in which the object 
becomes irreplaceably significant.   
 
Summary 
By looking at the forgoing theories of love, the features that were laid out in 
the first chapter become much clearer. The reason for us to think that love has 
different forms and objects is due to the fact that throughout history, people have 
experienced this phenomenon of being emotionally, mentally, and physically 
attached to different objects that have a special meaning. That special meaning 
consists of the objects being irreplaceably significant to the lover. The intricacies 
and relationship make the object stand out from all other objects. This 
phenomenon is expressed by us through different manifestations depending on 
the aspects that we experience. We feel it, give it, recognize it, etc. and yet to 
experience it we must respond to an object in a specific way. 
In the next chapter I will devise a joint theory of the appraisal and bestowal 
views. By combining these two value theories of love, I can account for not only 
each feature of love, but I will be able to explain how an appraisal/bestowal theory 
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fits into each experience of love that was mentioned in this chapter. While there 
are problems that face both the appraisal and bestowal theories, by incorporating 
them together, I can paint a more accurate picture of love that comprises our 
experiences of it and explains its nature. 
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Chapter 3 
Unifying Appraisal and Bestowal: A Cohesive Theory of Love 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will develop my own theory of love which consists of a 
unification of the two value theories that were examined in the previous chapter. 
While each of these value theories does not fully capture the nature of love by 
itself, I believe that by combining them, I can begin to develop a more complete 
explanation of what love is, that coincides with the features of it that we 
experience. It is important that a theory of love incorporates the features that were 
laid out in the first chapter because they highlight the way we experience love. 
Each value theory identifies and overcomes the problems faced by the other. By 
combining them, I can maximize their strengths into a coherent theory while 
casting out their weaknesses. An appraisal view of love explains the intricacies of 
how we relate to and experience objects while a bestowal view explains the 
attribution of value onto a love-object, making that object irreplaceably significant. 
Together they explain what love is, how it comes about (its conditions) and is 
sustained, and the role that it plays in our lives. 
It helps to look at appraisal and bestowal as two parts of the same process 
rather than two separate processes. Appraisal is the first part, and without 
bestowal the relationships that are formed cannot amount to love because the 
object’s value is something that can be replaced by objects that have similar 
characteristics and play the same functional role in the subject’s life. Love objects 
however are irreplaceable to the lover regardless of other objects having better or 
more favorable qualities. In addition, similarly functioning relationships based on 
respect or admiration boast overlapping behaviors which may make differentiating 
between them and love difficult. The theory of bestowal however, can overcome 
these obstacles by showing that the love-object has attributed to it a type of value 
that makes it stand out from all other objects of interest to the lover because of its 
significance and irreplaceability. If we explain love as a bestowal of value without 
incorporating the appraisal of value, the bestowal of value will lack sufficient 
reasoning – evidence for what causes the bestowal of value. Analyzing the 
phenomenon of love therefore requires that the processes of appraising and 
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bestowing value be inseparably entwined. By analyzing the appraisal and 
bestowal of value, in terms of combining the processes, I can explain love’s nature 
in a complete way. Through my analysis of this combined process, I can account 
for the experiences and features that are the basis of the theories of love, such as 
the object becoming irreplaceably significant to the subject, that love can be 
manifested in multiple ways and has multiple forms and that love is intentional. 
In Irving Singer’s three part series: The Nature of Love, 97  he undertakes the 
project of combining these two theories, but fails to explain the extent to which 
appraisal and bestowal work together. Singer ultimately relies on the theory of 
bestowal to carry the weight of explaining love and does not fully explain where 
and how the appraisal theory fits into his bestowal view of love – only that it occurs 
but not for a specific purpose that affects the bestowal of value. While I agree with 
Singer, that the phenomenon of love requires the lover to bestow a special type of 
Value98 on the object, he/she must first appraise the value of its properties; this 
makes the appraisal of value in an object just as important in the process as the 
bestowal of value on the object. 
Jollimore however errs in the opposite way, not fully explaining how the 
phenomenon of bestowing appreciation and concern for the object make it any 
more valuable (loved) than objects that are merely respected or admired. 
Jollimore’s theory therefore is really no more than a type of appraisal theory 
whereby the love of the object occurs upon the lover appraising it of its value, but 
not necessarily requiring a bestowal of anything unique to the phenomenon of 
love. The object is therefore loved because of some particular way in which it is 
appraised, similarly to Soble’s and Kolodny’s theories – which is problematic for 
the same reasons.  
Both Singer and Jollimore are right however in that appraisal and bestowal 
are necessary processes for the phenomenon of love. Again, without the bestowal 
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will be the irreplaceably significant value that is created in an object upon bestowal 
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irreplaceably significant, to bestow Value is to bestow a quality in the object of 
being irreplaceably significant, and an object that is loved has irreplaceable 
significance bestowed upon it, and so on.  
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process, the subject’s response to an object is valuable based on the qualities the 
object has which are either replaceable or similar to the qualities that are valued in 
instances of admiring, respecting or having some other type of response to the 
object. Similarly, differentiating between liking something very much and loving it 
would cause problems to the theory if merely appraising the valuable qualities in 
an object were conducive to love – what qualities in an object are the qualities of 
love? What are the qualities of liking something or being infatuated with it? If the 
value the object has, because of its qualities, overlap in loving and liking 
relationships, then what distinguishes the two? 
Without the appraisal process however, a bestowal that projects the value 
of irreplaceable significance onto an object of love would lack a basis in reason.  
What then would make that object significant and irreplaceable? A person cannot 
bestow value on something without having first appraised it. The appraisal 
identifies the relevant properties that connect with the lover’s scheme of values 
and beliefs; therefore, without an appraisal, the lover would not be able to have an 
experience of the object and therefore would have nothing to bestow on it. It would 
be like if a person thought an animal was dangerous that he/she knew nothing 
about. Without knowing any of the animal’s properties, he/she could not make an 
appraisal of it and therefore could not judge it in any way. Moreover, it is this 
process of appraising and bestowing Value on an object that I will tackle in this 
chapter – explaining where Singer goes wrong and how I can fix the problem.  
Both the appraisal and bestowal are necessary for the phenomenon of love. 
The appraisal creates the relationship between the subject and love-object, 
allowing the lover to respond to his/her subjective perception of the object. Once 
the appraisal is made, the subject is equipped to bestow Value, projecting an 
importance onto the object and making it irreplaceably significant. In this chapter I 
will explain the process of appraisal and bestowal in further detail and show why 
they account for our experiences of love. I will therefore work to show that love is a 
process in which a person perceives the qualities of an object and projects his/her 
response of the object onto the object, deeming it Valuable beyond its objective 
qualities because its Value, to the lover, is due to how he/she appraises the object. 
By explaining love in terms of appraisal and bestowal, I can unify the theories of 
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love as the quest for Truth, love as God, love as a union, and love as robust 
concern under a single explanation that accounts for love’s features (e.g. the vast 
array of objects that can be loved, the different ways in which we love them and 
express that love, and the irreplaceable significance that a love object has for its 
lover). 
A combined appraisal/bestowal (A/B) theory can make sense of why love 
seems like a union between two objects and it can explain why people have robust 
concern for a love object. A/B is the reason for obtaining or trying to obtain Truth, 
Beauty and Goodness, and can even explain the notion of God as love. Through 
the two value theories, the phenomenon of love can be explained in terms of how 
a subject relates to any object, whether it is a romantic partner, God, or even the 
quest for Truth. Love is something that can be directed at all objects, including 
ideas, animals, inanimate objects, nature and anything else. Love is not an 
exclusive phenomenon that only occurs between romantic partners or family 
members, etc. It is entirely inclusive of everything because of the fact that it is a 
way of responding to an object which makes that object irreplaceably significant. 
As long as an object can have this Value projected onto it, then it can be an object 
of love. 
A subject has to be able to love any object because any object can be 
subjected to an appraisal, and anything that can be appraised can be the object of 
bestowed Value. Since love is a way of responding to an object, no matter what 
the object is, as long as the subject responds to it by appraising and bestowing 
Value on it, it can be a love-object. There are no exceptions as to the objects that 
can be loved. The idea that love is an appraisal and bestowal of Value requires 
that the term “love,” be able to refer to any type of object, as well as to unite all of 
the forms under the same process of making it irreplaceably significant. We will 
see that love is a general type of response, and from love, come the different 
forms such as romantic love, familial love, etc. Furthermore, any subject that is 
capable of appraising and bestowing Value is capable of loving; and the factors 
and relationship roles that are present determine the form of love – I am 
romantically involved with my love object, romantic love, I have the same blood 
line as my love object, familial love, etc. Different factors and relationship roles go 
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into determining the different types of love such as the behavior towards an object 
and the type of object the beloved is. This thesis is not concerned with the 
distinction between these types; only that every type, in order to be loved, has to 
be subjected to the A/B process.   
These two ways of valuing an object (Appraisal: perceiving an object’s 
value, Bestowal: creating Value in the object) create the phenomenon of love in 
the specific type of relationship. Both appraisal and bestowal must occur for love 
to exist. The absence of appraisal, and there could be no reasons to love. The 
absence of bestowal and the object of love could not be separated from other 
valuable things as being special (set apart by significance and irreplaceability). By 
not recognizing both the appraisal and bestowal of Value, a theory of love misses-
out on key features of love; such that it involves a relationship between subject 
and object, and that it makes things irreplaceably significant to the lover. Both are 
necessary for love. 
While this seems to be what Singer advocates in his theory, some of his 
explanations become vague with the limited evidence he provides, such as when 
he states that love is irreducible to any system of appraisal or why that is the 
case.99 This makes love seem as if it cannot be understood fully because it occurs 
without justification. According to Singer’s theory, love looks to happen 
spontaneously and magically. Given a few alterations and explanation into the 
details of what appraising and bestowing Value entail, I believe I can develop a 
theory that accurately explains love using Singer’s combination of appraising and 
bestowing value which accounts for all of love’s forms.100 To begin this explanation 
we must first be clear as to what Singer means when he uses the concepts of 
“appraisal” and “bestowal” and what they ought to mean.  
Once I have explained the process of appraising and bestowing, we can 
revisit the other theories mentioned in the previous chapter in order to show that 
the experience of love has been the same phenomenon throughout western 
history, despite it seeming different. So while people may have explained love in 
terms of specific objects such as romantic partners, or a quest for Truth, or God, or 
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have explained it in terms of how we act towards a love-object, each theory 
expressing what love is has been partially correct. People have expressed ideas 
about love that account for how we experience love, such that it involves a form of 
coming together, or that the effect of love is typically concern, that love is 
determined by value, and that it is a process. Love, nonetheless is the same 
phenomenon despite different theoretical perspectives. Plato had the same 
response to Truth and Beauty as Heathcliff did for Catherine, and the person who 
loves God does so according to the same conditions that Frankfurt suggests that 
love occurs when caring about someone robustly. These examples of love exhibit 
the same reactive process despite the different behaviors associated with the 
different forms of love. These theories can tell us about love and have provided an 
account of the multiple features of the phenomenon of love. The theories are 
important to us because they all share the fundamental process of responding to a 
love-object and show a different aspect of love and the diversity of love as it is 
expressed and experienced. 
My method in this chapter is to explain the appraisal and bestowal process, 
first explaining what an appraisal is and then what a bestowal is. Then I can 
explain how they work together in creating the phenomenon that we recognize as 
being love. By developing analyses of these two processes (appraisal and 
bestowal), I will develop a theory that accounts for the different features that occur 
as a result of love and will be able to phenomenologically examine the thoughts 
and behavior that make up these processes (appraisal and bestowal). With both a 
phenomenological reflection and the analysis of the process of appraising and 
bestowing Value, we can account for love on two fronts that will coincide with the 
different ways we experience love and the practicality of how we play an active 
role in choosing who and what we love – which will be developed in the next 
chapter in order support my theory of love with psychological studies of how we 
relate to objects. 
Even though the A/B process is able to account for multiple other theories 
of love, we still often misuse the concept “love” in certain situations. We often use 
the word metaphorically or to express a great liking for something, such as when 
we say “I love those shoes” or I “love soda,” in which case, love is not actually 
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present. This does not mean that we cannot love shoes or soda, however not 
every utterance of the term “love” expresses a genuine case of love. While this 
may complicate our vocal expression of love, it does not mean that the A/B theory 
cannot explain certain instances of love, like that if it were not to account for 
familial love. As well as having the potential to be misused, the word “love” is often 
referred to in awkward ways, such as when we say that “I am in love with you” as 
opposed to “I love you.” These phrases simply follow social conventions that we 
use in order to express a belief or attitude about love or the love-object. By 
understanding love as the appraisal and bestowal of Value however, we can get 
around problems that face the previous theories mentioned as well as explaining 
love over time, love at first sight, whether or not there are pathological cases of 
love, and other dilemmas and popular misconceptions about love. Before any of 
this can be done however, we must look again at appraisal and bestowal. We 
must first understand the components of the process of love in order to account for 
the features of love that we experience. It is thus essential that we examine 
exactly what is involved in the appraisal and bestowal of Value. 
 
3.1 Appraisal 
The role of appraising in love is similar to the act of appraising anything else 
– it is to place a value on an object. The appraisal process of love does the same 
thing, but when a person appraises an object in regards to love, the appraisal is 
made subjectively, rather than objectively. A subjective appraisal is the action of 
creating a relationship with an object. The subject appraises the object whereby 
he/she finds it to be personally appealing and valuable, while an objective 
appraisal aims at making a neutral, detached valuation. Irving Singer gives an 
example of subjective and objective appraisals through a man who is looking to 
purchase a home.101 The man may seek out someone that objectively appraises 
houses such as a surveyor or appraiser. The appraiser will give the man a price 
that she thinks the house is worth based on certain qualities. As Singer describes 
it: 
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[An appraiser] seeks to find an objective value that things have in relation to 
one or another community of human interests…although [the objective 
value] exists only insofar as there are people who want the house, the 
estimate is open to public verification. As long as they agree about the 
circumstances – what the house is like and what a relevant group of buyers 
prefer – all fair-minded appraisers should reach a similar appraisal, 
regardless of their own feelings about [a] particular house.102 
The appraiser will therefore look for qualities in the house such as the condition it 
is in, the neighborhood where the house is located, the size of the house and other 
qualities that give a house a generally agreed upon value.  
The man who is buying the house however appraises the house 
subjectively in terms of what the house’s value is to him. He will therefore look for 
certain characteristics of the home that are personally important to him. While 
everyone would look for a house in good condition with working utilities, etc., the 
home buyer will also look for qualities in the house that are more fitting for his 
needs and desires. He will determine whether the house is close enough to a 
freeway so that he can easily travel to work, whether the house is close enough to 
schools for his children to get there easily, whether or not the house is one story, 
because he may have a poor back and the act of walking up steps is painful and 
inconvenient, or the layout of the house, whether the windows in the master 
bedroom face east or west because he does not like to be woken up by the sun 
shining directly into his room in the morning. These are all qualities of the house 
that are valued differently among different individuals and therefore the man’s 
appraisal of these qualities is subjective to his scheme of values. They are 
requisites for his interest in buying a particular house – he may objectively need to 
buy some house, but subjectively chooses the particular one he wants. They are a 
part of his reasons, just as in love. The appraisal gives a person reason to love the 
beloved. 
The role of appraising in love is therefore to gain a subjective vision of how 
valuable a particular object is. This subjective vision is the way that the subject 
perceives the object, meaning that the object becomes valuable to him/her 
because it satisfies his/her interests and desires. Of course not all appraisals lead 
to positively valuing a person or object. Some lead to disliking things; however for 
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the purpose of this section we will only concentrate on positive appraisals that lead 
to an object’s becoming valuable to the subject – later we will discuss negative 
appraisals. In romantic relationship for instance, our subjective appraisals usually 
include qualities like beauty, a sense of humor, religious practices, trustworthiness, 
etc. We value different partners for different qualities because of their 
meaningfulness to us for that specific relationship. 103 
By subjectively appraising an object, the subject sees value in it which 
creates an experience of the object which includes emotions and feelings that lead 
to beliefs and attitudes about or towards the object. If for instance a woman is 
confronted by a man at a baseball game, she may subjectively appraise him on his 
looks, the way he carries himself, etc. She may think he is extremely handsome, 
confident, as well as many other things. Her appraisal of perceiving these qualities 
in the man may affect her by causing her to have feelings, emotions, judgments, 
desires, and beliefs about this man. These effects are an experience that she has 
of appraising him. Based on her subjective appraisal of the man, the woman may 
become aroused and desire the man as a sexual-love partner, or possibly just 
enjoy spending time with him – to which they may become friends or romantic 
partners. Regardless of their future involvement, the woman upon meeting and 
subjectively appraising the man will experience him based on his qualities and 
their meaningfulness to her in light of her emotions, beliefs, feelings, desires, etc. 
that result. 
Of course not every evaluation is evoked by emotions and feelings, beliefs, 
and desires – often we simply do not experience emotions or feelings or desires 
about an object and are therefore apathetic towards it, such is the case when we 
objectively appraise/evaluate something. In addition, sometimes our evaluations 
are negative104 – however for the purpose of love, we will only be concerned about 
positive evaluations that are subjective and experienced through having emotions, 
feelings, beliefs, desires, etc. This process of appraising an object based on the 
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controversial, I will make a separate argument for the inclusion of inanimate 
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104. These instances of negative and non-appraisals will be examined in a 
later of the thesis.   
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experience (having emotions, feelings, desires, and further beliefs) of it is the first 
part of the process of love. 
It is important to mention that the types of emotions and feelings, desires 
and beliefs about or in regard to an object are not important for the general 
understanding of love – which is what I am concerned with in this thesis. The 
above example about the woman and man at the baseball game is of course only 
referring to a sexual/romantic/friendship type of relationship, of which some of the 
emotions and feelings that a person may have because of/for an object will 
overlap with emotions and feelings that a person may have for a family member or 
pet. The focus then is not on the specific emotions, feelings, desires, and beliefs in 
regard to the object, but that feelings, emotions, desires and beliefs create an 
experience of an object which makes it valuable to the subject. Whether certain 
emotions and feelings and beliefs lead to a specific form of love is for another 
work. I am not concerned with what makes romantic love, romantic or what makes 
familial love, familial, but about the necessary conditions for making a positive, 
subjective appraisal of value. 
During this appraisal stage of the loving process, the object is fungible – 
able to be replaced. The object’s value is based on its qualities and so it is 
interchangeable with any object that has the same if not more attractive qualities. 
The object’s value during the appraisal is only ever just a meaningful reaction to a 
group of qualities that elicit significance to the subject. The subject could therefore 
just switch attention to another object with similar qualities. For an example, 
suppose I am presented with a woman from a distance. She looks beautiful to me 
and I appraise her based on her physical qualities. I could then assume that if she 
had an identical twin sister, I would think that she is also beautiful and would hold 
her in equal regard. The first sister I saw would therefore be replaceable to me 
because her value is quality dependent. She is either valuable or not valuable to 
me based on my perception of her qualities; and since I perceive her twin sister as 
having the same qualities I would value her equally. Upon meeting both sisters I 
will quickly discover that they are not identical in every aspect and value one over 
the other.  At that point I would be making another appraisal based on their 
personality rather than their physical beauty. I would continually appraise the 
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sisters and the accumulation of these appraisals would further distinguish one 
sister from the other. While making appraisals about their qualities, I would be 
separating one sister from the other based solely on my perception of their 
qualities. 
The more appraisals I make, the more I come to value one sister over the 
other. This process of appraising over and over like this makes the sister I value 
harder to be replaced. It would be simple to replace one black haired, thin woman 
with another woman who has the same features, although it becomes a little more 
difficult to replace a black haired, thin woman, who is of similar age to me and 
enjoys the same activities as me. It then becomes even more difficult to replace a 
woman that has black hair, is thin, who is of similar age, enjoys the activities I 
enjoy, has a similar sense of humor to me and who has similar plans for the future 
that will take her to a similar place as me. The more of these appraisals I make, 
the more the one sister stands out – becoming more and more significant and 
valuable. This of course is not just based on the number of attractive qualities I 
perceive her to have but the importance of those qualities to me. 
Again, not all appraisals are positive. For instance when appraising my 
parents I often find that I am doing so negatively. They not only possess qualities 
that I do not value, but have qualities that make me angry, frustrated and annoyed. 
For example, I get extremely irritated due to the loudness in which my father 
chews his food. On the other hand, I believe my father to be a very kindhearted 
person. Furthermore, my appraisals are both positive and negative. It thus 
becomes a weighing game, such that appraisals can be good and bad and some 
can be more meaningful and significant than others. Moreover the fact that I make 
negative appraisals of him because of the loudness of which he chews food is 
easily outweighed by the appraisal that he is kindhearted. 
 Going back to the example of the sisters, regardless of how much they are 
differentiated from each other by my appraisals, the sister that I appraise as being 
more valuable is still only valuable because she has more qualities or qualities that 
that are more important to me, making her more valuable to me than her sister 
overall. She is quantitatively (as well as qualitatively) the most valuable of the two 
to me. No matter what qualities an object has though, anything that possesses 
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those same qualities is equally valued because the object’s qualities are what 
determine its value. The sister I appraise as being more valuable may have 
more/better qualities than her sister (to me); however, there may be many people 
that have those qualities if not more/better qualities of which I would value them 
more if I met them. 
Every appraisal gives the subject an experience of the object– the subject 
experiences emotions, feelings, desires, and further beliefs based on prior beliefs 
and judgments about the object. As an example, my friend is a good person; she 
is trustworthy, nice, funny, and honest. These are the qualities that make a person 
valuable in my eyes. Once we met and I appraised her, I realized that she had 
these qualities. Before I met her I had an idea of what makes a good friend, what 
qualities a person would have to have for me to want to be his/her friend. When I 
met her the appraisals began. Through our conversations I realized that she was 
funny and we had a very similar sense of humor. We laughed together that day 
with other mutual friends and I noticed the way she interacted with everyone else 
who was with us at the time. She came across as nice and kind. She seemed to 
be an honest person who was not afraid of embarrassing herself in public and I 
admired that. I enjoyed being in her company. She listened as I told her jokes, told 
jokes of her own which made me laugh, and engaged me in our discussions. I 
made judgments about her and the kind of person I thought she was – likewise 
she was doing the same. During the day I had many positive emotions and 
feelings. I felt happy and comfortable, expressed pleasure and joy, all of which led 
me to judge her as a good person that I could enjoy myself with. I appraised her 
based on all of the information that I gathered about her. I judged her as being 
valuable based on her qualities that I experienced as being meaningful – based on 
the kind of person that I took her to be. Just as with the appraisal view of love, I 
liked her because she had value (she possessed the qualities and characteristics 
that I subjectively deemed valuable for a friendship).  
My appraisal of her was subjective in the sense that I found importance in 
her qualities. The qualities that she presented that day were all objective qualities 
– i.e. were open to be objectively perceivable by anyone who was there. The fact 
that she made me and others in the group laugh suggested she was funny, she 
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possessed good communication skills such as listening and engagement in 
conversations, and she was not afraid to speak her mind and be honest about 
questions that she was asked. These qualities were open for anyone to notice but 
the meaningfulness of them was subjective to me, just as the house was 
meaningful for the homebuyer. I find these particular qualities to be valuable in a 
person just like someone else may find different qualities in a person valuable. 
Appraisals work on the basis that objective qualities of an object are perceived 
subjectively by the subject, causing the subject to have certain emotions, feelings 
and further beliefs about the object that create significance, meaning value. 
The process of creating love (appraising and bestowing), is often done 
unconsciously. This is because appraisals are often made unconsciously when 
interacting with an object. While interacting, our focus is not on the emotions and 
feelings and desires we are having but on the exchange between oneself and the 
object. I therefore am not always aware of qualities that I appraise. In the previous 
example with my friend, I did not have a checklist of the qualities that the people 
that I met that day would be judged on. I was not thinking that hanging out with 
people that I have never met before at the beach was going to consist of friendship 
interviews. I merely met a group of people that I did not know and one of them 
stood out as someone that I wanted to spend time with again. Upon reflection I 
can pinpoint the qualities of her that I enjoy and dismiss the qualities that I may not 
care for. Overall the good qualities outweighed the bad qualities and we became 
best friends.105 During that day and the days that followed I was not thinking about 
why I should hang out with her more. I merely enjoyed the day we met, enjoyed 
being around her, and enjoyed the other times that we spent together afterwards.  
In many cases like this, even upon reflection we can be unaware of why we 
like someone. If I am unaware of my original beliefs on a matter like: what is a 
                                                          
105 Relationships involve a system of weighing costs and benefits. My friend 
is funny, nice, and honest which are benefits, however she lived an hour away 
from me, which meant that anytime I wanted to hang out with her I had to drive to 
see her; which of course is not a quality of hers but a factor that affects the future 
of our relationship which is an appraised quality as well, and was not pleasant and 
was a cost. In that situation I felt that the cost was nothing compared to the 
benefits of such a good friend so we ended up hanging out quite a bit and became 
best friends. 
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friend, or what qualities should a person have for me to want to be his/her friend, 
etc., then I may not  be aware of why I enjoy being in someone’s company other 
than the fact I just do enjoy being with him/her. In addition, when I meet new 
people I do not directly try to find out if the person that I meet possesses the 
qualities that I desire, from a friend, checking to see if they have certain qualities 
or asking them upon meeting them if they are nice, funny, honest, etc. I simply go 
about the day and either enjoy myself or do not. Some people may ask direct 
questions to people they meet, for instance potential romantic partners may be 
bombarded with questions about their qualities, tendencies, hopes, dreams, etc.; 
however, people differ in terms of how they appraise people. Appraisals of 
different types of relationships like familial relationships or relationships with 
inanimate objects also differ, and I will explain how later. 
Regardless of our awareness about why we like other people’s company 
more than others, we constantly appraise the objects, including people, around us. 
For instance one of my old friends from college who did not possess many 
favorable qualities in my eyes was my friend nonetheless. When wondering why 
we were friends at all I think back to the times we were together and all I can 
remember is being in a constant state of laughter. He was funny, and I enjoyed 
being around him because he made me laugh like no one else could. At the time I 
did not care about wondering why some people were my friends and others were 
not, I did not analyze my relationships with friends. Nevertheless I still had to have 
made the appraisals of people because I had opinions, and beliefs about people. I 
had a friend who always made me laugh; I valued him for his sense of humor. I 
made judgments and had relationships, all of which required appraisals. For that 
particular friend and the level of friendship we had, I felt that his sense of humor 
outweighed his negative qualities. 
The appraisal step of the process is the same for all other emotions and 
behaviors where a relationship is established. If I were to hate someone, I would 
be forced to appraise them in the same way as I would in love; however, the 
difference is that rather than subjectively appraising the object positively, I would 
do so negatively. The phenomenon of hate will be discussed later in this chapter 
as well as other character traits that negative appraisals issue in such as jealousy, 
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envy, and traits like admiration, etc. For any of these phenomena to occur 
however there must be an intake of information about the object by the subject; 
the object must be appraised. 
Without appraising an object, a person cannot judge it because he/she will 
be unaware of any of its qualities. This goes back to the idea of love’s 
intentionality. Love must take the form of a subject/object relationship. In order to 
hold a belief about something I must know something about it, even if the object is 
fictional, for instance a unicorn. My appraisal of a unicorn would consist of me 
knowing something about it, like that it is a horse with a horn on its head and 
possesses mystical powers. Without an appraisal, no opinions, judgments or 
beliefs about an object can be made. Just as propositions have to be about 
something (in virtue of which the proposition is either true or false); an appraisal 
has to have an object in order for the subject to have a subjective perception of 
what he/she thinks its qualities are.  
Once an object is appraised, we have a perception of it even if that 
perception does not accurately match up to the object (which I will explain shortly). 
By appraising an object, an experience occurs of the subject relating to that object. 
For example, a woman is hungry and thinks about a box of cookies that are in her 
cupboard. Before she thinks of those cookies and before she is hungry, she has 
the belief that cookies are delicious. Upon thinking of the cookies in her cupboard 
she begins to have further beliefs about her going to get the cookies from the 
cupboard. She begins to have feelings, emotions, desires, and more beliefs about 
what it will take to get the cookies and eat them, i.e. getting out of bed, walking 
down the steps, hopes about the satisfaction she will receive from eating the 
cookies etc. This consortium of things is an experience she has about the cookies 
that are in her cupboard. She can later express what it felt like to desire the 
cookies in her cupboard as if her emotions, feelings, behavior, actions, etc. were 
compiled into an experience of desiring and appraising the cookies.   
In order for the subject to have an experience of the object, he/she must 
first appraise it. The accumulation of one’s beliefs, feelings, emotions, etc., 
constitutes the appraisal which leads to the experience of an object. The subject’s 
beliefs about whether an object fits his/her desires affect his/her emotions and 
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feelings. So the belief of the woman that cookies are delicious and she wants 
cookies, coupled with her appraisal of the cookies in her cupboard – there are 
cookies in the cupboard, they have a specific taste that she wants to enjoy – 
creates an experience of anticipation for satisfying her desire, and the cookies 
become valuable to her.  
The same type of appraisal process could be said about fear. The subject 
becomes fearful of an object when he/she appraises that object as being 
something that is fearful. For example, when a person confronts a polar bear, 
his/her beliefs about polar bears are what elicit fear.106 If the person either did not 
know what polar bears are or that the object in front of him/her is a polar bear, or if 
he/she appraised the polar bear as being a cuddly, friendly animal, then he/she 
would not be fearful. The belief that polar bears are dangerous, vicious, possesses 
great strength and speed is generally what elicits the emotions and feelings of fear 
and anxiety. So just like all other appraisals, beliefs, feelings, and emotions create 
an experience of reacting to an object.  
Appraisals are based on beliefs and desires we have about the world 
before we confront the object of appraisal. These desires and beliefs are caused 
by the experiences that we have in the world. By adhering to norms of rationality, 
experimentation, empirical data collecting and any other means of information 
gathering, we acquire beliefs about the world. This is why love is a process that 
begins when we are born – we learn about the world, form beliefs, opinions, 
desires, all of which enter into our appraisals of objects. By taking in information, 
we learn about and adapt to the world. The beliefs that we form when we are 
young either consciously or unconsciously determine how we go about appraising 
objects in the future. We experience emotions and learn to recognize feelings 
based on the experiences that we have. So if I were a child coming into contact 
with a polar bear cub and I did not know what kind of creature it was, the 
experience of that polar bear cub would begin. I would analyze it by recognizing 
colors, shapes, sounds, smells, feels, and would begin to perhaps compare it to 
other similar creatures I have come into contact with or that I have learned about. 
                                                          
106. Robert Solomon, Love: Emotion, Myth, & Metaphor (Amherst: 
Prometheus Books, 1990), 42-43. 
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Perhaps I would interact with it and find that it is playful like a dog and huggable 
like a stuffed animal. My experience of the polar bear cub would allow me to form 
beliefs about it which would therefore shape my future appraisals of polar bear 
cubs.107 
If that happened to be my only experience with polar bear cubs and I were, 
from that point on, to never learn anything else about polar bear cubs, it is likely 
that if I did come across another polar bear cub later in life, then I would appraise it 
based on the information that I gathered as a child. My beliefs about the polar bear 
cub would allow me to access emotions and feelings based on the information and 
experience from my first encounter. My appraisal would therefore be based on my 
knowledge and experience of my original encounter with the polar bear cub. 
By learning about things and experiencing them, we are able to use the 
information gained in later appraisals. Those appraisals create further beliefs, 
emotions and feelings that make up an experience that can lead to the bestowal of 
Value and creating the phenomenon of love. We encounter, learn, form beliefs, 
and have emotions and feelings about objects in the world, then based on the 
experience that those things elicit, we appraise later objects and form new beliefs 
that cause emotions and feelings for them which make up new experiences and is 
how we subjectively appraise the value of objects.  
Thus far, I have focused on appraising objects in a very static way to show 
how appraising an object for its value works. The qualities of an object are often 
more complicatedly perceived and valued than by just encountering an object 
briefly. Subjective appraisals are fluid. While the process of the appraisal stays the 
same, how we appraise objects and what objects are appraised are always 
changing. As Abramson and Leite suggest, appraisals are based on our reaction 
                                                          
107. Andy Clark, “Where Brain, Body, World Collide,” AEDALUS: Journal of 
the American Academy of Arts and Science Vol. 127: no 2: (Spring 1998) p. 257-
280, 21, accessed February 14, 2014, 
http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/people/clark/pubs/where.pdf.  
 
  
107 
 
to objects.108  For instance I may appraise an object in one instance as being 
valuable for a certain reason but in another instance, appraise that same object as 
being not valuable for different reasons. This is a familiar occurrence because our 
circumstances in the world are always changing. A man may appraise the 
government action of giving subsidies to large corporations as being harmful to the 
nation because he himself is in the lower income bracket and believes that the 
economic principle of the trickle-up effect is a better way to boost the economy. 
Later in life however, the man may appraise the government action of giving 
subsidies to large corporations as being helpful to the country because he has 
become the owner of a large corporation and now believes that the best way to 
help the economy is through the trickle-down effect. The same government action 
of proving subsidies to large corporations is therefore appraised differently 
because the circumstances of the individual changed. What once was a negative 
appraisal of an economic policy became a positive appraisal in a different 
circumstance. 
Mood may also affect our appraisals. For example, a teacher might (but 
should not) grade students’ papers more generously when in a good mood than 
when in a bad mood. The qualities of an object are therefore not the only factor 
when a subject appraises it. Appraisals are heavily reliant on the circumstance of 
the subject. When appraising an object, we appraise the qualities that we perceive 
the object to have; however, our circumstance when appraising an object may 
skew our perception of it from how we might perceive it given different 
circumstances. Some appraisals for instance can occur immediately with little 
interaction between subject and object, like appraisals of physical qualities, 
whereas other appraisals require time and effort on the subject’s part. It may take 
a person hours or days and numerous encounters to appraise someone or 
something, just like as some people need to hear a song a hundred times before 
they come to like it. Sometimes, the attitude and behavior of the subject brings out 
qualities in the object for the subject to appraise. For example, a person who has 
an understanding and empathetic personality may encourage another person to 
                                                          
108. Kate Abramson and Adam Leite, “Love as a Reactive Emotion,” 676 -
678.  
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divulge qualities about him/herself by getting the person to express his/her 
personality – something that the subject may not have had the pleasure to 
perceive if it were not for the subject encouraging the person to express 
him/herself.  
The circumstances of the subject play an important role when appraising an 
object because the subject’s circumstances may alter the outcome of his/her 
appraisal. Suppose for instance I have had a rough week at work and am 
desperate for a relaxing night at home on the couch with a book in an attempt to 
avoid other people, and lose myself in the story. Suppose my best friend is going 
through a divorce or break-up and calls me and asks me to meet him at a club to 
party and get his ex-partner off his mind. Despite desperately wanting to sit at 
home, alone and read my book, I feel obliged to help my friend through a rough 
time. I get dressed and head out to meet my friend, all the while silently wishing I 
was at home with my book. We enter the club and are surrounded by people 
(exactly what I wanted to avoid that night). My mood is negative and even though I 
pretend to be having fun for my friend’s sake, I am constantly thinking about how 
nice it would be to be at home relaxing. Now suppose we find our way to a group 
of people and a woman begins to flirt with me and rather than flirt back, I brush her 
off because I am not in the mood to flirt or for that matter, talk to or be around 
anyone. Perhaps months later I run into that same woman that was flirting with me 
in the club and come to find that she is an incredibly charming woman. She 
expresses her interest in things that interest me, has a great sense of humor, and 
is a great person – an ideal romantic partner. I then come to find out that shortly 
after the night I met her in the club she met someone and then later got engaged. I 
missed my chance to have a romantic relationship with her because having 
brushed her off that night in the club I failed to notice her charming personality. 
Romantic relationships are not the only types of relationships that are 
affected by the subject’s circumstances. Perhaps I get fired from my job; I am sad, 
frustrated, and lethargic about my future. I get home, turn on the television and 
begin flipping through the channels, looking for something to watch. I come across 
a program and watch the first ten minutes. The show seems silly, poorly made, 
and the story is too slow for me to enjoy. My bad mood makes me impatient and 
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negative towards everything. Skip ahead three years and I get offered an 
opportunity from my current job to travel to a foreign country I have always wanted 
to go. I drive home, excited for my adventure, happy with my future prospects, 
feeling adventurous, and constantly thinking about what life will be like in a foreign 
country. I have no plans that night so I get home and turn on the television. The 
show that I found dull three years ago comes on the television, however this time, 
being in a more adventurous mood, I watch the whole thing, for the purpose of 
experiencing and giving new things a chance. When the program is over I am 
struck by how entertaining it is. Whereas it was tedious before, now it is pleasant 
entertainment.  
In both of these scenarios and many others like it, the way we appraise 
things is affected by our circumstances. Any distractions can affect my appraisal of 
things. For instance if I go out with some friends after doing poorly on a test or 
maybe I get reprimanded at work, my foul mood that evening may prohibit me from 
interacting with someone that is perfect for me, as in the example of my going to 
the club with my friend. Perhaps I am stressed because of an upcoming deadline 
and when interacting with an associate that I do not talk to much, he makes a few 
jokes that I would under normal circumstances find funny, but because I am only 
half paying attention (because my mind is on my upcoming deadline) I brush him 
off, not experiencing his sense of humor and therefore not desiring to spend more 
time with him. Just as Abramson and Leite suggest, the qualities of the object 
often come about through interaction.109 
It is not just negative moods that affect the way we appraise objects though. 
Positive circumstances in our life may get us to appraise objects more 
optimistically than we would otherwise have done. Even desperately desiring to 
form a positive appraisal may make us appraise objects differently than if we do 
not desperately desire to do so. Perhaps a woman goes out desperately looking 
for a romantic partner. Her desperation may influence her to appraise a potential 
partner positively despite his negative qualities because her desire to find a 
romantic partner has caused her to overlook or discount his negative qualities and 
focus only on his positive qualities. 
                                                          
109 Ibid., 675.  
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Of course, I do not only want my analysis to be restricted to romantic or 
friendship types of relationships only. Appraisals of all objects happen in this same 
way. While moods may not play a large role in the appraisals of family members or 
some other objects (because the constant interaction with family persists 
throughout many different moods), we appraise objects for their value in the same 
way. 
Appraisals however do not constitute love on their own; they are just the 
first part of the process. Loving an object is solely based on the intrinsic qualities 
of an object. If it were, our love objects would be replaceable by anything else that 
possesses the same or better qualities. But a core feature of love is that the 
beloved is irreplaceable and love requires more than a subjective appraisal to 
make the object irreplaceable. If the people and things we love are truly 
irreplaceable, then a theory of love ought to account for that feature. That being 
said, subjective appraisals alone do not give us the experience of our love object 
being irreplaceably significant. They are purely a way of experiencing an object 
and valuing it based on its qualities. 
 
3.2 Bestowal  
While the appraisal part of love is object-centric in that the subject values 
the object because of the qualities it is perceived of having, the bestowal part of 
the process focuses on value that is given to the object in the form of an attitudinal 
response to the experience that the appraisal of the object causes the subject to 
have. Bestowing Value is the act of attributing irreplaceable significance (Value) to 
the object in virtue of which the object is perceived as possessing the quality of 
representing the experience of the subject’s relating to it. The Value attributed to 
the object is a projection of the subject’s experience of relating to the object’s 
perceived qualities. When the subject perceives the object’s qualities and 
appraises the object, he/she has certain emotions, feelings, beliefs, and desires 
about the object that make it valuable. The value of having those emotions, 
feelings, beliefs and desires is then projected by the subject onto the object so that 
the object represents the value of the subject’s experience of responding to it – 
which makes the object irreplaceable and significant. Once Value is bestowed by 
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the subject, he/she perceives the object as possessing this Value, just as it 
possesses the qualities of beauty and a sense of humor. The subject perceives 
the object as being trustworthy, sincere, having dark hair, and as representing the 
Valuable experience of his/her response to it. For instance a man may not only 
perceive his long-time pet cat’s personality and looks, he may also perceive its 
specialness of being irreplaceably significant, unlike other cats. The Value of the 
cat becomes a quality to the subject that consists of the experience the subject 
has of her. This quality makes the cat stand out from other cats as being special. 
Love occurs when the bestowal consists of Value – an irreplaceable 
significance of the object. By bestowing Value onto an object, we attribute to it a 
quality that is not intrinsic to it – it is subject dependent. This value is dependent 
on the subject’s attribution of irreplaceable significance through his/her experiential 
reaction to his/her subjective appraisal. Once the Value is attributed to the object, 
the subject perceives the object as having this Value. To the subject, Value 
becomes a quality of the object. 
The idea of a subject projecting a quality onto an object is not peculiar to 
love. Only when Value is projected does the subject love the object. Some 
projections however do not attribute significance or value to an object, or create a 
negative value instead. As an example we can look at how we can bestow 
qualities that are not intrinsic to an object and are not qualities of Value either. 
Suppose a woman is unfaithful to her husband and has sex with another man. The 
husband then comes to find that she had had sex with the man in a motel located 
on his route to work. Every day he drives by that motel. At first he may think to 
himself when driving past it, “That is where my wife cheated on me.” He may 
imagine what happened between his wife and her lover, get angry, frustrated, sad, 
and have many other negative emotions. After a while, if he continues having the 
same negative emotions every time he passes the motel, he may eventually 
associate that motel with the feeling of being sad and aggravated. Then, when he 
drives past the motel, he may no longer have the specific thought “that is where 
my wife cheated on me,” but simply becomes automatically sad and upset. The 
motel would become a direct representation of his experience with it – being sad 
and aggravated when he sees the motel. He will have bestowed his experience on 
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the motel as a quality that is not intrinsic to it. He responds to the motel without 
even thinking of his wife’s infidelity or the experience that he has associated with 
it. He thus projects the negative experience (the emotions, feelings, and beliefs) 
he has of the motel on the motel, and that experience becomes a quality of it – to 
the husband. It becomes a representation of his negative experiences, a quality 
that he bestowed on the motel. 
A bestowal of Value occurs in the same way, only with the projection of 
irreplaceable significance on the object to which the object represents the 
experience the subject has of it. We bestow Value on an object which is made up 
of the experience of our response to it. The object becomes a representation of 
that experience and therefore significant and irreplaceable. If the object does not 
become significant and irreplaceable then a bestowal of Value would not have 
been made, but instead a value of different sorts, perhaps a negative value as in 
the example of the man and the motel. Further appraisals of an object after a 
bestowal of Value may consist of the object’s possessing the quality of being 
special (significant in an irreplaceable way) in addition to its other subjective 
qualities. So after the initial bestowal of Value, the subject’s future appraisals 
include the Value that was previously bestowed on the object and therefore the 
experience that the object represents is reinforced (or possibly diminished which 
will be addressed later in this chapter), making the object more significant. 
Bestowing Value is the response of the subject based on the subjective 
valuation resulting from appraisals. The appraisal view states that the subject 
deems the object valuable because of the desirable qualities it has. For instance, I 
believe my dog is beautiful because she has certain, intrinsic qualities that I value 
as being beautiful; under a bestowal view however, the value comes from the 
subject ‘creating a quality’ in the object that is not intrinsic to it, i.e. the projection of 
my experience of it (the way in which I respond to it). I therefore make my dog 
valuable to me by attributing Value (the quality of irreplaceable significance) to her 
because I perceive her qualities and evaluate them as being important to me. 
The act of bestowal, like appraisal, often occurs unconsciously without our 
awareness; which is why we often wrestle with the idea of whether we love (Value) 
something or just value it for its qualities. Since we attribute various degrees of 
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importance short of irreplaceable significance to objects, knowing whether the 
object has had Value bestowed upon it and is irreplaceably significant to us is not 
always straightforward. We may often feel as if love grows gradually so we do not 
realize it the second it comes to exist – we value the object one day, thinking it is 
significant because of its qualities; then, at a subsequent time, we bestow Value 
on it, making it the object of our love; all the while, we are not sure when we 
switched from merely valuing it, to Valuing (loving) it. It is not necessary for a 
person to know that he/she is bestowing Value on an object for love to occur, just 
as long as the object becomes irreplaceably significant to the subject. Since we 
experience our emotions, feelings, beliefs, desires, etc. differently from one 
another, we should accept that the experience of bestowing Value onto an object 
(i.e. loving something) can occur without our being aware that it is/has happened. 
Regardless of when exactly the bestowal of Value occurs or whether the subject 
realizes that he/she Values the object, the object gains the quality of being 
irreplaceably significant to the subject. It becomes more than just a set of qualities 
to the subject though; the object becomes a representation of the experience the 
subject has of it – and whether we know what conditions to look for to know 
whether we are in love, we can often feel and experience the beloved’s 
irreplaceable significance, even if we do not realize that perceiving an object in 
such a way is what love is. 
 For a more in depth example as to how the bestowal of Value works, I will 
use the relationship I have with my father. My father is important to me, not solely 
because of his qualities (because many people possess the same qualities as 
him), but because of the Value that I have bestowed on him. His Value is not just 
based on the fact that he has raised me to be understanding, intelligent, 
hardworking, or honest. He does not just have Value because he bought me 
things and tried to provide me with all of the opportunities that he could. His Value 
does not even solely stem from the fact that he made life enjoyable for me, was 
fun to play sports with and made me laugh with his antics on the golf course where 
we would bond each weekend. Even though these are qualities of his that I value, 
I would similarly value anyone who does these things. The difference between my 
father and anyone else who possess these same qualities is that my experience of 
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those qualities was with him and not with anyone else. Since he was the one that I 
experienced life with (which has been positive, significant and meaningful), I 
created Value in him based on the experience of appraising him. I project the 
Value of my experience of how I respond to him (my beliefs, emotions and 
feelings) onto him. I love him (bestow Value on him) because he represents my 
feelings of happiness for succeeding at things I did that made him proud and the 
warmth and comfort I felt when he took care of me when I got hurt. He represents 
all of those things he did for me (taught me to be the person that I am, provided for 
me, and took care of me) and the meaningfulness of experiencing them. He 
represents my belief that he would do anything for me (even though he would 
complain about it every step of the way). He represents my emotions, memories, 
beliefs, feelings and desires. This is the significance that I bestow on him that 
makes him irreplaceable to me. He becomes a representation of my experience 
with him. He becomes significantly important and irreplaceable because I have 
bestowed the Value of the experiences that I have of relating to him. 
Kolodny makes a similar point of the object representing the experience of 
the relationship when he states that the subject “mak[es] the object the source of 
value.”110 It is not merely the relationship that provides the reasons for love 
however, as it is with Kolodny’s appraisal view. Instead, the qualities of the object 
combined with the experiences of the subject make up the experience that is 
projected onto the object. Furthermore, contrary to Singer’s bestowal view, love is 
reducible to the appraisal which generates desires, beliefs, emotions, and feelings. 
The appraisal gives us an experience of the object that is then projected onto the 
object as a quality of representing that experience which makes the object 
irreplaceably significant – the Value of the object. We can thus avoid the problem 
of a bestowal view (not explaining where the Value that is bestowed comes from) 
by reducing it to its appraised elements. It does not happen magically or by a 
mysterious cause. The bestowal of Value can be reduced to the experiences of 
the subject and the qualities of the object that are combined and projected onto 
the object as a given quality.  
                                                          
110. Niko Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” 150. 
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What distinguishes love from other attitudinal responses is the bestowal of 
Value. When we bestow Value for love, we conduct the same process of 
appraising as the woman did with the cookies in the example in the last section. 
The difference however comes when we bestow the Value of our experience of 
responding to the object onto the object – creating the quality of irreplaceable 
significance that is special to that object, separating it from any other objects 
regardless of their similarities. I project the experience of my appraisal onto the 
object, giving it a quality that it did not possess, a representational quality. So 
when I appraise it after that, my appraisal takes into account that quality of my 
experience just as my initial appraisal was a response to the quality of say taste in 
a cookie or in a romantic relationship how an appraisal accounts for a sense of 
humor or trustworthiness.  By projecting the experience I have of appraising the 
object, it gains a quality that is personal and private. No one else can appraise the 
object for the quality that I have given it because no one can experience the 
experience that I had when appraising it. For instance, if I explained to someone 
why I loved my mother, told them about all the kind things she has done, the 
memories I have of her, etc., I would still have an experience of those instances 
that include my feelings from times we shared together, emotions I had when I 
was with her, worries of losing her, etc. I would have a unique experience that no 
one could experience themselves. The experience would be organized a specific 
way and feel a specific way, just as a piece of writing can be unique because of 
the style and organization of how it is written. The content may be similar to other 
pieces, but the intricacies are different.    
The bestowed quality that is given to an object in love is not a verifiable 
quality like having a specific eye color or a sense of humor. The quality is one that 
only I can perceive because only I have experienced it. Even if two women love 
the same man, the experience that they bestow upon him is different and 
individual to each of them. If we were to ask both women why they love him and 
both were to give identical accounts of his valuable qualities, their love would still 
be different because of the way in which they experience those qualities. Even if 
both women only experienced the man at the exact same times during the same 
dates, they would still have a different experience of him because of the way they 
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subjectively appraise him. This would happen because the women themselves are 
different. They have different relationship role models, different experiences about 
relationships, different attitudes, expectations, beliefs, etc. As I mentioned earlier, 
love is a process, and that process begins to develop in childhood because 
learning how to relate to the world and to others shapes our experience of the 
world and others. We have experiences and ways of thinking that influence how 
we appraise. So with the two women who both love the same man, their bestowal 
of Value onto the man stems from their experiences rather than his perceivable 
qualities. The qualities of the man help create the experience the women have – 
having beliefs, feelings, emotions, desires, etc. – and those different experiences 
are projected onto the man, bestowing onto him the Value of being irreplaceably 
significant to each woman. 
Experiences form the basis of the quality that is bestowed on the love 
object. Instead of citing qualities of the object that are meaningful and valuable like 
his/her trustworthiness, understandingness, nuturingness etc., which are 
replaceable qualities, a person’s bestowal of Value can be explained with 
reference to particular instances of experiences or merely an overall experience of 
relating to the object. The intricacies of how a person relates to an object, creates 
an experience of that object being irreplaceable. While it may sound odd that a 
person is capable of eloquently listing reasons for why they love things, it is not 
hard to believe that the object that is loved has a phenomenological quality that 
separates it from other similar objects for the subject – that quality being the 
representational Value of the experience that has been bestowed upon it by the 
subject. So while many of us cannot verbally explain our love for an object, our 
experience of love will have come from perceiving an object as being irreplaceably 
significant, because the object represents an experience of relating to it that is 
valuable because of its intrinsic qualities. In other words, an object’s Value 
consists of its qualities and how we react to those qualities which create an 
experience for the subject. That experience is then bestowed on the object as 
being a quality (the object becomes a representation of Value – the experience the 
subject had) which affords the object significance and makes it irreplaceable.  
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 I therefore do not love my mother because she simply played kickball with 
me in the street when I was young or because she got me ready for school every 
morning, rain or shine – the value of doing these things is something that is 
replaceable. I love my mother because of my experience of all those things – how 
I have felt and thought about her during and after those experiences and what they 
meant to me (their meaningfulness). They were subjective experiences to me and 
me alone, making them irreplaceable. Again however, it may often be difficult for 
people to explain why they love their mothers. One might say “I love my mother 
because she is my mother,” however there is an experience that underlies that 
saying. If I loved her just because she is my mother then anyone who happened to 
be my mother is someone I would love, however this may not be the case if my 
mother was someone who beat me and treated me poorly. I love her because I 
have a favorable experience of Value that I have bestowed on her – the 
experience of my knowing she is my mother and believing that she has been a 
good mother and the emotions and feelings that she represents from those past 
and current experiences of her doing those motherly things. Her Value to me not 
only relies on the fact that she is my mother, but that being my mother is a quality 
that I value.  
So if two women were presented to me, one of them being my mother and 
the other being an equally good mother, and I was asked which mother is more 
significant to me, I would choose my mother. The reason is because my mother 
has something that the other woman does not have. Solomon may suggest that I 
chose my mother because of the qualities that she has, Kolodny might suggest 
that I chose my mother because of the relationship I have with her, Abramson and 
Leite may suggest that I chose my mother because of my reactive attitude toward 
her and not the other woman, and Singer may suggest it is because my mother 
has an irreducible value that the other woman does not have. I would agree with 
each of them. My mother does have something that the other woman does not 
(Solomon); it would be a quality that I have bestowed on her (Singer); that quality 
would be my reaction to her qualities (Abramson and Leite), and would consist of 
the experience and relationship I have with her (Kolodny). My mother would 
represent something to me that the other woman does not. She would represent 
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my childhood, my emotions and feelings of growing up, the habits and qualities of 
my mother – an experience of my relating to her that is irreplaceable.     
The experience is what is represented by the bestowal of Value.  The Value 
becomes a new quality of the object that is created by the subject, and that value 
represents the experience I had of the object. The object becomes an image for 
that experience as a result of the bestowal. It becomes the object of love – an 
object that is irreplaceably significant. By loving an object, the lover projects 
his/her beliefs, feelings and emotions (experience) onto the beloved as a quality (a 
representational quality). Since the emotions, feelings, and beliefs can only be 
experienced by the person having them, the projection is original and creates the 
Value in the object that afterwards can be perceived by the subject that bestows it 
as a quality of the object. 
 
3.3 Appraisal and Bestowal as Conditions of Love 
The act of appraising and bestowing Value is the process that creates the 
phenomenon of love. Within the process we experience feelings, emotions, beliefs 
and desires; we make judgments, have opinions, act certain ways, etc. Love is a 
way of responding to an object. By subjectively valuing an object’s qualities and 
then bestowing irreplaceable significance on the object once that appraisal is 
made, the object is given a quality that it did not previously have. By bestowing a 
piece of oneself (the experience – emotions, feelings, beliefs, etc.) onto an object, 
it becomes the object of love. Bestowing that representational quality onto the 
object makes it Valuable and special because of the significance that no one but 
the person appraising and bestowing can elicit. The object becomes irreplaceably 
significant because of the experience that it represents – a representation that only 
exists through the person who projects it. This is why love is often portrayed in 
poems and novels as being special, magical, a phenomenon to strive for and 
worth sacrificing everything for. We would give our lives to protect our partners, 
children, parents, friends, and even our pets and our nation. While the action of 
protecting these things does not necessarily mean that we love them and our love 
for them does not necessitate our disposition to give our lives to protect them, the 
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things that we love hold a specialness, a Value that makes them more significant 
to us than other objects and often worth sacrificing for.    
In this section I will focus on the phenomenon of love in regards to 
relationships and the different ways that love can be expressed as well as outlining 
how an A/B theory captures the behaviors and experiences of love. Any theory of 
love ought to be able to address why and how we experience the phenomenon of 
love in different ways and exhibit different behaviors despite the same underlying 
A/B process; because again, there are innumerable different ways of experiencing 
love and even the way we think about it differs among individuals. In addition I will 
focus on notions such as infatuation, love over time, arranged marriages, 
pathological love, and the different objects that can be loved.  
Throughout this thesis I have used examples about people who appraise 
other people, inanimate objects, animals, and ideas and have done so in the 
context of different types of relationships, whether it is romantic relationships, 
familial relationships, relationships of friendships, relationships between people 
and inanimate objects, pets, and other things. Similarly, I have tried to provide 
different examples of people bestowing Value on different things. The reason for 
doing this is because all objects can be objects of love, in some form. One of the 
features of love I laid out in the first chapter was that it has different forms, such as 
familial love, romantic love, love of friends, love of gods, etc. Because we express 
our love for different things the A/B theory of love accounts for the different objects 
that can be loved in different ways. It therefore follows from the A/B theory that 
anything can be the object of love. 
In addition, the reasons of love – what counts as a meaningful experience 
of subjectively appraising an object’s value, differs from person to person. And 
since we create meaningfulness and the Value that is bestowed on an object is 
also done differently among people, there is no set type of experience to create 
love. People do not need to be flushed, and have sweaty palms to love an object, 
they do not need to feel that they need to protect and look after the object. People 
do not need to know every detail about the object. While there may be social 
guidelines as to the forms of love, for instance familial love may require the lover 
and beloved to have the same bloodline or romantic love may require some sort of 
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sexual intimacy, loving an object (creating Value in it), has no experiential 
requirements. Whether a person creates Value in a person who has deceived the 
subject about his/her qualities or creates Value in an object that is harmful to 
him/her does not matter. Just as it would be odd to suggest that a person who is 
scared of something is not really scared because he/she is not scared for the right 
reasons or of a legitimate object, so the same is the case with love.       
 There are no limits to what can and cannot be loved and for what reasons, 
just as long as the A/B process occurs through which the lover creates Value in 
the beloved. This is because any object can be appraised by the subject. An 
object must have qualities, even if the object and qualities are unreal, like a 
unicorn. Regardless of the real-world existence of a unicorn, we are capable of 
appraising it for the qualities that we take it to have. Those qualities can cause us 
to have an experience of the object and therefore have the tools for making a 
bestowal of Value. By placing a Value on the object it becomes a beloved – an 
object of love. 
It may sound odd to love something like a wardrobe for instance, but we 
cannot exclude the possibility of someone to do so. Of course it would be silly to 
think of loving something like an old wardrobe in the same way that a person loves 
his wife or husband, but that is because these are examples of two different forms 
of love. Even familial love and romantic love are different and exhibit different 
behaviors, thoughts, feelings, emotions and desires. Perhaps it is not difficult to 
see why romantic and familial love can be examples of love since the object in 
both forms are people. But surely people are not the only thing that can be loved. 
Once we begin thinking about other objects besides people that can be loved, we 
will soon realize that excluding anything will cause major problems for a theory of 
love. For instance suppose we were to believe that only objects that could relate 
with us in a specific, let us say, “loving” way can be the objects of love. Then we 
might have to exclude people that cannot respond in this “loving” way, like 
mentally handicapped people or babies. Denying that we can have love for babies 
and mentally handicapped people just because they do not relate “properly” to us 
is ridiculous.  
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 The reason someone could love objects like babies, food, art, romantic 
partners, etc. is because love is a way of responding to an object. It is a way of 
creating Value in an object by bestowing a quality on it that represents the 
experience a person has with it. We therefore must accept that a person can 
perform this type of response toward anything that can be appraised. For example, 
suppose a schizophrenic man believes that a book is a person. In the man’s head 
he may believe the book is communicating with him and having a relationship like 
most people have with friends. The schizophrenic man appraises the book for its 
qualities, has beliefs that the book is of value for those qualities and thus has 
emotions and feelings that are associated with his beliefs about the book to the 
point that he bestows that experience on the book, like a mother bestows her 
experiences of her child. The schizophrenic man may bestow the quality of being a 
representation of his experiences with it, just like a person who loves another 
person. The man would see the book as being an object of Value that he created, 
deeming it significantly irreplaceable. He would protect the book from harm, look 
after the book, etc. In this instance it would be plausible that the man does in fact 
love the book, regardless of his believing that the book communicates to him or 
has a human persona. 
Of course we might think this to be a pathological case in which the man 
and the book are not actually friends so his friendship love of the book cannot be 
genuine; however that does not mean that the man does not love the book. We 
might accept that the love is not friendship love because certain factors need to go 
into what it means to be a friendship, but that does not negate the possibility that 
he loves the book in some specific form of love. There would be no difference 
between the man loving his book and an artist loving her painting. Again if we 
were to think that loving a painting is different because the qualities of the painting 
exist objectively in contrast to the illusory qualities that the schizophrenic man 
perceives in the book, then we would also have to deny Plato’s love for Truth or a 
Christian’s love for God. In both of these instances Plato and Christians perceive 
qualities that are not objectively present in their object, and to deny them the 
experience of love would demolish our experience of understanding the 
phenomenon of love. If we cannot include the experiences of the Greeks or 
122 
 
Christians as legitimate experiences of love, also on the grounds of pathology, 
why could someone not maintain that actually their (Greeks or Christians) 
experience of love was genuine, and that our experience of loving our family and 
friends is fallacious?    
If love is fundamentally a relation, then how can we put limits on the kinds 
of objects that we can relate to lovingly? For another example, take a game puck 
that was kept as a trophy by a hockey player who scored with it, setting a world 
record. That puck, like a loved one, may be Valuable because of the experience 
that is bestowed on it. The puck may even be treated better than some of the 
hockey player’s loved ones. He could constantly dote over it, clean the case that it 
is held in, refuse to let people touch it because they might lose it or scuff it and 
may even talk to it. The hockey player’s relationship with the puck would be one in 
which he appraises it based on the quality of the puck (it being the puck he used to 
score the world record goal with), causing him to have emotions and feelings and 
beliefs about the puck that he then bestows onto the puck, making it Valuable for 
its representational quality. The experience that he bestows on the puck may be 
the memories of scoring the record breaking goal, the excitement of the game, and 
the feel of his skates on the ice. These experiences are his that he projects onto 
the puck so that the puck becomes more than the puck he scored the record 
breaking goal with. It is his life as a hockey player and he creates Value in the 
puck that is specialized and unique to him. 
This of course does not mean that every game puck or ball that athletes 
keep is an object of love. Some are mere symbols or items of remembrance that 
are kept as an object of value. In the instance of a game ball that is not an object 
of love, it would simply be valuable based on its appraisal – its objective qualities. 
The athlete may keep the ball that she used to score the game winning basket 
because it is the ball that was used to score the game winning basket. When 
people buy these types of items at auctions, they are buying the object because it 
is valuable in itself – in that a quality of the puck makes it valuable to others for the 
same reason. The value is the type of value that is perceived by simply appraising 
the object. It does not have a bestowed value like the game puck that the hockey 
player creates for it. It is objectively valuable. This does not mean that the person 
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buying the ball at an auction cannot love it however. If of course the person who 
buys the ball relates to it in the right way, than it can become an object of love for 
him/her just like the puck did for the hockey player in the above example.     
A similar type of value is given to objects like wedding rings. Rings are no 
doubt valuable objects, usually exceeding their monetary value. They are valuable 
because they are symbols of love, commitment, togetherness, etc. Just because 
they are valuable though does not mean that those wearing them love them. 
Wedding rings remind the people wearing them of the actual beloved (the romantic 
partner), they symbolize the marriage; they represent a union. These however are 
qualities that are appraised values, and appraised values alone do not create love. 
In addition to making an appraisal, a bestowal of Value is also needed for love. 
Without the bestowal of Value, we run into the problems that the Appraisal View 
faced, such as the problem of fungibility. Bestowal is what gives specialness to the 
object which stimulates the experience of love. Appraisal on the other hand 
creates a relationship with an object and gives the subject something to relate to. 
Only with both the appraisal and bestowal of Value can love occur. 
So while relationships can spawn love, any object with which a subject can 
form a relationship can be an object of love. This is why there are different forms 
of love. Not all love relationships are the same. Romantic love is different from 
familial love; familial love is different from the love of an idea like truth or 
happiness. All the forms differ in ways that represent the type of love instantiated; 
therefore the love of objects should not to be dismissed as inappropriate, 
metaphorical, or as a pathological form or object of love. Again, love is a 
phenomenon that consists of relating to an object by the process of appraising and 
bestowing Value onto it. 
Even though any object can be an object of love, this does not mean that 
our use of the term “love” always denotes an actual case of love. For much of the 
time, we use the word “love” metaphorically. For example when we eat a good 
meal, drink an ice cold soda on a warm day, suggest that we love playing with a 
frisbee on the beach, we most likely are expressing a strong desire or liking of 
these things. As much as I may claim that I love soda, I do not actually love it. 
Soda is delicious and thinking of soda makes my mouth water however one can of 
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soda can be easily replaced by another one. I appraise the objective qualities of 
soda and have a subjective experience of it. I do not bestow anything on a can of 
soda, although that does not mean that someone in the world cannot love a 
specific can of soda or perhaps the idea of soda, only that we often use the word 
“love” metaphorically or inappropriately. Because of this, our use of the word “love” 
does not always refer to the actual phenomenon of love. I may love a can of soda, 
I may not. If I respond to an object by appraising it and bestowing Value on it, then 
the object is loved by me. If I do not bestow that Value on it, then my use of the 
word “love” would be metaphorical. 
Because love requires the subject to have an experience of the object, 
some love relationships may take some time to develop. Arranged marriages are a 
perfect example of time’s inclusion into love. In an arranged marriage, the 
husband and wife often have not met and know little about each other before 
getting married. Love is not their reason for getting married, but it often comes 
later. Once the couple spends time together even if they initially dislike one 
another, they may experience emotions and feelings and form beliefs about one 
another – emotions, beliefs, and feelings that would not have existed without their 
spending time together. After spending so much time together they can become 
comfortable with the other and in their living situation. They go through sicknesses 
together, raising children together, happy times together, all of which provide each 
person with beliefs and experiences about the other. Since they spend so much 
time together, they invariably become open to one another and after some time, 
they may begin to see the experiences they have had together represented in the 
other. They will have bestowed this representational quality on one another, which 
gives the partner a value that he/she did not possess before the other started 
seeing him/her as a representation of the experiences they have had. They have 
shared their lives together, the ups the downs. They become valuable and 
important to one another for the quality that each has created in the other. They 
are the husband or wife that has been by each other’s side. Unlike when they first 
met and got married, they appraise one another on traits that they may not have 
liked previously but do now because those traits evoke pleasant feelings and 
emotions which provide an experience that is valuable and can be bestowed on 
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one another, making each other irreplaceably significant to one another – because 
of their having to spend time together. 
The creation of love in an arranged marriage is in fact very similar to finding 
love through the conventional western dating game. It seems odd to think that 
every time a single adult goes out on the town, they are looking for love. While 
people often say and think that love might happen, what they really do is go out 
looking for a relationship and through that relationship hope to find (create) love. 
We look for someone who has certain qualities and characteristics that we can 
appraise and through that appraisal we can enter into a relationship, where we 
become susceptible to falling in love. So just as with arranged marriage, love is 
often not the first objective when considering romantic partners or friends in similar 
forms of love. Creating the relationship is the primary goal, while beginning to love 
a person may come later. This however does not mean that love cannot be 
created quickly in a relationship. 
Let us consider the notion and experience of love at first sight, a 
phenomenon which my Appraisal/Bestowal view recognizes; notwithstanding the 
rarity of this ‘Romeo and Juliet’ type of love. But just because love at first sight 
may be uncommon, a theory of love ought to be able to recognize its possibility 
because of the reports of people who do actually experience it. In Romeo and 
Juliet, upon entering the ball, Romeo spots Juliet from across the room and with 
that first glance, without ever having spoken to her and knowing nothing about her 
other than the few physical qualities that he visually perceives, he falls madly in 
love with her, and her with him.111 This idea of love may be thought of as some 
kind of fictional romantic story that is not real love and does not accurately account 
for how love in the real world happens; however, who is to say that love at first 
sight does not or cannot actually occur? An explanation of love ought to allow for 
such a phenomenon since it seems reasonable to assume that somewhere in the 
world, at some point, two people saw each other for the first time, and created a 
similar bond to that represented by Romeo and Juliet. Again, suppose for instance 
love can only occur after a certain period of acquaintanceship; but then what is the 
                                                          
111. William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, ed. Brian Gibbons (London: 
Methuen & Co., 1980), 116.  
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cutoff point between an adequate period of acquaintance and one that is too 
short? Why could love not occur for some people after a period slightly shorter 
than the stipulated adequate period of acquaintance, and so on? So a theory 
would seem much stronger if it not only recognizes as a possibility this 
phenomenon of love at first sight, but can also explain it. 
Under the Appraisal/Bestowal theory, love at first sight is possible because 
the two main requirements can be met (appraising and bestowing Value). Upon 
seeing someone we are able to appraise him/her on his/her physical qualities. This 
may be the person’s looks or their actions or mannerisms. An appraisal on just the 
physical qualities of another may match up to an idea of a romantic partner in the 
lover’s imagination. For example, if Romeo desired a lover and envisioned himself 
in a relationship with a woman, thinking of all the grandiose experiences that being 
in love would create, then upon seeing someone who fits this image, he would be 
able to bestow the experiences that she evokes of that desired relationship and he 
would have the experience that would allow him to bestow Value on her. His 
appraisal of her would induce his beliefs, emotions, and feelings which he could 
experience as being that imagined relationship and would therefore bestow upon 
her, the sense of Value and importance that was elicited by her physical qualities 
in interaction with his imagination.  
Similarly, this could be the cause of how we begin to love in what is known 
as rebound relationships. A rebound relationship is a relationship that happens 
shortly after the end of the previous relationship in which the lover transfers 
feelings and emotions that he/she had with the previous beloved and bestows 
those experiences on the new beloved. This is a phenomenon that happens quite 
frequently in order for people to deal with the failure of the previous relationship. It 
is a way of not having to feel lonely after getting out of a relationship and to not 
have to cope to adjusting to a change in one’s lifestyle. Regardless of the reason, 
rebound relationships occur very similarly to relationships that are based on love 
at first sight. Suppose a woman gets left by her girlfriend of three years and then, a 
day later, she meets another woman who seems attractive and nice and after only 
one or two dates, she falls in love with her. It may be the case that her past 
feelings of being with her ex-girlfriend, the emotions that she experienced with her 
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and the beliefs that she has about an ideal partner were transferred to her new 
girlfriend, thus bestowing onto her a representative quality of her experience with 
her new girlfriend that the appraisal of her stimulates. 
It is quite easy to see what is not good about a rebound relationship from 
the above example. Since the woman transfers feelings, beliefs, and emotions 
from the ex-girlfriend to the new-girlfriend, she misleads herself into believing that 
the new-girlfriend represents the experience of the ex-girlfriend. As the relationship 
develops, her appraisal of her new-girlfriend will change and alter as appraisals do 
(since we grow and change, so does our desires and interests). Perhaps when 
she becomes more stable in terms of not being scared by the idea of being lonely 
(which is why she originally turned to the new-girlfriend), she may reappraise the 
woman’s qualities as not being what she wants her romantic partner to have. Then 
of course her future appraisals may become negative until she begins to resent or 
just lose interest in her new partner, in which case the relationship would be 
doomed. Of course, if she was to keep her original mindset of positively appraising 
the new-girlfriend and continues to always bestow Value onto her, than they could 
live happily ever after (although this seems to be an unlikely outcome). 
Even if the woman did “rebound” with the new-girlfriend, this does not mean 
that she never loved her, which brings me to my next point in that, even if a 
relationship does not last or if a person falls out of love with someone (or 
something) that does not mean that they never loved him/her/it in the first place. 
There is no required period of temporal duration for love. It can last a minute or it 
can last a lifetime. We generally refer to these quick ephemerals of love as 
infatuation. Infatuation however is not just a short-lived love – a relationship that 
ends briefly after it begins. Infatuation is an appraisal without the bestowal.   
As with appraisal, in the case of infatuation, the subject perceives the value 
of an object and deems that object important for the qualities that make it valuable 
to the subject. The subject then fixates on, obsesses over, desires, holds beliefs 
about, has emotions and feelings for the object but does not love it. The object is 
fungible (it is replaceable). Because infatuation is only an appraisal without the 
bestowal of Value, it is different from love. Relationships of infatuation often end 
after a short period of time (although do not have to), cannot overcome obstacles 
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that loving relationships can overcome and often come and go frequently because 
the subject does not perceive the object to be irreplaceably significant, and 
therefore is easily replaced by other objects. The object fails to represent the 
experience of the subject in a significant way, like a love-object and is therefore 
prone to being replaced as soon as the subject’s desires change. Because, 
however, infatuation is a way of relating to an object through appraising, it has 
similar features and aspects to love, but is not love. Infatuation is not distinguished 
from love because of its often short duration; but because it is a form of appraisal, 
so when the desires that leads a person to positively valuing the object ends, so 
too will the relationship. 
This is similar to how Aristotle describes friendships of pleasure and 
utility.112 Friendships of pleasure exist among people who form a union for the 
sake of receiving a pleasure from the friend. These types of relationships are fairly 
common. One group particularly subjected to these types of relationships is young 
people and children. As children, we typically pick friends and associate ourselves 
with others that provide a pleasurable experience or fun time. This seems to be 
why different personality traits do not show themselves as predominantly as they 
do when we get into middle school, high school, and adulthood. During grade 
school, children seem to have similar interests in that they enjoy playing games. 
Games for children provide a pleasurable experience in which children can 
befriend other children as long as the games they are playing continue to be 
entertaining and fun. When the games begin to lose their appeal, the children will 
often separate and put an end to the relationship with one another. Usually this 
occurs around middle or high school. Children begin to take pleasure in other 
activities from when they were younger and therefore begin to make new friends 
or keep friends whose interests coincide with their own. There are plenty of cases 
of children who grow up and stay friends through their lives; however, in situations 
like this, either the individuals continue to gain pleasure from one another, or their 
friendship is based on more than just pleasure. Friendships of pleasure, however, 
only last inasmuch as the individuals take pleasure in each other. When the 
pleasure stops, so does the relationship. 
                                                          
112.  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1827. 
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Friendships of utility are similar to friendships of pleasure. This type of 
friendship also exists in so far as the individuals receive some sort of benefit from 
the relationship. Aristotle claims that friends of utility usually exist among older 
people.113 For example, if an old man has lost his long-range sight, he may be 
unable to drive a car. It would therefore be advantageous for him to make friends 
with someone who could see well and has her license. Perhaps we can add that 
the woman that could see and had her license also had a disability that prevented 
her from walking that the man who could not see did not have. In this situation, the 
friendship between these two people would exist out of the utilities that they could 
provide each other. The friend that could drive could often take the man to run 
errands while the man who could not see as well could provide some service for 
the friend that could not walk. Again, as with the friendship of pleasure, we can 
see that friendships between two people would only exist while they required 
assistance from the other. If perhaps the man who could not see miraculously got 
his sight back, he would no longer need the woman to take him to run errands and 
therefore the relationship may not continue. 
Infatuation works in the same way. When the usefulness of the object 
ceases to be useful or the object is no longer pleasurable, the relationship ceases. 
Depending on the desires of the subject, the infatuation relationship can end 
shortly after it begins, or perhaps endure for longer. Either way, infatuation is not 
time limited, but process based. If the relationship only exists as the appraisal of 
an object’s value – with the elements of fixation or obsession, then it is infatuation; 
but if the subject actually bestows Value on the object, then it is love. Infatuation is 
therefore not time sensitive, but rather sensitive to how a person responds to 
his/her object.  
In the case of Romeo and Juliet, some may think that they were only 
infatuated with each other because of the brief passionate time that they were 
acquainted; however the point of the story is that they are in love. If they were only 
infatuated with one another we can imagine that if they had successfully run away 
together then they may not have lived happily ever after and may have divorced 
and went their own separate ways when they realized that what they had for each 
                                                          
113. Ibid. 
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other was not love. Of course the story could be taken that way, but I am inclined 
to think that they were actually in love.  If they were not in love, the story would be 
much less moving than if Romeo and Juliet were just infatuated with one another 
and acting out of normal teenage behavior. 
Children are often told that their love for the girl/boy next door is just 
infatuation – that it is a temporary phase and is not really love. Children object 
greatly and while their feelings, beliefs, and emotions about their supposed love-
object may not last a month, week, or even a day, this does not mean their love for 
the other is not genuine. While children are usually just infatuated with each other, 
this does not mean that there are not some instances of love among school 
children, regardless of how long the relationship endures. Infatuation would thus 
be better explained as being just an obsession, i.e. an appraisal without the 
bestowal. Timeframes cannot be placed on love because love is how we respond 
to an object and responses are not bound by time. As a child I would have been 
thought to be infatuated with a girl who sat opposite me in fifth grade. We became 
boyfriend and girlfriend and a week later, we broke up. I was heartbroken for a 
couple of days until a new girl caught my eye. Maybe I loved her, and maybe I did 
not. 
Let us now look at an example of a relationship in which a couple was 
married for twenty five years and then got a divorce. During that time the couple 
had three children, relocated twice, took vacations every year and had one career 
change each. After the twentieth year the couple began to fight, stopped going on 
vacations, their children moved out, and after the twenty fifth year of marriage, 
they got a divorce. Four years later, they both found new partners and remarried. It 
would seem silly to think that the couple who had been married for twenty five 
years were just infatuated with each other. I think it is safe to assume that the 
couple would have probably been in love at some point, and then may have fallen 
out of love; however, why could it not have been the case that they were 
infatuated with one another? Perhaps they were just obsessed with each other 
sexually and it was not until they stopped finding each other sexually attractive that 
they started to fight. 
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In each of the stories (my relationship in the fifth grade and the twenty five 
year married couple), the relationships had the same structure, we were together, 
we split up, and we found another partner. While there are a few differences, such 
as the length of time of the relationship and the experiences that were had during 
the period we were together, neither of these are distinguishing factors of love. 
Can love only exist after being in a relationship for eight months, or five years, or 
does it have to last a lifetime? Surely that cannot be the case. If there exists some 
timeframe on love, then how could we acknowledge being in love before the 
allotted timeframe? Would that mean that as a child I did not love my mother? Can 
people not love their pets before a certain amount of time? Do couples who are in 
arranged marriages have to wait a certain length of time to fall in love? What if it 
happens shortly after they meet and get married? The idea that love has a set time 
is rather silly. Did Romeo and Juliet not love each other because they only spent a 
few times together and died shortly after meeting one another?  
All of this brings sharply into focus the question: “Can there be love at first 
sight?” If time does not affect love, and love is appraising an object, of which an 
experience is created and then bestowed on that object, giving it Value that it did 
not previously have, then why can we not perceive an object and then immediately 
bestow Value on it? By perceiving it we will have an experience of it, and if we 
have an experience we are in a position to bestow Value. Take the example of 
Romeo and Juliet again. Of course this is a fictional story but that does not mean 
that the experience they were said to have had upon seeing each other is not a 
possible experience of love. It may also be the case that love at first sight happens 
between mothers and their children. What is wrong with the common belief that a 
woman upon finding out that she is pregnant begins to love the child that is 
growing inside her? While a mother may be disposed to love her child and 
therefore have ideas that when she has a child she will love it, this does not make 
loving the child shortly after realizing she’s pregnant any less of an instance of 
love at first sight. The mother does not have to wait until the third trimester of her 
pregnancy or until the child is born to love it. Upon realizing that there is a baby in 
her womb the mother can begin to love it straight away. A woman does not have 
to be pregnant for a certain number of days or weeks before she can love the child 
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inside her, nor does a person have to be in a relationship for X amount of time to 
love his/her partner, a piece of art, humanity, etc.  
As well as not being bound by time, love cannot be bound by specific 
events or experiences that occur or are had during the relationship. We could not 
therefore suggest that a subject loves and object because the subject has a child 
with or is married to the object. The experiences of having children, taking 
vacations, and sticking by each other during professional changes does not 
account for love because there are many couples that have not experienced any 
of those things but still love each other. The idea of marriage creating love is 
equally trivial. I again expect that there are many couples in the world that are not 
married that happen to love each other. Perhaps enduring good times as well as 
bad times is the necessary factor for love; but then again, Romeo and Juliet did 
not endure very many good or bad times together. Or if they did (the dying of 
Tybalt and Mercutio), perhaps I could make the same argument for my girlfriend in 
fifth grade. What if she became really sad that she received a failing grade on a 
homework assignment and I was by her side to cheer her up through that dark 
time? And of course we had good times, the two or three times we played footsies 
under the table and laughed as if we had no cares in the world.  
The idea that love requires a specific set of events or experiences for the 
subject to endure or requires that the relationship endure a certain period of time 
cannot adequately determine whether love exists nor can they hamper a theory’s 
ability to explain what love is. If either of these ideas were true, than an argument 
would have to be made as to why that event or experience, apart from others, is a 
requirement of love; or why this time period and not a shorter or longer one is 
required for love. In addition, the idea of denying that a person experiences love is 
as irrational as the suggestion that a person does not have a headache when they 
say that they do. Love is based on the perspective of the subject and is not 
something that can be diagnosed more accurately by other parties. Perhaps this is 
where our frustration occurs when we are young and some adults underappreciate 
the sincerity of our feelings, emotions, and beliefs about love objects.  
Just as no particular specifiable events or experiences are sufficient for 
love, they are also not necessary. I do not expect to have to bring my future wife 
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flowers each month in order for my love for her to persist. I do not need to send my 
mother and father birthday cards every year in order to love them. These are 
expressions that may show love in some instances but are not what love is. In the 
same way that I do not need to perform any particular actions in order to have love 
for something, actions cannot take away my love for something. Actions such as 
taking care of something or trying to help someone do not prove love or the 
absence of it. Take for instance a man who continually beats his wife and children. 
Under the circumstance, some may say that he does not love his wife or children 
because physically harming them is unacceptable behavior. Love is thought to be 
a phenomenon that as Frankfurt suggests, is the robust concern for the individual, 
and physically harming a wife, child, pet, husband or anyone, manifests great lack 
of concern for him/her/it.  
Doing so however does not mean that the violated party is not loved by the 
assailant/perpetrator. The man who beats his wife and children may love them 
very much, although the way he conducts himself in relationships is counter to 
how most people believe a healthy relationship should be lived. Perhaps the man 
is trying to teach his wife and children lessons and to do so he believes that 
extreme negative reinforcement is necessary to get them to learn. Perhaps he is 
addicted to drugs and when he comes home he continually mistakes his wife and 
children for threatening creatures. It does not matter what the excuse is (of course 
I do not mean to defend these behaviors at all), the problem that the husband and 
father has is with dealing with relationships, not with not having love. Perhaps he 
does not love them; however it is possible that he does and physically or mentally 
harming his wife and children do not change that. Again, maybe the husband grew 
up in an abusive household himself so his only experience of dealing with conflict 
is through violence. Regardless, the issue in cases like these is with the 
individual’s ability to deal with situations rather than the non-existence of love. So 
just because a person is physically violent with someone, this does not entail that 
he/she does not love that person. I maintain that it is safe to assume that 
somewhere in the world there is a person who is aggressively violent towards a 
person or animal that he or she really does love, and with that we must conclude 
that these types of physical actions do not undermine love. No particular actions or 
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set of actions are incompatible with love. What does constitute love is the process 
in which a person responds to and creates Value in an object. 
 
3.4 Understanding Previous Theories through the Appraisal and Bestowal of 
Value 
Many of the theories that we looked at in the previous chapter focused on 
an aspect of love in order to reveal the essential nature of love, such as the way 
we concern ourselves with our love-objects’ wellbeing, or the feeling of creating a 
life united with the object. These aspects of love, e.g. being a robust concern, or a 
union, only apply to certain experiences of love and do not capture love across its 
many forms. Because we experience different aspects of love, such as how it feels 
or how we behave when in a loving relationship, a theory of love should be able to 
account for the different features that match all of our experiences, rather than just 
certain selected experiences whilst leaving out others. Throughout this thesis we 
have seen different experiences of love such as experiencing love for ideas such 
as Truth, or love for god(s). We have looked at theories of love as a union of two 
people, as well as theories solely based on the appraisal of value and solely based 
on the bestowal of value. An overarching theory of love however should account 
for each of the different ways we experience love and for the variety of things that 
we love. 
This section will focus on the theories that were presented in the second 
chapter, explaining their inclusion into an A/B theory. Each theory from chapter 
two, as well as theories that have not been mentioned, can be rectified by the A/B 
theory in order to explain all of love’s forms. By being able to account for all the 
other main contending theories, an A/B theory does not exclude experiences that 
are taken to be everyday examples of love, such as how we relate to god(s) the 
behaviors we express in different relationships, the feelings and emotions that 
accompany love, etc. Again, the experiences of love that we have provides us with 
features of the phenomenon that are our only means of understanding what love 
is; so for an experience to be excluded from explanatory view means that the 
theory in question does not accurately portray the whole phenomenon. I will begin 
with the Appraisal and Bestowal views of love since they are the main focus of an 
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Appraisal/Bestowal joint view. I will then systematically go through the other 
theories that we looked at in the second chapter to show their relevance to an A/B 
view of love. 
The two value theories, the Appraisal and Bestowal theory, clearly play a 
role in the A/B view. They make up the two parts of the theory and without either 
part, the theory does not work. As outlined in the second chapter of this thesis, the 
appraisal view by itself runs into the problem of fungibility while the bestowal view 
becomes difficult to explain since according to it, love is not reason based. When 
put together however, these two theories make up a comprehensive view of love 
that not only solves the problems that other theories fall victim to, but explains love 
in a way that accounts for how it is experienced in our everyday lives.  
The Robust Concern Theory does not play as big a role in an A/B theory of 
love but is a feature of most love relationships. In most relationships where love is 
present, there is the experience of robust concern (this of course excludes violent 
behavior as expressed in the previous section of people beating their family and 
partners). In fact with loving relationships, a robust concern is often the type of 
behavior that is predominantly expressed which may be the reason why some 
philosophers, like Frankfurt, believe that love just is the robust concern for another. 
Under the Appraisal/Bestowal view the object is given an importance by the lover 
that is based on the qualities and characteristics of the object, along with the 
response that is created within the lover (the experience). Since the object 
becomes something that is believed to be especially valuable, the lover typically 
cherishes and shows robust concern for the object. Robust concern is therefore 
just an effect of love rather than love itself. 
As for the Union Theory of Love, although I have previously mentioned its 
problems, there still is some truth to the view that love is the union between two 
‘people’.114 I had earlier stated that the union between two people is neither a 
metaphorical nor an actual fusing of selves. There is however a union process that 
occurs with love that consists of the combination of objective and subjective 
qualities that becomes the experience that the lover bestows on the object. Love 
                                                          
114. As well as people this includes animals and the relationships between 
people and things. 
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requires a subject and an object in order to fulfill the conditions of appraisal and 
bestowal. The subject appraises an object based on its objective qualities, creating 
a subjective appraisal of beliefs, emotions and feelings that makes up the 
experience (subjective quality) that is bestowed onto the object as a 
representational quality of Value. Without this combination of the objects qualities 
(even the perceived qualities of an imaginary object or one that is mistakenly 
appraised) and the experiences of the subject, the phenomenon of love will not 
occur. This process requires the combination of both a subject and an object, so it 
could be said that love is in fact a union – a combination of subject and object. 
Again, the coming together of subject and object does not require some union of 
physicality nor is it merely a metaphor. The union that occurs is in fact a coming 
together of subject and object in order for the subject to ultimately bestow the 
representational value. 
The Union Theory of love therefore is an accurate account of what occurs in 
order for the phenomenon of love to be created; however, the theory has been 
slightly misconstrued as to what is that is united when speaking of love. By treating 
the union as the combination of qualities taken from the object and experiences 
(beliefs, emotions, and feelings) from the subject, we can account for love 
occurring between people and animals, people and art and other inanimate 
objects, ideas, and anything else. No matter what the object is, even if our love 
object is ourselves (self-love), we perceive the object as having certain qualities 
and from that we appraise those qualities and are able to have experiences that 
can later be bestowed onto the object.  
Another theory that we looked at was love as the quest for Truth. The A/B 
theory would suggest that this view is an example of the phenomenon of love 
rather than a general theory of what love consists in. Under the A/B theory we 
might instead suggest that for Plato the idea of Truth (and attaining it) is a love 
object instead of love itself. Plato treats Truth as his object of love, appraising his 
idea of Truth, Knowledge, Beauty and Goodness, and bestowing his beliefs and 
his philosophy on this idea, making it uniquely Valuable. He gives Truth a value 
beyond that which it already has for others. By appraising the idea of Truth and 
then bestowing on it Value that partly comes from Plato himself (his experience of 
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the appraisal), Truth, or Plato’s idea of Truth becomes a love object for Plato (and 
others that think the same way).    
Plato’s theory does not explain love, but it does teach us that not just 
people or living things can be and have been the focus of our love. Love can be 
directed at ideas, inanimate objects, gods, people, or anything else. Furthermore, 
there can be cases of odd sounding love relationships like Plato’s love for Truth or 
a schizophrenic person’s love for someone or something that does not actually 
exist. However, in these instances, the lover believes that the object exists, and 
that belief is amenable to appraisal and then it (the object of the belief) can be 
subject to the bestowal of Value – just as one does with a mother, father, friend, 
partner, or pet. 
There is one more theory that we looked at in the second chapter of this 
work and it is by far the most difficult to make sense of – the theory that love is 
God. The theory that love is God is different from the other theories that we have 
looked at because its truth depends on the powers of a transcendent being that 
many believe exists. Nonetheless, this is a theory of love that is put forth by the 
followers of Judeo-Christian religion and should be accounted for just as much as 
any other theory. So if God exists, then a theory of love should account for the 
experience that is described in the teachings of Him. As with the other theories, I 
aim to show that the theory of God as love can be incorporated into the A/B 
theory. God may be the source of all love in the universe, or it may be the case 
that God does not even exist. Either way, the A/B theory of love neither negates 
nor affirms the existence of God’s love and therefore makes an even stronger 
case that love is in fact the appraisal and bestowal of Value. 
To begin to understand how an A/B theory accounts for God as love, we 
must look back at the two types of love that were discussed in the God section of 
the first chapter according to Soble, namely, agapic love (subject-dependent) and 
erosic love (object-dependent). Agapic love is the love that is referred to as the 
love of God for humans and erosic love is the love of humans for God. These two 
types of love are historically differentiated, but I claim that the types of their 
differentiation are misleading when looking at the nature of love. Love, according 
to the A/B theory cannot be separated into two different ways of loving. There is no 
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difference between the love of God for humans and the love of humans for God as 
if God loves in a subject-dependent way and humans love in an object-dependent 
way, nor is there a difference between the love of humans for humans. Love may 
be expressed differently between God and humans because everyone is different 
in the way they feel, believe, act, emote, etc., including God. Love is both agapic 
and erosic – it is neither just one nor just the other. It is both, just as our modern 
theory of love is neither appraisal by itself nor is it bestowal. Love consists of 
agapic love and erosic love because appraisal and bestowal are combined. The 
phenomenon of love should not be different for the love of God or God’s love than 
it is for humans just as if we created robots that were capable of loving (appraising 
and bestowing Value on an object), our love would be the same as theirs. The 
phenomenon does not change, only the individual (or deity or animal, etc.) that 
experiences it.  
To elaborate, Erosic Love is the love of humans for God. This is like the 
Appraisal View of Love. We love God because God is valuable. In fact God is the 
most valuable, because he is perfect. Anders Nygren states that, “God [is] love’s 
only suitable object.”115 Because God is perfect He possesses the qualities which 
we deem most valuable just like a man or woman would look for the best qualities 
that he/she could find in a partner. In this way, erosic love is reason based 
(consisting in the perception of an object’s beneficial qualities) just as the appraisal 
theory of love is. This however falls into problems like the fungibility problem. 
Perhaps we might think that since we are human and not God-like, our love is 
somewhat not as pure or infallible as God’s, in that we have to accept that 
fungibility is a weakness that we suffer with regard to love. I do not believe this is 
the case however. Erosic or appraisal love cannot rest on the notion that God’s 
love is perfect and humans are susceptible to fungibility because we know that our 
love is not fungible. I do not love people who have better qualities than my 
girlfriend and we, typically, do not love one of our children more than another 
based on their merit. The appraisal view does not work and we should not have to 
                                                          
115. Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1986), 157.  
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accept the notion that fungibility is a part of love. Erosic love does not adequately 
explain humans’ love for God or each other.       
Agapic love however is thought of as being God’s love for humans because 
God bestows value on humans. Bestowal and agapic love are synonymous. God 
creates humans and therefore the love for them comes from God without reason, 
just like the Bestowal Theory. With the Bestowal Theory, value is bestowed on an 
object without reason. God does not need to look out over His creation and think 
about our friendliness or kindness and think, “They are so good. I really love 
them.” God does not need to see the valuable qualities in humans to have love; 
just as the bestowal view resists reduction to reasons that create the bestowal. 
Love comes from the subject, in this case God, without reason, and while this 
seems inadequate for our understanding of love in humans, God plays by different 
rules. We can conceive that God has this ability to create without reason because 
He is God. We, as humans, do not share that capability. This seems to account for 
the love of God for humans better than erosic/appraisal love accounts for the love 
of humans for God, but is it right? 
The answer is no. While again these ideas are quite speculative, I can 
assume that God does not love humans in a different way than humans love God 
because God is confined to the same phenomenon of love that we are. While God 
is the source of all things, he still requires virtues in humans in order to love. While 
God already has knowledge of the universe and is both the beginning and end of 
time,116 humans do provide God with an experience. Humans submit to God and in 
doing so give God glory. The glory of God could then be thought of as a quality 
that we possess117 that provides God with an experience. If He desires glory and 
we are the ones that give it to Him, then our ability to provide God with that glory 
gives Him reasons for us to be the objects of His love.  
Just like Plato who may have had a love for Truth (an idea), God can love 
humans, as an idea so long that there exists a quality in God’s idea of humans that 
allows for God to appraise them and then bestow a special importance onto them. 
We may think of God as not needing to appraise anything because he is the 
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Oxford University Press, 1972), 973.  
117. Being capable of giving God glory. 
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source of everything; however the reason for all of creation is inevitably for God’s 
glory. Just like an idea that originates in a person’s head, humans originate within 
God. People appraise ideas for an importance and that importance combined with 
the experience that it sparks is projected on the object, even if the object is only an 
idea, making it the object of love. The same would have to apply for God. He 
creates an idea (that of the existence of humans) and from that idea, appraises 
some quality of them. They can provide glory, and that, mixed with the experience 
of receiving glory is projected onto humans by God as love.  
So while love may first originate in God, because all things do (under the 
Judeo-Christian religion), we can assume a situation in which even the love that 
God is and creates, is based on appraising and bestowing Value. And if God must 
appraise humans to love, than our ideas about erosic and agapic love are nothing 
but concepts that refer to different parts of love rather than being two different 
types of love. Again, even with this exploration of love and the idea of God being 
speculative at best, we can still make a consistent story with the A/B theory of love 
that works, even if God is love. And if God does not exist, then the A/B theory still 
applies. Moreover, even with the premise that “God is love,” the Appraisal Theory 
and Bestowal Theory do not need to be at odds with each other and can both work 
together to accommodate love in a manner that is consistent with the Judeo-
Christian religion.  
 
3.5 Criticisms of an A/B Theory 
Despite the potential for the A/B theory to more comprehensively explain 
the phenomenon of love, there have been arguments that have been put forth 
against a joint value theory. Alan Soble suggests that a joint theory just reduces to 
an appraisal theory of love, leaving out the necessity for the bestowal of Value.  
He also criticizes a joint theory on the basis that the bestowal of Value is an act 
that only God can perform. Soble alleges that since humans cannot love how God 
loves, the idea that the phenomenon of love requires the bestowal of Value is 
mistaken.118 As we saw in the previous section, God’s love may in fact be both 
appraisal and bestowal together. We can therefore conjecture that even God’s 
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ability to love is not much different from that of humans; however, the objection 
that God loves in a different way than humans will be briefly mentioned, as well as 
other objections that have plagued other theories. I will also look at further 
objections to a joint A/B theory and show why they are ineffective arguments 
against this joint value theory of love.    
Soble attacks the idea of appraisal and bestowal joint theories with two 
arguments. One of the arguments that we discussed at the end of the previous 
section refers to God’s love for humans. Soble suggests that God is the only being 
that is capable of bestowing Value to create love because of his omnipotence in 
creating humans and the qualities that they possess.119 God creates humans and 
by their nature of being one of His creations, are Valuable. God therefore does not 
need to appraise the qualities of humans to love them. Humans do not create the 
world or others like God so they cannot bestow Value the way God does. Humans 
need to appraise objects to love them according to Soble. The problem with his 
critique however is that even God may not be able to bestow Value on an object 
without first appraising it. As we saw in the previous section, God may need to 
appraise the qualities of humans in order to bestow Value on them. Since humans 
are the purveyors of the glorification of God, they possess a subjectively valuable 
quality for Him that He can then use to bestow Value onto humans. Love that is 
created by anyone or anything would need to be able to both appraise and bestow 
Value in order to love. While again we are speculating on God’s powers, the idea 
that a joint A/B theory applies to God’s love for humans is not contradictory to the 
way in which God and love in the Judeo-Christian teachings are explained.  
Soble’s second criticism of joint appraisal/bestowal theories is that they 
inevitably lead to, or essentially are, just appraisal theories of love.120 He argues 
that even if we do bestow some kind of representative, experiential quality onto an 
object, we will still need to recognize that the quality exists in the object; thus 
appraising the object for its value – even if the value is subjective and created as a 
projected quality.121 So for example, I may appraise a friend for his sense of humor 
and honesty which creates beliefs, emotions and feelings (an experience) that I 
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then bestow on him as a phenomenological quality that represents that experience 
so that my perception of him in addition to his sense of humor and other qualities, 
includes the representation of my experience of and with him. My further 
interaction with him consists of me re-appraising him for his new representative 
quality that I have bestowed on him – unlike his sense of humor and 
trustworthiness which are qualities that I do not create. Even though I have 
bestowed Value onto him, I am still required to re-appraise him in order for the 
phenomenon of love to occur (to have the features of love such as deeming his 
significance to be that of irreplaceableness). 
This objection to joint theories only strengthens my position and it does so 
in two ways. First, even if we are forced to re-appraise in order to experience the 
phenomenon of love, recognizing the significance that we have created in an 
object, we still have to appraise and bestow value. Regardless of whether or not a 
re-appraisal is the final step to experiencing love, that does not undermine the A/B 
theory. The phenomenon of love can be created by the bestowal of Value or the 
re-appraisal of that Value once it has been bestowed just as long as the beloved 
becomes irreplaceably significant to the lover through the process of appraising 
and bestowing Value. Secondly, The A/B process of love is cyclical in that 
appraisals and bestowals continually happen over and over. We appraise an 
object, bestow our experience on that object, re-appraise the object which gives us 
more/different experiences to bestow, which leads to another appraisal and more 
Bestowals. This is how we experience love over time – and thus accounts for the 
continuation of love despite the changes that relationships undergo. 
The phenomenon of love is not sustained by just one appraisal and 
bestowal of Value. We appraise and bestow value on an object over and over 
again. As time goes on, the love that a person has for an object adapts and 
changes. Sometimes it gets stronger and sometimes it gets weaker and also 
changes in other ways too. The experience that the subject has of the object 
continues to change, incorporating more events and experiences into the original 
experiences that were bestowed on the beloved. The expansion of the 
experiences can often lead to the ending of a relationship rather than 
strengthening it. Perhaps friends or family love each other at one time but upon 
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discovering new qualities or characteristics about the person that are negative, a 
negative appraisal is made and the bestowal is withdrawn. If for example a 
mother’s son murders children and commits other heinous crimes, the mother may 
appraise her son negatively and withdraw her bestowal or possibly create a new 
negative bestowal of disgust. The experience the mother has of her son is overrun 
with negativity and the valuable qualities she perceives him to have are 
overshadowed by negative qualities and a burdensome experience of him. Many 
situations in which this type of situation occurs may not lead to a bestowal 
withdraw or a new negative bestowal; however, that does not show that appraisals 
and bestowals of Value do not change. In the news we often hear about parents 
who still love their delinquent children despite their crimes, however new 
appraisals and bestowals occur all the time. When partners separate (if they had 
been in love) they do so because they become unable to or choose not to continue 
positively appraising and bestowing Value in the other. 
Furthermore, a joint A/B theory of love depicts a continual process of 
appraising and then bestowing value. The A/B theory does not end with bestowal, 
nor does it end with appraisal. Love occurs when the response of the subject 
creates something new in the object that makes the object irreplaceably 
significant. It is a process that requires valuing an object for its qualities, 
experiencing that value subjectively, and bestowing irreplaceable significance onto 
the object. Should we say that love occurs once the bestowal is made or once the 
bestowal is recognized by the subject? Surely a case can be made either way. We 
can imagine a person being in love with a friend, partner, pet, etc. and not realize 
it, in which case perceiving the bestowed quality of Value is done unconsciously 
by the lover just as we can argue that love requires a realization on the part of the 
subject as a form of verifying that Value was bestowed. Either way, the process 
that creates the phenomenon of love includes both appraising an objects value 
and bestowing Value on it. 
 Another objection to appraisal/bestowal theories of love is that they do not 
differentiate between attitudes such as liking, respect, admiration, etc.122 While 
these similar phenomena seemed to plague both the bestowal and appraisal 
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theories of love on their own, they can be explained under a joint theory. By having 
a theory that requires both appraising and bestowing value, similar phenomena 
like admiration and respect only occur on the level of appraisal. As with liking, 
these phenomena are the subject’s recognizing value in an object without 
bestowing Value on it. Because there is no bestowal of Value, the object is not 
irreplaceably significant therefore does not reach the stage of love. This relates 
back to the earlier discussion on infatuation. Moreover, a joint A/B theory 
separates love from other similar phenomena by the object standing out in virtue 
of having Value, which other objects do not have for the subject. For instance if we 
look at the phenomenon of hate (or a phenomenon similar to hate) we will see that 
hate may be similar to love because of the similar process of appraising and 
bestowing but the bestowal of Value that the love object receives is different from 
the bestowal that the hated object receives. 
The process of appraising and bestowing also occurs by recognizing and 
creating negative value for an object. The idea of hating someone is similar to love 
because the subject must appraise the qualities of the object – the object is mean, 
dishonest, vindictive, etc. (having an experience of the object), and then bestow 
the negative experience (beliefs about the object, emotions and feelings) on the 
object. If for instance a man murder’s another man’s daughter, the man whose 
daughter died may negatively appraise the murderer as the man who killed his 
daughter and then bestow the negative experience of that appraisal on the 
murderer, creating a type of negative value on him. That value will not be the 
same Value that is given to an object of love. The object of love is significant and 
valuable in an irreplaceable way because of the process that made the object 
significant. The phenomenon of hate would however fall on the opposite side of 
the significant spectrum in terms of the hate object, which then makes the object 
stand out from other disliked objects because of the A/B process and its negative 
significance.   
The last critique that I will defend the joint A/B theory from is the problem of 
pinpointing how the bestowal of value originates out of the appraisal of value. Why 
do Bestowals occur? Do appraisals of certain qualities or an X number of appraisal 
cause Bestowals? For instance Abramson and Leite suggest (in what I would 
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consider to be partially a joint A/B view of love), that love occurs only if the 
appraisal is of “morally significant character traits.”123 This of course leads to the 
problem that we saw in the second chapter such as what counts as morally 
significant and seems to not adequately address the problem of explaining the 
origin of bestowal. Regardless, these questions about the transition between 
appraisal and bestowal are unproblematic. We do not need to pinpoint the exact 
moment that appraisal creates the experience and a bestowal is made. To say that 
appraisals of value elicits a bestowal is to say that there comes a time when one 
final or specific appraisal causes a person to respond from just liking, admiring, 
respecting, etc. a person to loving him or her. Just because we cannot pinpoint the 
exact criteria for a bestowal does not mean that we cannot account for the origin of 
the bestowal. Everyone appraises different qualities and a different number of 
them. The point in which appraisals become something that is bestowed is 
completely subjective – it differs from person to person. 
An example of a similar idea occurred when my roommate invited me to a 
concert. I told him I would think about it and get back to him. The next day I told 
him I was going to pass on the show. While I do not recall at which part of the day 
I changed from being indecisive to deciding I did not want to go, I know how I 
came to the decision of not wanting to go. I weighed the pros and cons of going to 
the concert and decided that I did not like the band enough to pay the money 
required to get in. Again, I came to the decision that I did not want to go to the 
show but I do not recall the exact thought that pushed me to decide not to go. I 
could have afforded the concert if I would have liked to see the band and I would 
have went regardless of how much I liked the band if the ticket price was equal or 
less than my level of interest, but with the ticket price being what it was and me not 
being too excited to see the band, I chose not to go. Similarly with the case of a 
bestowal of Value, I may not be conscious of the exact moment I begin to bestow 
Value and it could be the case that there is no exact moment; however, the 
process includes making appraisals and bestowing the Value that the appraisal 
creates. So while there may be a “gray area” before the bestowal occurs, we can 
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explain how the phenomenon of love is created and therefore what the 
phenomenon of love is.            
 
Summary 
The combined process of appraising and bestowing Value in an object 
creates the phenomenon of love. By thinking of love in these terms, not only can 
we account for the features of love that get us to experience love in our own 
individual ways for innumerable kinds of objects, but we can acknowledge other 
theories of love in relation to the A/B theory. We can experience love in the form of 
emotions by expressing our thoughts and beliefs, we can experience love as a 
feeling, by knowing that we are perceived by others as being irreplaceably 
significant to them. We even often recognize love in people by their behavior and 
expression of Value that their beloved has.  
So while love consists in creating Value in an object through a particular 
process of appraising subjective value and bestowing a phenomenological quality 
that represents the experience the subject has of the object, making the object 
irreplaceably significant, we can think and talk of love as being different things. We 
can think and talk about it as an emotion (the expression of bestowing Value), a 
feeling (the sensation and meaningfulness of the process), a description (type of 
relationship in which this process occurs); we can think of love as being beautiful, 
destructive, a necessity in life, and we can even love the idea of love. It makes 
sense that love is portrayed in a variety of ways in movies, books, and theater, 
because the phenomenon of love lends itself to effect people based on their 
psyche and specific way of thinking about the world. The next chapter will 
therefore focus on the psychological correlation between a person’s thoughts and 
behaviors and the process of appraising and bestowing Value in objects.   
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Chapter 4 
Cognitive Behavior of Love 
Introduction 
The process of appraising and bestowing Value on an object is conducted 
in accordance with how people psychologically respond to objects. One way that 
we respond to objects is by appraising them; then, depending on that appraisal, 
we can bestow an attitudinal quality on the object, whether that is irreplaceability, 
significance, fear, hatred, etc. This A/B process is utilized in different psychological 
therapies in order to help patients to change their unhealthy ways of responding to 
objects. Therapies such as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) and Rational 
Emotive Behavioral Therapy (REBT) rely on the A/B process and will be the 
subject of this chapter.   
 My objective in this chapter is to support my A/B theory of love with 
psychological evidence through the analysis of thoughts and behavior and their 
correlation to relationships and love. By closely examining effective therapeutic 
processes that can lead to a patient finding love (such as CBT and REBT), we can 
gain insight into the components that make up love which matches up to the A/B 
process of love. To examine these therapeutic processes, I will look at their aim 
and how they work. Once we understand the mechanics and efficacy of the 
therapies, I will provide examples, through self-help books, in which the therapies 
are directed at helping patients love an object. The therapies utilized in these 
types of books rely on the same principles that are used by therapists in 
counseling sessions.         
There will be two payoffs to this examination. First, by being able to identify 
how the A/B process is incorporated into therapies such as CBT and REBT, I will 
be able to further support the theory through practical evidence. The second 
benefit will be to gain an understanding of the active role that the subject can play 
in the process of appraising and bestowing Value on an object and how knowing 
about the nature of love can allow us to be active participants, capable of 
exercising choice when it comes the objects that we love. We can withdraw our 
love from those that we are in an unhealthy relationship with, prevent ourselves 
from withdrawing love from our partners, or give love to those that we want to be in 
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a loving relationship with. To begin our examination of the role of the A/B process 
in certain psychotherapies, we will look at how the therapies, CBT and REBT, 
work. 
 
4.1 A/B and the Examination of Psychotherapies 
As we shall see below, the psychotherapeutic approach of CBT shows that 
prior beliefs play a shaping role in what we perceive – thus affecting the way we 
appraise and react to a given stimulus. By altering these beliefs, a person is able 
to change the way he/she responds to objects, and CBT aims at getting people to 
change their beliefs through various techniques. By actively taking part in 
changing the certain perception forming beliefs we have about an object or 
situation, which I will explain how later, we can alter our perceptions, emotions, 
feelings, and reactive attitudes toward objects, essentially altering our ability to 
love. Since love for me occurs just the same as my fear of being mauled by a lion, 
in that both are reactive attitudes toward an object, altering my love for an object 
(choosing to love it or to withdraw my love from it) should involve similar processes 
to overcoming fears, depression, and other mental disorders. If love is a reactive 
attitude, then I come to love an object because I have perceived it in some way 
that is different from how I perceive objects that I do not love. And in order to 
perceive it in a way that is different from the objects that I do not love, I must hold 
certain beliefs about it. Furthermore, if my beliefs were to be altered, I may no 
longer perceive the object as being valuable or special, or no longer have certain 
emotions or feelings about it and may lose my love for it. This process of beliefs 
altering attitudes is exemplified by CBT and REBT. 
Before getting into the details and efficacy of CBT and REBT, it is important 
to first mention and establish, what being able to actively control our beliefs consist 
in. I am not speaking of a type of direct doxastic voluntarism whereby a person is 
able to alter their beliefs as easily as flipping a switch.124 I therefore do not suggest 
that tomorrow when I wake up, I can look out the window and decide to believe 
that the clouds in the sky are made out of millions of cotton-balls that are glued 
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together and happen to be floating in the sky. Similarly, it will not be within my 
power to go to my neighbor, who I happen to despise, and decide I actually love 
him and that we are best friends. I do not advocate anything so extreme and 
untenable as this.  
What I will be presupposing however is a type of indirect voluntarism in that 
a person is able to alter their beliefs indirectly through the presence or absence of 
inferences that one makes in order to arrive at that belief.125 So while I may not 
have direct control over the belief that I do not love my neighbor, there are steps 
that can be taken and inferences that can be made in order for me come to love 
my neighbor. For instance, if I became more acquainted with my neighbor than I 
am now, spending more time with him and understanding him as a person, 
perhaps I may see him as really great guy. Or maybe getting to know my neighbor 
will just make me dislike him even more than I already do because of all his 
negative qualities that I discover. I may learn that he lies about things, has no 
sense of empathy, has poor communication skills, and lacks conversational skills. 
But then I may realize that the qualities that I hate in him are also qualities that I 
myself possess; and upon reflecting on how I believe I am a good person 
regardless of those qualities, I am also able to overlook or discount those qualities 
in him and then come to be able to respond to him with neighborly love. Of course 
this could work in the reverse order, and upon reflection and comparison, I might 
come to dislike myself as much as my neighbor. However the same outcome 
applies – my beliefs are changed from what they were before making inferences 
and gathering information about my neighbor. I am therefore able to alter my 
beliefs indirectly through means of inference, introspection, information gathering, 
etc. 
Altering beliefs is not something that occurs immediately upon desire to 
change them however. Using the psychotherapies that I am about to exposit are 
time and effort consuming endeavors that often require professional psychologists. 
But there are other ways of receiving the type of therapy that garners the same 
results – for example, bibliotherapy (which will be discussed in the next section). 
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Regardless however of the time frame in which, and the way that psychotherapy is 
administered, CBT and REBT both exemplify not only how beliefs can be 
changed, but as I will show later, how the appraisal and bestowal of Value feature 
in the process of altering which objects we love.        
CBT and REBT are some of the most widely practiced and effective forms 
of Psychotherapy.126 They are used to treat patients with depression, phobias, Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and many other cognitive disorders. What CBT 
and REBT aim at doing is to eliminate these types of problems in patients by 
changing the way they think and behave. The National Health Service of Great 
Britain explains how CBT works thus: 
CBT works by helping you make sense of overwhelming problems by 
breaking them down into smaller parts. Your thoughts, feelings, physical 
sensations and actions are interconnected, often trapping you in a negative 
spiral. CBT helps you stop these negative cycles. It aims to break down 
factors that are making you feel bad, anxious or scared so that they are 
more manageable. It can show you how to change these negative patterns 
to improve the way you feel.127 
The way of managing these factors is by a therapist introducing ideas to the patient 
in a way known as “semantic therapy.” 128 Albert Ellis and Robert A. Harper give a 
brief description of how we help make sense of our problems – with reference to 
REBT, a type of CBT. In their book A Guide to Rational Living, Ellis and Harper 
state: 
[H]umans tell themselves various sane and crazy things. Their beliefs, 
attitudes, opinions, and philosophies often take the form of internalized 
sentences or self-talk. Consequently, they can change their self-defeating 
emotions and behaviors, by their clearly seeing, disputing, and acting 
against their internal philosophies.…[REBT] has been backed by literally 
hundreds of research studies, almost all of which show that when people 
change their beliefs or philosophies about something, their emotions and 
their behaviors also significantly change.129 
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They go on to explain Instances of this “self-talk”: 
When clients insist, “I can’t stop worrying,” or “I find it impossible to diet,” we 
try to help them to change their beliefs to “I can stop worrying, but so far I 
haven’t,” and “I’m finding it exceptionally difficult to diet – but hardly 
impossible!” When people say “I always do badly at social affairs,” we try to 
help them to change this to “I often do badly at social affairs.” When clients 
insist, “It would be awful if I lost my job!” or “How terrible to get rejected!” we 
try to get them to think, instead, “It would be highly inconvenient if I lost my 
job,” or “It is distinctly disadvantageous when I am rejected.”130 
In order to therefore change negative thoughts and behaviors, people can 
introduce ideas in the form of ‘rational sentences’ which will help get them to 
change what they believe and think about a given stimulus. 
To help treat disorders in patients, therapists examine the experience a 
patient has to a given stimulus – whether the stimulus is an object that he/she 
is afraid of or something that he/she becomes anxious about, etc. – and helps 
the patient to change the way he/she thinks about it. The experience that a 
person has when reacting to one of these stimuli consists of thoughts, feelings, 
emotions, sensations, and desires, which all function interconnectedly to make 
the patient’s experience negative. When changing what he/she thinks about the 
given stimulus, the emotions, feelings, desires, etc. also change. So by helping 
a patient change the way he/she thinks about an object that he/she is afraid of, 
the therapist can help cure people from phobias and other cognitive disorders. 
As an example, suppose a woman goes to see a therapist for her fear of 
micro-organisms (germs). Her germaphobia would be broken down into the 
thoughts and beliefs that make up her fear, such as the thought of getting sick, 
the feeling of being “dirty” and having bacteria on her skin, and the belief that 
she can get viruses or diseases which could be fatal. These beliefs and feelings 
that make up her fear of germs would be addressed by the therapist in order to 
get her to put them into a context that helps her alter how she responds to 
germs (or the thought of them). For instance, the therapist may try to alter her 
thoughts and beliefs by explaining that not all germs are bad. Germs include 
micro-organisms such as bacteria, which depending on its type can be helpful 
rather than harmful to the human body. So rather than be afraid of germs or all 
types of micro-organisms, she may actually only be afraid of pathogens, the 
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types of micro-organisms that cause diseases, or harmful viruses. The therapist 
may then explain to the patient that it is rare for a person to catch a life-
threatening disease or virus and by catching some diseases and viruses, a 
person can become healthier – by developing a stronger immune system or by 
receiving an anti-virus. By continuing to focus on how harmless the everyday 
germs are that she may encounter, the woman may begin to form different 
beliefs about germs. She may start to believe that not all germs are bad and the 
germs that she comes into contact with can often be helpful in allowing her 
immune system to develop. Those beliefs can then alter the way she feels 
about being in situations where she comes into contact with germs – by her no 
longer attributing negativity to the feeling of being surrounded by germs and 
therefore stopping her from feeling bad, anxious, uncomfortable, etc. – and 
helping her to experience germs in a new, positive way.     
While this is a very simplistic account of the CBT process and CBT often 
requires much more in depth and lengthy explorations into the thoughts and 
beliefs of a patient, I am trying to illustrate how CBT works at a very basic level. 
By contextualizing, altering, dismissing, and accepting beliefs about a stimulus, 
a person can alter the experience he/she has of that stimulus. So instead of 
being afraid of germs, the patient may develop a psychological tolerance to 
germs and begin to live a more pleasant life. 
This CBT process implicitly features the concept of appraisal and 
bestowal. A subject appraises an object objectively, then has a subjective 
experience of that object, and then bestows on it the experience of being fearful 
– thus giving a quality to the feared object that represents the negative 
experience of perceiving it. The A/B theory of love works according to the same 
process, only the experience of the object is positive and the subject bestows 
Value instead of fear. For CBT to therefore be effective, the patient must alter 
the way she appraises the object that she is afraid of so that the experience 
that she has of it will not be negative. Once she begins to have a more positive 
experience of the object, she will no longer bestow fear onto it, thus treating her 
fear of germs. 
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The scope of the CBT method far exceeds that of just curing patients 
from unwanted or harmful behaviors. The implications of changing behavior 
through altering beliefs or personal philosophies implies that by targeting and 
altering the right beliefs, we can adapt our behavior to however is personally 
desirable. If we therefore want to fall in love, then we can alter some set of 
beliefs that get us to perceive an object as being subjectively valuable and 
putting us in the position to bestow Value on it. We do not need an exact 
philosophical account of the ontology of love to address the fact that we can 
play an active role in choosing who we love (romantically, familially, brotherly, 
etc.). As long as love is a reactive attitude, then we can play a role in creating it. 
By altering our beliefs about something (and ourselves and our philosophies), 
we can alter our perception of it, transforming it from something that is not 
perceived as an object of love to being something that is perceived as an object 
of love. 
 
4.2 CBT and Love 
If CBT works according to my A/B model, then to support an A/B theory 
of love, CBT should also be able to effectively alter the way people respond to 
love-objects – by either helping a patient to withdraw the bestowed Value given 
to an object or getting a person to positively experience an object in order to 
provide him/her with the opportunity to bestow Value on it. By being able to 
help a patient love (or withdraw love), the effectiveness of CBT will imply that 
love follows this A/B process. This will help support my thesis of love being a 
response to an object by appraising it and bestowing Value on it, by showing 
that an A/B process features in the development of love. This section will 
therefore focus on how CBT has been directed at love, utilizing the A/B 
process. 
To examine the therapeutic process of CBT’s focus on love, I will look at 
self-help books – which are directed at romantic love, and are a self-treatment 
substitute for counseling sessions with a therapist. I do not mean to imply here 
that all self-help books or even most self-help books are effective cognitive 
therapeutic tools; however, bibliotherapy and the use of books in aiding an 
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individual’s mental health recovery have been proven and endorsed in clinical 
reviews to be effective.131 Again, going to the local bookstore and buying a self-
help book may not be the best or most effective way in treating mental 
problems, but certain self-help books, written by professionals in the field and 
administered to a patient under the right circumstances may provide the patient 
with a way of altering his/her behavior. 
For instance, if my marriage is failing and I buy a self-help book about 
how a person can save his/her marriage and the book does not really address 
the problems my partner and I are going through or the information in the book 
is not delivered by the author in a way that captures my interest, then I will most 
likely not benefit from that particular self-help book. On the other hand however, 
if the author addresses the exact problems that my significant other and I face 
and I am engaged with the material and learn techniques and strategies for 
fixing the problems that plague my marriage, then it is possible that I can use 
those solutions to fix my marriage.  
Bibliotherapy can be an effective addition to psychological counseling 
and in some cases a replacement in general. It is important to note that the 
types of books that can be used in bibliotherapy are not always books that are 
written by professional psychologists for the purpose of helping people 
overcome problems. Books that can help a person overcome mental disorders 
can be literary fiction, journal articles, pamphlets, and of course, self-help 
books. The reason that many different forms of literature can be used as a 
therapeutic tool is because of the indirect way we can alter or change our 
beliefs. As mentioned in the previous section, indirect doxastic voluntarism 
suggests that beliefs can be altered through introspection, making inferences, 
and information gathering, which can be brought on by reading different types 
of literature. If we are to therefore assume that beliefs can be altered and 
changed in this way, then regardless of the type of self-help book or how un-
scientific a piece of literature is, literature can help alter and change our 
behaviors and perceptions of the world. 
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Like therapists, bibliotherapy utilizes the A/B process in order to help a 
patient change his/her response to a given stimulus. Some self-help books for 
instance can assist readers to change the way they think about an object by 
introducing positive “self-talk,” which was mentioned in the previous section, 
and/or evidence that negates the reader’s irrational beliefs. The reader can 
then incorporate the ideas from the book into the way he/she thinks about an 
object in order to alter his/her beliefs about it; thus, altering his/her behavior 
towards it – giving him/her a more pleasant experience of the object and 
therefore the opportunity to bestow Value on it. 
The first example we will look at is the New York Times Bestseller, The 
Five Love Languages, by Gary Chapman. In it he talks about how there are five 
different ways that couples communicate in romantic relationships. The five 
ways are: words of affirmation, quality time, receiving gifts, acts of service, and 
physical touch. Through these five means of communicating, the partners are 
able to give and receive affection in a way that they are most familiar with. 
While for one person, the physical touch of his/her partner is a romantic 
gesture, the other partner might think that giving gifts is a romantic gesture. 
Each partner may communicate their romantic feelings for each other through 
these different ways and if neither partner acknowledges the other’s romantic 
gesture, they will not feel romantically loved and may withdraw themselves from 
the relationship.  
For instance if a man believes giving gifts is a sign of romantic love and 
continually gives his wife gifts to show her he loves her, but his wife believes 
that spending quality time together is a sign of romantic love and gifts are given 
to friends and relatives, her receiving gifts from her husband may not register 
with her as being a way of him communicating his romantic affections toward 
her. Her idea of communicating their affection for each other is to spend quality 
time together – something that he may not think is a show of romantic love. By 
not feeling as though they are receiving an expression of love from each other, 
each might begin to believe that they are not loved by the other and then begin 
to withdraw themselves from the relationship, becoming distant to the point at 
which they stop loving each other. Their romantic relationship could end 
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because their ways of communicating with each other were not being 
recognized by the other. 
Chapman explains his experience with counseling couples thus: 
I have listened to many married couples share their secret pain. Some 
came to me because the inner ache had become unbearable. Others 
came because they realized that their behavior patterns or the 
misbehavior of their spouse was destroying the marriage. Some came 
simply to inform me that they no longer wanted to be married. Their 
dreams of “living happily ever after” had been dashed against the hard 
walls of reality. Again and again I have heard the words “Our love is 
gone, our relationship is dead. We used to feel close, but not now. We 
no longer enjoy being with each other. We don’t meet each other’s 
needs.”132 
According to Chapman, his clients no longer met each other’s needs because 
they could not communicate their affection for each other. His book thus 
explains the different ways of communicating affection to a romantic partner; 
and, in order for that message of affection to be received, both partners must 
know how each communicates. If a woman is therefore aware that her partner 
is communicating his affection and can herself communicate her affection to 
him, then their experience of each other will be more pleasant, thus providing 
them with the opportunity to bestow Value on one another or avoid withdrawing 
it. 
By providing the reader with a new way of thinking about communicating 
with his/her partner, Chapman’s book can help to alter the behavior of partners 
in a romantic relationship – creating a more pleasant relationship for both 
partners. The new beliefs about how they can communicate better with each 
other will allow each partner to positively appraise one another, creating an 
experience of emotions, feelings, and desires about each other that can then 
be bestowed as an irreplaceable significance onto each other. CBT, as 
implemented through this book, shows that my A/B theory is correct because 
CBT itself is predicated implicitly on the A/B theory. By utilizing CBT, 
Chapman’s book requires the reader to respond to his/her partner according to 
my A/B model. 
                                                          
132. Gary Chapman, The Five Love Languages: How to Express Heartfelt 
Commitment to Your Mate (Chicago: Northfield Publishing, 2004), 23.   
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We must avoid confusion over the order of things though. In this case 
Chapman mentions receiving love before the relationship gets better because 
he is speaking of relationships in which love is already present. Under the 
circumstances of a first date or before love occurs or even in the instance of a 
couple that was in love, and then fell out of love, adhering to the love languages 
are meant to create better communication and therefore affection and a 
stronger relationship, rather than actual love. By having a stronger relationship, 
each partner can respond to the other with positive appraisals of value and 
have a better possibility of perceiving the other in the “loving way.” In a positive 
relationship, the lover continually re-appraises the beloved, adding to the 
experience of being with that person in a healthy affectionate relationship which 
nurtures the experience that is represented by the beloved. The breakdown of 
communication therefore would lead to an “empty love tank” and partners that 
re-appraise each other by adding negative experiences or withdrawing positive 
experiences. 
 The psychologist, Nathaniel Braden explains this in his book, “The 
Psychology of Romantic Love:” 
In a joyful relationship between a man and a woman, the experience of 
love, desire, and pleasure does not flow along a simple, unidirectional 
pathway but rather through a reciprocal cycle of continuing mutual 
reinforcement. Loving an individual, we perceive him or her as a source 
of real or potential happiness; desire is born; desire generates actions 
that result in pleasure or joy, through involvement with the loved person; 
pleasure operates through a kind of feedback loop to intensify desire and 
love; and so on. In this manner, love develops and strengthens.133 
Here, perceiving the object as a real or potential source of happiness is the act 
of bestowing. By bestowing Value, the lover projects the experiences of 
happiness and other pleasures on the beloved because the beloved is the one 
who is appraised for the positive experiences to occur. These experiences, 
which are the responses from the lover, are then bestowed onto the beloved. 
As for the feedback loop that Branden mentions, under the A/B theory, love is 
exactly that, a feedback loop. The lover appraises the beloved and responds by 
                                                          
133 Nathaniel Branden, The Psychology of Romantic Love: Romantic Love 
in an Anti-Romantic Age (New York: Penguin, 2008), 83 
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having experiences consisting of beliefs, emotions and feelings and then 
projects those experiences onto the beloved, creating love. Once the beloved is 
loved by the lover, the beloved then has further qualities that are appraised 
again. The lover sees the beloved as a source of love (because she represents 
the experience the lover has of her) and then reacts to those experiences by 
having more beliefs, emotions and feelings that can be rebestowed onto the 
beloved. 
Of course, this would be the hoped for way in which the process would 
work. Often however the bad experiences or learning new information about 
our partner causes us to appraise them negatively and sometimes the negative 
appraisals create negative beliefs, emotions and feelings and overcome the 
lover, to where he/she no longer bestows  Value or importance on the beloved 
and the couple falls out of love. This is why Chapman’s thesis about the love 
languages and communication are so important to love. Without the ability to 
communicate properly, the relationship will weaken, causing negative 
experiences that work in the opposite way in which Branden talks about with 
the feedback loop. Rather than constantly reinforcing the Value of the beloved 
the lover actually unravels the Value that was placed on the beloved by adding 
negative experiences or withdrawing positive experiences from the Value – 
making the beloved less significant. 
For instance, if I loved my mother and all through my childhood I saw her 
as a kind-hearted, caring individual who worked hard to take care of me and my 
brother, then I may perceive her as being a person with those qualities. My 
experience of her would be that she is a good mother and would Value her 
because of it. Now perhaps when I got older I noticed things about my mother 
that I did not notice when I was younger. I saw that she often kicked small 
animals, yelled incessantly and beat my brother when she thought I was not 
around, lied, stole, passed-off the good deeds my father did as things that she 
did, was lazy and many other negative things. Seeing all of those qualities may 
get me to reappraise her as not being the kind-hearted, caring individual, who 
worked hard to take care of me and my brother that I thought she was. It may 
be the case that despite her being my mother and my growing up happy and 
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unaware of her bad qualities, I begin to perceive her as a bad person who no 
longer has the Value that she once did. 
I could have withdrawn the Value that I bestowed on her; but whether 
the Value is strengthened as is often the case in healthy relationships, or 
withdrawn in negative relationships, the acquisition of new experiences with an 
object leads to the lover continually reappraising the beloved, creating newer 
experiences and perceptions of him/her/it. Either way, love exists as this 
looping process that is constantly taking place although, because of a 
collapsing relationship, the love diminishes, which is the message that is 
expressed in books like “The Five Love Languages.” They try to correct the 
problems in the relationship in order to give the couple the best chance at 
obtaining love. When the relationship falls apart, appraisals begin to become 
negative and a possible outcome will be that the negative experiences 
overcome the positive experiences and the bestowal of Value will diminish or 
be withdrawn.  
Another example of a self-help book that aims at creating love or 
preventing the withdrawal of it is Men Are from Mars Woman Are from 
Venus.134 This book expresses a similar message to the previous book 
mentioned. By understanding the differences between the sexes, romantic 
partners can communicate in a healthier way, creating a more pleasant 
relationship and provide the partners with the opportunity to bestow Value on 
each other. By understanding how the sexes differ in their ability to interact in a 
romantic relationship, each partner can know how his/her partner reacts to 
certain situations or what he/she thinks generates conflict in the relationship, 
thus being able to avoid conflict and know the best course of action for 
communicating with each other. 
John Gray, Author of the books, says: 
To improve relations between the sexes it is necessary to create an 
understanding of our differences that raises self-esteem and personal 
dignity while inspiring mutual trust, personal responsibility, increased 
cooperation and greater love.135 
                                                          
134.  John Gray, Men are from Mars Women are from Venus: The Definitive 
Guide to Relationships (London: HarperElement, 2002). 
135. Ibid., 4. 
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He goes on to suggest: 
Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus reveals new strategies for 
reducing tensions in relationships and creating more love by first 
recognizing in great detail how men and women are different. It then 
offers practical suggestions about how to reduce frustration and 
disappointment and to create increasing happiness and intimacy. 
Relationships do not have to be such a struggle. Only when we do not 
understand one another is there tension, resentment, or conflict.136  
Just like Chapman, Gray argues that love comes from the relationship as an 
effect of the positive experiences of understanding, cooperation, trust, etc. 
Positive appraisals lead to a bestowal of Value and positive appraisal occur 
mostly in healthy relationships. So if a person builds good relationships, he/she 
is likely to create love relationships – relationships where the lover bestows 
his/her experience of the beloved on the beloved as a positive Value. 
The aim of these books is to help partners in relationships (and even 
those that are not in a relationship), through the use of CBT, to understand the 
behavior of their partner (or potential partner) in order to build a healthy 
relationship and not ruin the relationship because of poor communication. If the 
relationship can be made better, stronger, or healthier, than the prospect of 
love is higher. By understanding each other’s behaviors, the couple may be 
able to avoid falling into the situation in which they resent each other, thus 
avoiding negative appraisals and bestowals that will hurt the relationship and 
lead to a withdraw of love. Again, these self-help books aim at understanding 
the partner so as to make the relationship better. If the relationship is good, 
then positive experiences are more likely to occur, allowing each partner to 
positively appraise the other and bestow the experience onto him/her, making 
him/her Valuable. Appraising and bestowing Value thus enter into the 
phenomenon of love by being the process by which an object becomes loved 
by a subject. 
 
Summary 
The process of appraising and bestowing Value on an object is 
conducted in accordance with how we psychologically relate to objects. The 
                                                          
136. Ibid., 5.   
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CBT method is used in instances of love because the nature of love requires a 
process of thinking and behaving that is the focus of CBT – the efficacy of 
which supports love being a phenomenon of relating to an object. If the lover 
were God or the quest for Truth, it may be difficult to apply the methods of CBT 
to it; while other theories like the union theory of love or the robust concern 
view of love were unable to adequately account for the depth of love and the 
features mentioned in the first chapter. In addition the appraisal view and the 
bestowal view of love independently were flawed, however together they 
account for love’s features and are inherent in CBT.  
The way psychotherapies address relations and love, shows us that we 
can in fact play an active role in the process of love. We may not be able to 
directly choose who or what we love, but we can take steps to indirectly give 
ourselves the opportunity to love or to introduce ourselves to ideas that can 
provide us with the courage to leave destructive relationships or fix/create 
broken relationships. Again though, playing an active role in love (utilizing CBT) 
is not an activity that works for everyone. Just because someone seeks out 
therapy or reads self-help books about making their relationships better or 
finding love, this does not mean that he/she will accomplish those things. 
Actively altering the way we think and behave is a difficult task that is often very 
time-consuming. Regardless of the type of people that psychotherapies help to 
love an object, or fix relationships that lead to love, the methods of altering how 
we respond to objects can lead to love for some because the phenomenon of 
love is constructed out of the appraisal and bestowal of Value.   
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Conclusion 
Even though explaining the nature of love in terms of appraising and 
bestowing Value may allow us to understand what love is, this does not mean that 
pursuing the phenomenon is a simple task. Some forms of love come easy and 
naturally like familial love, or the love of inanimate objects, and some forms of love 
take time and effort, such as romantic love, friendship love, and often self-love. 
Love affects our state of mind, often causing us to feel happy, sad, comforted, 
scared, concerned, as well as many other feelings and emotions. Just because we 
can explain the phenomenon of love through A/B, this does not mean that we can 
decide what objects are going to affect us and what objects will not. The most we 
can do, armed with our understanding of love, is to open ourselves to the 
possibilities of being able to experience objects in a meaningful way, giving us the 
potential to create irreplaceable significance in objects. 
I have taken an essentialist idea of love that consists in the appraisal and 
bestowal of irreplaceable significance in order to show how the different 
experiences we have of love relate to a single phenomenon. Within this 
phenomenon however, there are multiple forms (romantic love, brotherly love, etc.) 
that each have specific properties and features of their own that make them that 
specific form of love. While I have not addressed the nature of these specific 
forms, their nature includes the framework of the A/B theory of love. Each form of 
love shares the appraisal and bestowal of Value but there are some other features 
that distinguish each form from the others. Love takes on different forms for the 
different objects that are loved, affects people differently, often causing extreme 
behavior, and does so because of the significance of the object that separates it 
from anything else not loved. 
Nevertheless, a theory of the nature of love is far from finished despite our 
understanding of how objects become loved. These questions remain: What 
exactly is the nature of each form of love? Are the forms of love simply the 
relationship role between the lover and beloved? Are there certain distinctive 
features that constitute romantic love, romantic, and familial love, familial, etc.? 
Each form requires its own detailed exposition, and the advancements of cognitive 
and neurosciences may help us in our understanding of our behavior and the ways 
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in which we relate to things. Regardless, the foundation of a theory of love has 
been laid in this thesis. We can now build on an A/B theory in order to further 
explore and identify the forms, experiences, and effects of love.  
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